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Foreword
This report and the companion volume (“Profiles of Criminal Justice Sys-
tems in Europe and North America”, HEUNI publication no. 33, Helsinki
1998) is the result of an innovative analysis of national responses to the Fifth
United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice
Systems (1990-1994). Responses to the Fifth United Nations Survey were
received from nearly all European countries, and from the United States and
Canada. The working group has supplemented this with a large amount of
other data, in particular the data emerging from the mammoth International
Crime Victim Survey.
As noted in the introduction, this report adds a new dimension to interna-
tional comparisons. Never before have so much different data been available
from so many European and North American countries. Never before has it
been possible to attempt to go beyond relatively simple statements of how
much crime has been recorded in each country or how many persons have
entered prison, to seek not only to actually compare countries in this respect,
but even to see whether various demographic, economic and social factors
could help to explain some of the differences and patterns detected.
Our findings must be regarded as tentative. Nonetheless, since many of
the findings are confirmed by a variety of indicators, we believe that they
will contribute  to  national and international discussions on how crime
prevention and criminal policy should be developed. At the same time, we
look forward to a methodological discussion in which the soundness of our
approach is reviewed. Any such discussion, and replication of our approach
with other data, can only promote international comparative research in this
critical area.
The analysis has been carried out by an international expert working group
consisting of Dr Carolyn Block (United States), Prof. Jan J.M. van Dijk (The
Netherlands), Dr Matti Joutsen (HEUNI), Ms Kristiina Kangaspunta (HE-
UNI), Prof. André Kuhn (Switzerland) and Professor Ineke Haen Marshall
(The Netherlands/the United States). Mr Adam Bouloukos (the Centre for
International Crime Prevention, United Nations) and Dr Ugljesa Zvekic (the
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute) have
actively assisted the group in their work. Ms Natalia Ollus (Finland) has
overseen the compilation of the data and the editing. Mr John van Kesteren
(the Netherlands) and Ms Lieke Bootsma (the Netherlands) have assisted
with the statistical analysis. HEUNI wishes to express its profound appre-
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ciation to the members of the working group for their time, expertise and
dedication to the cause of international comparisons. All HEUNI staff
members can also add, with particular appreciation, that it was a pleasure to
work together with them on this project.
Many of the national criminal justice profiles published in the companion
volume have  been prepared  or  supplemented  by individual  experts. In
addition, all of these profiles have been reviewed by national experts and
authorities, to whom we owe a sincere debt of gratitude for their kind
assistance.
Helsinki, 2 October 1998
Matti Joutsen
Director, HEUNI
To the reader
The data used in this report and in the companion volume containing national
criminal justice profiles are taken primarily from the responses submitted by
the countries in question. In many cases, supplemental data have been used,
and the sources are cited.
In the process of the validation of the data, a number of presumable errors
were noted. These often appeared to be errors in understanding the questions
or in transcription. In such cases, the respondents have been asked to
comment on the matter. Replies were received from most, but not all, of such
respondents.
Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of the report noted many of the difficulties in
analysing official or research data  on crime  and criminal justice from
different countries. The importance of bearing these cautions in mind when
reading the present report cannot be stressed too highly.
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Summary
The Fifth United Nations Survey
This report is based on an analysis of national responses to the Fifth United
Nations Survey. The report covers the years 1990 through 1994. The Fifth
United Nations Survey data have been supplemented by other information,
including in particular the results of the International Crime (Victim) Survey.
The report differs considerably from its predecessors. The data has been
subjected to quantitative analysis in order to test whether a set of indicators
can be developed that may help us to better understand differences between
countries in the level and structure of crime, and in the operation of the
criminal justice system (a brief summary of the procedure is presented in
sections 1.5.-1.6.; more detailed descriptions are provided in the annexes).
Different sources of data have been used in order to develop “indices” of,
respectively, burglaries, motor vehicle crimes, petty crimes, serious violence,
violence against women, and corruption (chapter 2). These indices have been
studied in the light of indicators that seek to measure the opportunity and
motivation to commit crimes (chapter3).
Indices have also been developed to assess the resources available to the
criminal justice system; the gender balance in criminal justice professions;
and citizen evaluation of the performance of the police (chapter 4).
Often, the  tentative conclusions that  have been reached may appear
self-evident (as is the case with the finding that many countries with a high
consumption of alcohol have a high rate of violence). Some other tentative
conclusions presented here, however, have scarcely even entered the debate
on criminal policy in many of the countries covered.
In reading the following summary, the reader is strongly cautioned to recall
the possible pitfalls of international comparisons of statistics (section 1.3.).
In this connection, we note only that the use of official statistics and the
existing survey data tends to focus our attention on “traditional crime”.
Because of the absence of data, this report cannot shed much light on the
extent of, for example, economic crime, environmental crime, organized
crime and drug trafficking.
A separate volume contains the analysis on a country-by-country level.
The amount of crime and the determinants of crime
We conclude that crime indicators which are based on a combination of
survey findings on the public’s experiences of crime and on police crime
statistics are related to criminologically relevant economic and social indi-
cators. These relationships can usefully be interpreted with the help of an
xi
interactionist model which sees crime rates as the result of a dynamic
interplay between motivational and opportunity factors at the macro level.
In two cases in particular - violence against women and corruption - we
have been faced with special methodological difficulties. The analysis of the
macro-correlates of violence against women is complicated by measurement
errors. Both official data (which are based on offences recorded by the police)
as well as victimisation rates (which are based on survey research among the
public) show cultural biases related to the social status of women. We
conclude that research is needed on the cross-cultural measurement of
violence against women. It is only when better comparative data become
available that the correlates at the macro level of this type of criminality can
adequately be determined (sections 3.1.4. and 3.2.3.).
The prevalence of corruption appears to be strongly related to the state of
the economy. Economies in transition and, more generally, weaker econo-
mies tend to experience higher levels of manifest corruption of public
officials. The various source variables used showed strong correlations. This
results suggests that the measurement of corruption might be less compli-
cated than often assumed (sections 2.7. and 3.2.3.)
Selected country-specific findings
The United States, Canada and the Czech Republic rank among the highest
in burglary, motor vehicle theft and petty crimes. Other countries with
relatively high levels of these types of crime are Bulgaria, Slovakia and
Estonia.
Countries with relatively  low levels of property crimes are Belarus,
Switzerland, Norway and “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.
Serious violent crimes tend to be relatively more prevalent in the countries
of the former Soviet Union (such as the Russian Federation, Estonia, Kyr-
gyzstan, Kazakhstan).
The United States stands out with a high score on serious violence, which
contrasts with much lower levels in Canada and the Western European
countries.
Countries with low levels of violence tend to be found in Western Europe.
Hungary and “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” also have
relatively low levels.
The levels of violence against women tend to be highest in the countries
of the former Soviet Union. The study showed, interestingly enough, that the
United States, Canada and several Northern European countries also had high
scores on the index for violence against women. However, these scores might
well be an artefact of higher awareness of this type of crime in the more
gender-balanced societies. (See the discussion in section 3.1.4.).
High levels of corruption tend to be concentrated in Central and Eastern
Europe and Southern Europe.
xii
Crime and the determinants of crime in Central
and Eastern Europe
In the light of the indicators developed for the study, the motivation to offend
would appear to be greater in the countries with economies in transition (the
countries in Central and Eastern Europe) than in Western Europe. (As noted,
the data used for this study deal primarily with “traditional” offences.) In
Central and Eastern Europe, the indicators suggest that there is clearly more
demand among male adolescents for opportunities to acquire income through
criminal activities. In these countries socio-economic deprivation and alco-
hol abuse appear to help in forming a breeding ground for different forms of
crimes of violence. Assaults, homicides and robberies appear to be more
prevalent in countries where many young males experience strain. Further-
more, in most Central and Eastern European countries violence against
women is relatively high. In addition to strain and alcohol abuse, this specific
crime problem is probably related to the low social status of women. For
example, the percentage of women with higher education is much lower in
most countries in transition than in the European Union member states
(chapter 3).
Corruption also appears to be much more common in many Central and
Eastern European countries than in North America and Northern Europe.
In the short  term, the  economic crisis in the  Russian Federation in
particular might exacerbate existing economic and social problems in the
region. In the longer term the economic prospects might be better but this
will not necessarily reduce the demand for crime. Increased affluence in these
countries will probably not reduce the prevalence of strain because in the
context of a free market economy the lower social strata will profit less from
it than will the higher strata. The rates of unemployment will probably remain
high for many years to come.
In most of the countries in transition people in urban areas typically live
in flats, and car ownership is still relatively rare. These factors may have so
far inhibited further increases of property crimes. Over the past ten years, in
most Central and Eastern European countries the level of affluence has
increased. This has been the case in particular in Hungary, Poland, Slovenia
and the Baltic states. If the GNP of these countries (which are among the
first candidates for entry into the European Union), continues to increase,
vehicle-related crimes and some forms of petty crimes are likely to increase
as well. Probably household burglary rates will also increase if households
start to possess more expensive commodities, and investments in anti-bur-
glary devices remain low.
Eventually, however, investments in self-protection against car theft and
burglary will increase and the rates of property crimes will stabilise. If at that
time strain among adolescents remains prevalent, there might well be a shift
towards more violent forms of property crimes (street robberies, car-jacking
and household robberies). Some of the less serious property crimes prevented
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by improved protection may be displaced in the form of more serious forms.
The crime profile of the countries in transition may start to resemble that of
South Africa which suffers from exceptionally high rates of robberies.
The level of corruption in government circles appears to be lower in the
countries where economic restructuring is relatively advanced, e.g. in Esto-
nia and Hungary. In fact the level of corruption in these countries is lower
than in some Western countries. These are encouraging findings. If the
restructuring in other countries in the region continues, the long-term pros-
pects for decreasing levels of corruption seem fairly good.
To sum up, the over-all criminological outlook for the countries in transi-
tion in our view is relatively bleak. Even if the current economic problems
are overcome, the rates of crimes of violence will probably remain high, due
to high levels of unemployment among young males and the high consump-
tion of strong alcohol. Also, the traditional attitudes towards females are
unlikely to change in the short term, and violence against women is likely to
remain a serious problem.
In the years to come, the increased affluence of the emerging middle
classes, although currently suffering a set-back in the Russian Federation,
will increase opportunities for crime. More people will be able to afford to
live in detached housing and to own cars. With a time lag of a few years, the
levels of self-protection will go up and the rate of opportunistic crimes might
stop increasing. Some of the crimes prevented, however, are likely to be
displaced to become robberies.
Crime and determinants of crime in Western Europe
The crime situation in the more industrialised and affluent nations of Western
Europe must primarily be understood in terms of special opportunity struc-
tures. Countries which rely on motor cars for their transportation experience
high rates of vehicle-related crimes. Countries where people traditionally
live in detached housing experience high rates of burglaries. In recent years
protection against car theft, theft from cars and household burglaries has
increased. Probably in relation to this – and perhaps also to intensified
policing and more severe punishment of offenders – the over-all level of
property crimes has been declining in both North America and Western
Europe since 1995 (chapter 3).
Paradoxically, crimes of violence – in particular violent juvenile crime –
show an upward trend in several member states of the European Union. The
increase in street robberies in some countries might be the result of displace-
ment of crimes prevented by improved protection. Another explanation is the
emergence of an ethnic underclass in the larger cities of Western Europe.
Although this cannot yet be determined with certainty, the level of strain
among some ethnic parts of the urban population might well be on the
increase. In the area of crime prevention, the main challenge for Western
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European countries seems to be the social and economic integration of young
immigrants in the urban areas.
At the same time, the outgoing lifestyle of young people and the combined
use of alcohol and drugs might also be a causal factor behind juvenile violent
crime. One of the main assets of Western Europe in this context is the
relatively low levels of handgun ownership. There are strong indications that
this is an important factor inhibiting homicides. The high rates of violence
against women in some Western countries, as shown by both police statistics
and ICVS data, might be the result of heightened sensitivity to and awareness
of the maltreatment of women by their spouses or other partners in a domestic
setting. If other countries become more gender-balanced, they may also show
higher rates of violence against women for the same reason. This explanation
for the high rates in some of the most affluent and gender-balanced countries
should be no reason to belittle the seriousness of these incidents. The recent
phenomenon of increased visibility of these crimes in the most gender-bal-
anced nations underlines the existence of very substantial dark numbers
elsewhere.
Relatively low levels of manifest corruption by public officials appear to
be typical of affluent nations with stable democratic traditions. This relation-
ship can also be understood in terms of criminal opportunities. In open
democracies with relatively unregulated markets there are fewer opportuni-
ties for public officials to require bribes for their services.
Crime and the determinants of crime in North America
Since 1988 the level of crime in the United States and Canada has declined,
according to both the ICVS and police data. The level of self-protection
against crime is high. The level of strain appears to be relatively low.
Both the United States and Canada have relatively high levels of car-re-
lated crimes in urban settings, as well as burglaries.
The level and profile of crime in the United States differs less from that
of countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom and The Netherlands than
is commonly assumed. The level of conventional crimes in the United States
is not exceptionally high, nor is the level of corruption. The most important
difference appears to be the high level of homicides and robberies, and the
fact that in the United States these often involve the use of guns. The most
probable cause of this deviation from the “European” pattern is the excep-
tionally high rates of gun ownership.
Resources and the operation of
the criminal justice system
Despite the cautions needed when working with the available international
data, the consistency in the findings in the present study regarding the
criminal justice systems of Europe and North America does provide confi-
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dence that we are beginning to piece together some important parts of the
intricate international puzzle of criminal justice. The main findings from
chapter 4 are summarized in the following seven points.
(1) There are large international variations in the rate of police, prosecutors,
judges, and prison staff (per 100,000 population), but there is a striking
international similarity in the distribution of criminal justice personnel
among the police, prosecution, the judiciary, and corrections. Although
Central and Eastern European countries have a significantly higher rate
of population employed in criminal justice than do the EU countries,
about 82% of criminal justice personnel in both groups of countries are
employed by the police, approximately 2% in prosecution, 3% in the
judiciary, and 13% in corrections.
(2) There appears to be a correlation between crime and the levels of criminal
justice personnel: countries that have a higher level of petty theft, serious
violence and homicide tend to have rather high levels of criminal justice
personnel than do countries with lower levels of these crimes.
(3) Criminal justice in Europe and North America remains a male-dominated
profession. There is not a single country where half or more of the prison
staff and police are female, and there are very few countries where
females make up more than half of the prosecutors or judges. Central and
Eastern European countries have a somewhat higher proportion of female
judges and prison employees than do the EU countries. Yet, it is an
oversimplification to conclude that Central and Eastern European coun-
tries consistently have a more gender-balanced criminal justice work-
force: several of the countries in transition rank rather low on the gender
balance Index, whereas some EU countries, Canada and the US rank in
the top quartile of the gender balance index.
(4) The Fifth United Nations Survey and the International Crime Victimiza-
tion Survey provide partially inconsistent portrayals of international
variations in criminality. However, once national differences in the level
of victim-reporting are taken into consideration, some of these inconsis-
tencies disappear (when the focus is on “total crime”).
(5) There are large international variations in the likelihood that the police
will record crimes that come to their attention. In the Central and Eastern
European countries crime victims are less likely to report the crime to
the police and the police appear less likely to record a reported offence
than is the case in the EU countries.
(6) International data on case flow are problematic and difficult to interpret,
particularly when the focus is on “total crime”. It is clear that EU
countries have a significantly larger number of recorded offences, sus-
pects, prosecutions, convictions, and prison sentences than do the coun-
tries in transition. Beyond that statement, it is difficult to draw any firm
conclusions. Differences in case attrition (the rate at which cases and
suspects appear to “drop out” of the criminal justice system at different
stages of the process) likely reflect differences in national criminal
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justice procedures, recording practices and sentencing philosophy, rather
than differences in the quality of work performed by criminal justice
employees. Data on the later stages of processing are likely to be more
reliable than those on the early stages; the ration between prosecutions
and convictions (i.e. how many prosecutions lead to a conviction) shows
relatively limited international variation and may, therefore, be a prom-
ising candidate for future international analysis.
(7) Assessment of international variations in the performance of a large
number of criminal justice systems remains a difficult, if not impossible
task. The data are simply not adequate. Subjective measures are more
easily available than objective, “hard” measures. Crime rates — although
obviously closely interlinked with the operations of criminal justice
systems — are not useful performance indicators. Countries do appear
to show (to a certain extent) a clustering on similar ranks in respect of
the measures of police recording performance, productivity (of police
and prosecutors, measured by number of suspects and prosecutions), and
several subjective measures (the citizen evaluation of police performance
index, evaluations of the fairness of the system and of the sense of
security, and ICVS responses on corruption). Some countries are high on
all (or most) performance indicators; other countries tend to be low on
all (or most) performance indicators. This suggests that the performance
indicators that have been developed for this study may have a reasonable
degree of usefulness. Also, crime rates are apparently not completely
randomly distributed among countries differing on the performance
indicators. Any conclusions at this early stage about cause-and-effect
should be avoided.
Sanctions
Life imprisonment: With a very few exceptions (such as Norway, where life
imprisonment was abolished in 1981), life imprisonment is possible through-
out Europe and North America for certain serious offences. Nevertheless, the
available data show that life imprisonment represents only a very small part
(less than 1 per cent in all the countries) of the total number of sentences
imposed.
Deprivation of liberty: Imprisonment is the backbone of the system of
sanctions of all countries in Europe and North America. It represents about
one-third of all imposed sanctions. The Fifth United Nations Survey data
show large variations when calculated per 100,000 inhabitants. The range
goes from less than 50 sentences of deprivation of liberty per 100,000
inhabitants each year in Azerbaijan, Cyprus, and Germany, to over 200 in
Greece, the Netherlands, Scotland, and Turkey.
The overall use of imprisonment has increased between 1990 and 1994.
In several countries the number of prison sentences imposed and the number
of prison admissions has in fact decreased during this period. Nevertheless,
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it seems that an increase in the length of the prison terms actually served
compensates for such a decrease in admissions and even results in an increase
in prison populations. Some interesting exceptions (Austria, Cyprus, Finland
and Slovenia) show that prison populations can be controlled and that
prisoner rates are not fated to increase (section 5.3.).
There appear to be substantial differences in the way imprisonment is
used. Some countries seem to have made a deliberate policy decision to
decrease the use of imprisonment (as in the case of Finland), while others
seem to have made a deliberate policy decision to increase its use (as in the
case of the United States). Some countries sentence only a few offenders to
long terms of imprisonment, others sentence many offenders to short terms,
and still others sentence many offenders to long terms. The Nordic countries
appear to represent one end of the spectrum, with the Central and Eastern
European countries (with a few exceptions) as well as the United States at
the other end (section 5.6.).
A correlation was found between the prisoner rate per 100,000 inhabitants
and the national percentage of ICVS respondents who favoured imprison-
ment (section 5.7.). However, the correlation can be due to the fact that the
courts are simply reflecting the “will of the people”, or to the fact that the
public comes to accept the sentencing practice of the courts — or it is even
possible that both the prisoner population and public opinion are determined
by some third factor(s).
The length of sentences of imprisonment seems to be the main factor in
explaining the prisoner rate. The length of sentences depends primarily on
the fundamental premise of criminal policy in a given country, which in fact
determines whether it is more or less punitive. Thus, to reduce the prison
population a criminal justice system has to find means to reduce the average
length of prison terms rather than to try to reduce the number of admissions
– although a reduction in the number of admissions can contribute to a
decrease in the prison population.
“Control in freedom”: Many sanctions involve considerable supervision
and control of the offender. These include suspended or conditional impris-
onment with supervision, probation, community service, reformative and
educative labour, special forms of treatment, and local banishment. Because
of this variety, it is not possible to find a common trend in the data on this
sanction. The different countries report that between zero and about 70 per
cent (for the Czech Republic and Slovakia) of their total number of sanctions
consist of “control in freedom”. A question in the Fifth United Nations
Survey refers to the number of persons placed on probation (a procedure
whereby an individual found guilty of an offence is released by the court
without imprisonment, and placed under the supervision of an official or
officially sanctioned body), and another question asks for the number of
persons on probation on a given day. In 1994, between about 10 (in Lithuania)
and 536 (in the United States) persons per 100,000 inhabitants were placed
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on probation, and on a selected day in the year the rates oscillated between
12 (in Slovenia) and 1137 (in the United States) per 100,000 population.
Warnings and admonitions: Here again, the countries report that between
zero and more than 50 per cent (in Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Slovenia and
Switzerland) of their sanctions were warnings or admonitions, including all
suspended sanctions without a supervision requirement. (The cautions noted
in sections 1.3 and 5.1.1 on the comparability of statistics on sanctions should
be noted; it can be assumed that in many countries, warnings and admonitions
may be imposed by the police and the prosecutor, and may not be entered
into the judicial statistics.)
Fines: The financial sanction is clearly one of the most popular among
European countries, especially in Western Europe. In Austria, England &
Wales, Finland, and Germany more than 70 per cent of all sanctions are fines.
At the other end of the scale, in Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania and Slovakia less than
10 per cent of sanctions were fines. (The same cautions noted above regard-
ing the statistics on warnings and admonitions apply to fines.)
Community service: Many countries do not recognize community service
as a sanction in their criminal justice system. According to the responses to
the Fifth United Nations Survey, the countries which make the greatest use
of community service are the Russian Federation (about 15 per cent of all
sentences), Azerbaijan (13 per cent), Georgia (12 per cent), the Netherlands
(8 per cent), Scotland (7 per cent), and Northern Ireland (6 per cent).
However, in this connection it should be recalled that the concept of com-
munity service can be substantively different from one country to the other
and therefore caution is needed in making international comparisons on the
topic. For example in several countries in transition, including the Russian
Federation, Azerbaijan and Georgia, community service is actually “educa-
tive labour”. This sanction requires the offender to continue working at his
or her regular employment, but a part of the wages are deducted as a sanction.
Among the persons convicted in 1994, between 3.5 per cent (in
Kazakhstan) and 18.2 per cent (in Austria) are women. In each country, the
differences between 1990 and 1994 in the proportion of women among the
convicted offenders are slight and go both ways; there are increases in some
countries and decreases in others.
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Résumé
La Cinquième enquête des Nations Unies
Le présent rapport se base sur une analyse des réponses nationales à la
cinquième enquête des Nations Unies. Le rapport couvre les années 1990 à
1994. Les données qu’il contient ont été complétées par une autre informa-
tion, laquelle inclut notamment les résultats de l’Enquête internationale sur
l’exposition  (de la victime ) au crime.
Ce rapport diffère sensiblement de ses prédécesseurs. Les données ont été
soumises à une analyse quantitative afin de tester s’il est possible d’élaborer
un ensemble d’indicateurs susceptible de nous aider à mieux comprendre
les différences entre les pays en ce qui concerne le niveau et la structure du
crime, et le fonctionnement du système de justice pénal (un bref sommaire
de la procédure est présenté aux chapitres 1.5-1.6; des descriptions plus
détaillées sont fournies aux annexes). Différentes sources de données ont été
utilisées pour élaborer des “indices” respectivement de cambriolage, de délits
sur les véhicules à moteur, de délits mineurs, de violence aggravée, de
violences/sévices contre les femmes, et de corruption (chapitre 2). Ces
indices ont été étudiés à la lumière des indicateurs qui visent à mesurer
l’opportunité et la motivation au crime (chapitre 3).
Des indices ont également été élaborés pour évaluer les ressources à la
disposition du système de justice pénale; l’équilibre ente les sexes dans les
professions de la justice pénale; et l’évaluation par le citoyen de performance
de la police dans son travail (chapitre 4).
Souvent, les tentatives de conclusions qui ont été atteintes peuvent sembler
évidentes (c’est notamment le cas du constat que dans de nombreux pays où
la consommation d’alcool est élevée le taux de violence est élevé). Certaines
autres tentatives de conclusion présentées ici, cependant, ont à peine suscité
le débat sur la politique pénale dans de nombreux pays couvert par l’enquête.
A la lecture du sommaire qui suit, le lecteur est vivement mis en garde
contre les éventuels pièges des comparaisons statistiques internationales
(chapitre 1.3). Dans ce contexte, nous notons simplement que le recours aux
statistiques officielles et de données existantes produites par des enquêtes
tendent à attirer notre attention sur “le délit traditionnel”. Faute de données,
le présent rapport ne peut guère faire la lumière sur, par exemple, l’étendue
du délit économique, le délit environnemental, le crime organisé et le trafic
de drogues.
L’analyse pays par pays est l’objet d’un volume séparé.
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Quantité et déterminants des crimes/délits
Nous concluons que les indicateurs de crimes/délits, qui se basent sur une
combinaison d’observations faites lors des enquêtes, sur l’idée que l’opinion
se fait du crime/délit et sur les statistiques criminelles établies par la police,
sont liés à des indicateurs socio-économiques pertinents sur le plan crimi-
nologique. Ces relations peuvent utilement être interprétées à l’aide d’un
modèle interactif, lequel voit dans les taux de criminalité le résultat d’une
interactivité entre des facteurs de motivation et d’opportunités au macro-
niveau.
Dans deux cas, en particulier – la violence contre les femmes et la
corruption –, nous avons été confrontés à des difficultés méthodologiques
particulières. L’analyse des macro-corrélations de la violence contre les
femmes est compliquée par des erreurs de mesure. Les données officielles
(qui sont basées sur les délits enregistrés par la police) et la fréquence de
l’exposition au délit (qui sont basés sur les sondages d’opinion) indiquent
des différences culturelles liées au statut social des femmes. Nous concluons
qu’il est nécessaire de mener des recherches sur la mesure transculturelle de
la violence contre les femmes.  Ce n’est que lorsque l’on dispose de
meilleures données comparatives que les corrélations au macro-niveau de ce
type de criminalité peuvent être définies de manière appropriées (chapitres
3.1.4. et 3.2.3.).
La prédominance de la corruption semble vigoureusement liée à la situ-
ation économique. Les économies en transition et, plus généralement, les
économie plus faibles tendent à présenter des taux plus élevés de corruption
manifeste de fonctionnaires. Les diverses variables à la source utilisées
présentaient de fortes corrélations. Ces résultats permettent de supposer que
la mesure de la corruption est peut-être moins compliquée qu’on le pense
souvent (chapitres 2.7 et 3.2.3.).
Choix d’observations spécifiques par pays
Les Etats-Unis, le Canada et la République Tchèque sont les pays où les
cambriolages, le vol de voitures et les délits mineurs sont les plus nombreux.
Les autres pays où ces délits sont relativement fréquents sont la Bulgarie, la
Slovaquie et l’Estonie.
Les pays où les taux de délits contre la propriété sont relativement faibles
sont la Bélarus, la Suisse, la Norvège et “l’ex-République Yougoslave de
Macédoine”.
Les délits de violence aggravés tendent à être relativement plus fréquents
dans les pays de l’ex-URSS (comme la Fédération de Russie, l’Estonie, le
Kirghizistan, le Kazakhstan).
Les Etats-Unis se distinguent par la fréquence élevée de violences ag-
gravées, laquelle contraste avec des taux beaucoup plus faibles au Canada et
dans les pays d’Europe occidentale.
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Les pays où les taux de violence sont faibles sont situés en Europe
occidentale. La Hongrie et “l’ex-République Yougoslave de Macédoine
présentent aussi des taux relativement faibles.
Les taux de violences contre les femmes tendent à être les plus élevés dans
les pays de l’ex-URSS. L’étude montre, de manière suffisamment intéressante,
que les Etats-Unis, le Canada et plusieurs pays de l’Europe du nord présentent
aussi des valeurs élevées de l’indice de violence contre les femmes. Ces chiffres,
toutefois, pourraient bien être le produit artificiel d’une plus grande prise de
conscience de ce type de délits dans les sociétés où l’égalité entre les sexes est
la plus équilibrée. (Voir la discussion au chapitre 3.1.4.).
Les hauts niveaux de corruption tendent à être concentrés en Europe
centrale et orientale et dans le sud de Europe.
Facteurs déterminants du délit/crime en Europe centrale et orientale
Au vue des indicateurs élaborés pour les besoins de l’étude, la motivation à
commettre un acte délictueux semble plus élevée dans les pays d’économie
en transition (les Pays d’Europe centrale et orientale) qu’en Europe occiden-
tale. (Comme on l’a indiqué, les données utilisées dans la présente étude
traitent essentiellement des délits “traditionnels”). En Europe centrale et
orientale, les indicateurs laissent à penser qu’il existe chez les jeunes adoles-
cents de sexe masculin une exigence nettement supérieure de trouver des
occasions de tirer revenu d’activités délictueuses/criminelles. Dans ces pays,
la carence socio-économique et l’abus d’alcool semblent favoriser la forma-
tion d’un support de croissance de diverses formes de délits de violence.
Agressions, homicides et vols qualifiés semblent prévaloir davantage dans les
pays où de nombreux jeunes gens vivent dans le besoin. De plus, dans la
plupart des Pays d’Europe centrale et orientale, la violence contre les femmes
est relativement fréquente. En plus du besoin et de l’abus d’alcool, ce
problème spécifique du crime est probablement lié au statut social – jugé
inférieur – de la femme. Par exemple, la proportion de femmes possédant une
formation supérieure est beaucoup plus faible dans la plupart des pays en
transition que dans les Etats membres de l’Union européenne (chapitre 3).
La corruption semble également être beaucoup plus courante dans de
nombreux Pays d’Europe centrale et orientale qu’en Amérique du Nord et
en Europe du Nord.
A court terme, la crise économique qui secoue la Fédération de Russie, en
particulier, risque d’exacerber les problèmes économiques et sociaux qui se
posent dans la région. A plus long terme, les perspectives économiques
pourraient s’améliorer sans pour autant entraîner une diminution de l’aspi-
ration au crime. L’amélioration du niveau de vie dans ces pays ne réduira
probablement pas le caractère général de la tension, car dans le contexte
d’une libre économie de marché, les couches sociales défavorisées en profit-
eront moins que les couches sociales favorisées. Les taux de chômage
resteront probablement élevés pendant de nombreuses années.
xxiii
Dans la  plupart  des  pays en transition, les  citadins vivent, en règle
générale, dans des appartements et posséder sa voiture reste relativement
rare. Ces facteurs peuvent avoir inhibé, jusqu’à présent, de nouvelles recru-
descences des délits contre la propriété. Durant les dix dernières années, dans
la plupart des Pays d’Europe centrale et orientale, le niveau de vie s’est élevé.
C’est le cas notamment en Hongrie, en Pologne, en Slovénie et dans les Etats
Baltes. Si le P.i.b. de ces pays (qui comptent parmi les premiers candidats à
l’adhésion à l’Union européenne) continue d’augmenter, les délits liés aux
véhicules et certaines formes de délits mineurs, risquent d’augmenter eux
aussi. La fréquence des cambriolages augmentera aussi si les ménages
commencent à posséder des mobiliers de plus en plus coûteux et si les
investissements dans les installations contre le cambriolage restent faibles.
Le cas échéant, toutefois, des investissements dans l’auto-protection con-
tre le vol de voitures et le cambriolage augmenteront et la fréquence des
délits contre la propriété se stabilisera. Si, à ce moment-là, le besoin dont
souffrent les adolescents continue de prévaloir, on pourrait bien assister à un
recentrage vers des formes plus violentes de délits contre la propriété (vols
qualifiés dans la rue, vols de voitures et cambriolages qualifiés). A certains
des délits les plus graves contre la propriété, empêchés grâce à une meilleure
protection, peuvent se substituer d’autres formes, plus graves. Le profil des
délits, dans les pays en transition, peut commencer à ressembler à ceux de
l’Afrique du Sud où les taux de vols qualifiés sont exceptionnellement élevés.
Le niveau de corruption, dans les milieux gouvernementaux, semble
moindre dans les pays où la restructuration de l’économie est relativement
avancée, par exemple en Estonie et en Hongrie. En fait, le niveau de la
corruption dans ces pays est inférieur à ce qu’il est dans certains pays
occidentaux. Ces constatations sont encourageantes. Si la restructuration
dans d’autres pays de la région se poursuit, les perspectives à long terme de
voir baisser les niveaux de corruption semblent relativement bonnes.
En résumé, sur le plan de la criminologie en général, la perspective des
pays  en  transition est,  selon  nous,  relativement sombre. Même si les
problèmes économiques actuels sont surmontés, les taux de délits de violence
resteront probablement élevés en raison des taux de chômage élevés parmi
les jeunes gens et de la forte consommation de boissons alcoolisées fortes.
De plus, les attitudes traditionnelles vis-à-vis des femmes ne changeront
probablement pas à court terme, et la violence contre celles-ci restera,
vraisemblablement, un sérieux problème.
Dans les années à venir, l’amélioration du niveau de vie des classes
moyennes qui émergent - même si présentement elles souffrent d’un certain
recul dans la Fédération de Russie - augmenteront les opportunités de délits.
Un nombre croissant de personnes auront les moyens de vivre dans un
logement pavillonnaire et de posséder leurs voitures. Avec un décalage de
quelques années, les taux d’auto-protection augmenteront et le taux de délits
d’opportunité pourraient bien cesser d’augmenter. Mais, à certains délits
empêchés se substitueront, probablement, des vols qualifiés.
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Délit et facteurs déterminants du délit/crime en Europe
La criminalité, dans les nations les plus industrialisées et où le niveau de vie
est le plus élevé en Europe occidentale, doit être perçue, avant tout, en terme
de structures d’opportunité particulières. Les pays où l’on compte sur les
voitures individuelles pour effectuer ses déplacements se caractérisent par
des taux élevés de délits contre les véhicules. Les pays où les gens vivent,
traditionnellement, dans une maison individuelle, connaissent des taux de
cambriolage élevés. Ces dernières années, la protection contre le vol de
voiture, le vol dans les voitures et les cambriolages de domiciles ont aug-
menté. Probablement pour cette raison, et peut-être aussi pour une pratique
policière intensifiée et la punition plus sévère des délinquants - le niveau
global de criminalité contre la propriété a décliné, depuis 1995, tant aux
Etats-Unis qu’en Europe occidentale (chapitre 3).
Paradoxalement, les délits de violence – en particulier le délit violent
commis par des jeunes – montrent une tendance à la recrudescence dans
plusieurs Etats membres de l’Union européenne. La recrudescence des vols
à main armée dans la rue, dans certains pays, pourrait bien être le résultat
d’un recentrage des délits lorsque ceux-ci sont empêchés par une protection
améliorée. Autre explication: l’émergence d’une sous-classe ethnique dans
les plus grandes villes d’Europe occidentale.   Bien que ce fait ne puisse
encore être établi avec certitude, le niveau de besoin, dans certaines parties
ethniques de la population urbaine, pourrait bien être en augmentation. Dans
le domaine de la prévention du crime, le principal défi, pour les pays
d’Europe occidentale, semble être l’intégration économique et sociale des
jeunes immigrants dans les régions urbaines.
Dans le même temps, le mode de vie convivial des jeunes et l’usage
combiné de l’alcool et de la drogue pourraient bien être aussi un facteur
causal de la délinquance juvénile violente.
L’un des avantages majeurs de l’Europe occidentale, dans ce contexte,
réside dans les taux relativement faibles de détention d’armes. Il existe de
sérieuses indications que ce fait constitue une important facteur de préven-
tion des homicides. Les taux de violences élevés contre les femmes, dans
certains pays occidentaux, comme l’indiquent tant les statistiques de la police
que les données de l’ICVS, pourraient résulter d’une sensibilité et d’une prise
de conscience accrues du mauvais traitement infligé aux femmes par leurs
conjoints ou par d’autres partenaires dans l’environnement domestique. Si
d’autres pays présentent une égalité entre les sexes améliorée, ils peuvent
aussi présenter des taux plus élevés de violences contre les femmes, pour la
même raison. Cette explication des taux plus élevés, dans certains des pays
les plus prospères et où l’égalité entre les sexes est la plus avancée, ne devrait
pas pour autant entraîner la diminution de la gravité de ces incidents. Le
récent phénomène de la visibilité accrue de ces délits, dans les pays où
l’égalité entre les sexes est la plus avancée, souligne l’existence de chiffres
très sombres ailleurs.
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Les taux plus faibles de corruption manifeste de fonctionnaires semblent
être typiquement le cas de nations prospères, dotées de traditions démocra-
tiques stables. Cette relation peut également être perçue en terme d’oppor-
tunités de commettre des délits. Dans les démocraties transparentes, carac-
térisées par des marchés relativement non réglementés, des possibilités
moindres s’offrent aux fonctionnaires d’exiger des pots-de-vin en échange
de leurs services.
Délit et facteurs déterminants du délit/crime
en Amérique du Nord
Depuis 1988, le taux de criminalité aux Etats-Unis et au Canada a décliné,
tant d’après les données de l’ICVS que d’après celles de la police. Le niveau
d’auto-protection contre les délits est élevé. Le niveau de tension semble
aussi y être relativement faible.
Les Etats-Unis comme le Canada présentent des taux relativement élevés
de délits liés aux voitures, en milieu urbain; il en est de même des cambrio-
lages.
Le niveau et le profil de la criminalité aux Etats-Unis diffèrent moins de
ceux observés dans des pays comme le Canada, le Royaume-Uni et les
Pays-Bas qu’on le pense généralement. Le taux de délits conventionnels, aux
Etats-Unis, n’est pas exceptionnellement élevé, pas plus que celui de cor-
ruption. La plus importante différence semble résider dans le taux élevé
d’homicides et de vols qualifiés, et dans le fait qu’aux Etats-Unis ils im-
pliquent souvent l’usage d’armes. La cause la plus probable de cette dif-
férence, par rapport au modèle européen, réside dans les taux exceptionnelle-
ment élevés de détentions d’armes.
Ressources et fonctionnement du système
de la justice pénale
En dépit des précautions qui s’imposent lorsque l’on travaille sur les données
internationales disponibles, la constance de ces observations dans la présente
étude, en ce qui concerne les systèmes de justice pénale en Europe et en
Amérique du Nord, permettent d’envisager avec confiance que nous com-
mençons à rassembler certaines des pièces les plus importantes du puzzle
international de la justice pénale. Les principales observations faites au
chapitre 4 sont résumées dans les sept points suivants.
(1) La proportion de policiers, de procureurs, de juges et de personnels
carcéraux (pour 100.000 habitants) présentent de fortes variations inter-
nationales; mais il existe une remarquable similarité internationale dans
la répartition  du personnel  de la  justice pénale, entre  la  police,  le
ministère public, le judiciaire et les peines infligées.
xxvi
Bien que les Pays d’Europe centrale et orientale présentent des taux
sensiblement plus élevés de population employée dans la justice pénale
que dans les Pays de l’Union européenne, environ 82% des effectifs de
la justice pénale, dans les deux catégories de pays, sont employés dans
la police, environ 2% dans les ministères publics, 3% dans le judiciaire
et 13% dans les établissements de détention correctionnels.
(2) Il semble exister une corrélation entre la délinquance et les taux de
personnels de la justice pénale: les pays qui présentent un taux plus élevé
de vols mineurs, de violences graves et d’homicides tendent a avoir des
niveaux moins élevés de personnels de justice pénale que dans les pays
où la fréquence de ces délits est moindre.
(3) La justice pénale, en Europe et en Amérique du Nord, reste dominée par
des professions essentiellement masculines. Il n’y a pas un seul pays où
la moitié ou plus du personnel carcéral est féminin, et il y a très peut de
pays où plus de la moitié des procureurs ou des juges sont des femmes.
Les Pays d’Europe centrale et orientale ont une proportion un peu plus
élevée de femmes exerçant la fonction de juge et d’employées dans les
prisons que les pays de l’Union européenne. En conclure que les Pays
d’Europe centrale et orientale réalisent, au niveau des personnels em-
ployés dans la justice pénale, une plus grande égalité entre les sexes serait
toutefois simplifier exagérément: plusieurs des pays en transition comp-
tent parmi ceux où l’indice d’égalité entre les sexes est plutôt faible,
tandis que certains pays de l’Union européenne, le Canada et les Etats-
Unis se classent dans le premier quartile pour cet indice.
(4) La Cinquième Enquête des Nations Unies et l’Enquête internationale sur
l’exposition aux crimes/délits (ICVS) donnent des descriptions en partie
incohérentes des variations internationales de la criminalité. Toutefois,
une fois prises en considération les différences nationales dans le taux
d’enregistrement des plaintes des victimes, certaines de ces incohérences
disparaissent (lorsque l’accent est mis sur la “criminalité/délinquance
totale”).
(5) Il existe de fortes variations internationales dans la probabilité que la
police enregistrera les délits qui viennent à sa connaissance. Dans les
Pays d’Europe centrale et orientale, les victimes des délits s’adressent
moins vraisemblablement vers la police et l’enregistrement des délits par
celle-ci est moins vraisemblable que dans les pays de l’Union
européenne.
(6) Les données internationales relatives flots d’affaires sont problématiques
et difficiles à interpréter, en particulier lorsque l’accent est mis sur la
“criminalité totale”. Il est clair que dans les pays de l’Union européenne
le nombre des délits enregistrés est sensiblement plus élevé, de suspects,
de poursuites, de condamnations, et de peines de prison que dans les pays
en transition. Ce constat fait, il est difficile de tirer des conclusions
définitives. Les différences dans l’épuisement des cas (le taux de cas et
de suspects qui semblent abandonnés par la justice pénale à différents
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stades de la procédure) reflètent vraisemblablement des différences au
niveau des procédures nationales de justice pénale, des pratiques d’en-
registrement et de la philosophie de jugement, plutôt que des différences
dans la qualité du travail accompli par les personnels au service de la
justice pénale. Les données relatives aux stades ultérieurs de la procédure
sont  vraisemblablement plus fiables que celles  relatives  aux stades
préliminaires; le rapport entre poursuites et condamnations (par ex. le
nombre de poursuites conduisant à une condamnation) indique une
variation internationale relativement limitée et peut, par conséquent, être
promis à candidature pour une prochaine analyse internationale.
L’évaluation des variations internationales de la performance d’un grand
nombre de systèmes de justice pénale reste une tâche difficile, voire impos-
sible. Les données, tout simplement, ne sont pas adéquates. Il est plus facile
d’obtenir des mesures subjectives que des mesures objectives, dites mesures
“dures”. Les taux de criminalité – bien que manifestement liés au fonction-
nement des systèmes de justice pénale – ne sont pas des indicateurs utiles de
performance. Les pays semblent présenter (jusqu’à une certaine mesure) un
regroupement au niveau du classement: pour la mesure de la performance de
l’enregistrement par la police, de la productivité (de la police et des pro-
cureurs, performance mesurée par le nombre de suspects et de poursuites),
et de plusieurs mesures subjectives (évaluation par le citoyen de l’indice de
performance de la police, évaluations de l’impartialité du système et au sens
de sécurité, et les réponses à l’ICVS sur la corruption). Certains pays sont
haut placés pour tous (ou presque tous) les indicateurs de performance;
d’autres pays tendent à être au bas de l’échelle pour tous (ou presque tous)
les indicateurs de performance. Ceci permet de penser que les indicateurs de
performance  qui ont été élaborés pour les besoins de cette étude sont
susceptibles de présenter un degré raisonnable d’inutilité. De plus, les taux
de criminalité n’obéissent apparemment pas à une distribution entièrement
aléatoire selon les pays qui présentent des différences au niveau des indi-
cateurs de performance. Toute conclusion, à ce stade précoce, sur la relation
de cause à effet devrait être évitée.
Sanctions/peines
Prison à vie: A quelques rares exceptions près (comme la Norvège, où
l’emprisonnement à vie a été aboli en 1981), l’emprisonnement à vie sanc-
tionnant certains délits graves, est possible dans toute l’Europe et l’Amérique
du Nord. Néanmoins, les données disponibles montrent que l’emprisonne-
ment à vie ne représente qu’une très faible proportion (moins de 1% dans
tous les pays) du nombre total de condamnations prononcées.
Privation de liberté: L’emprisonnement constitue la charpente du système
de sanctions/peines dans tous les pays d’Europe et d’Amérique du Nord. Il
représente environ un tiers du total des peines prononcées. La Cinquième
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Enquête des Nations Unies montre d’importantes variations lorsque l’on
rapporte le nombre d’emprisonnements pour 100.000 habitants. L’éventail
est compris entre moins de 50 condamnations à des peines privatives de
liberté pour 100.000 habitants par an en Azerbaïdjan, à Chypre et en Alle-
magne, à plus de 200 en Grèce, aux Pays-Bas, en Ecosse et en Turquie.
Le recours général à l’emprisonnement a augmenté entre 1990 et 1994.
Dans plusieurs pays, le nombre de peines de prison prononcées et le nombre
d’entrées en prison a, en fait, diminué durant cette période. Il semble toutefois
qu’une augmentation de la durée des emprisonnements actuellement purgés
compense un tel recul du nombre d’entrées et même se traduise par une
augmentation des populations carcérales. Quelques exceptions intéressantes
(Autriche, Chypre, Finlande et  Slovénie) montrent que les  populations
carcérales peuvent être contrôlées et que les taux d’emprisonnement ne sont
pas voués à augmenter (chapitre 5.3.).
Des différences substantielles dans le recours à l’emprisonnement sem-
blent  exister. Certains  pays  semblent  avoir  pris  une décision politique
délibérée de réduire le recours à l’emprisonnement (cas de la Finlande),
tandis que d’autres semblent avoir pris une décision politique délibérée d’y
recourir davantage (cas des Etats-Unis). Certains pays ne condamnent que
de rares délinquants à de longues peines d’emprisonnement, d’autres con-
damnent de nombreux délinquants à des peines courtes, d’autres encore
condamnent de nombreux délinquants à des peines de longue durée. Les Pays
Nordiques semblent représenter une extrémité du spectre, tandis que l’on
trouve les Pays d’Europe centrale et orientale (à quelques exceptions près) à
l’autre extrémité de celui-ci (chapitre 5.6).
Une corrélation peut être établie entre le taux d’emprisonnement pour
100.000 habitants et le pourcentage national des réponses à l’enquête sur
l’exposition des victimes aux délits (ICVS) qui se déclaraient favorables à
l’emprisonnement (chapitre 5.7). Toutefois, la corrélation peut être due au
fait que les tribunaux reflètent simplement la “volonté du peuple”, ou le fait
que l’opinion en vient à accepter la pratique exercée par les tribunaux en
matière de condamnation – ou il est même possible que la population
carcérale comme l’opinion sont déterminés par quelque(s) facteur(s) tiers.
La durée des peines d’emprisonnement semble être le principal facteur
qui permette d’expliquer le taux d’emprisonnement. La durée des peines
dépend principalement des principes fondamentaux de la politique pénale
dans un pays donné, laquelle détermine, en fait, si elle est plus ou moins
punitive. Ainsi, pour réduire la population carcérale, un système de justice
pénale doit trouver des moyens de réduire la durée moyenne des peines de
prison plutôt que chercher à réduire le nombre des admissions - bien qu’une
réduction du nombre d’admissions puisse contribuer à une diminution de la
population carcérale.
“Liberté sous contrôle”: De nombreuses sanctions/peines entraînent une
surveillance et un contrôle considérables du délinquant. Il s’agit de peine
d’emprisonnement suspensive ou conditionnelle, assortie de surveillance, de
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probation, de service communautaire, de travail correctionnel ou éducatif,
de formes particulières de traitement et d’interdiction de séjour. En raison de
cette diversité, il n’est pas possible d’identifier une tendance commune dans
les données couvertes par ce chapitre. Les différents pays déclarent que dans
0 à 70% (pour la République Tchèque et la Slovaquie) du nombre total de
sanctions qui y sont prononcées consistent en “liberté sous contrôle”. Une
question de la Cinquième Enquête des Nattions Unies renvoie au nombre de
personnes placées en  probation (procédure dans  laquelle une  personne
convaincue de culpabilité pour un délit commis est remise en liberté par le
tribunal, sans emprisonnement, pour être placée sous surveillance d’un
fonctionnaire ou d’un organe officiellement reconnu); le nombre de person-
nes en situation de probation à une date donnée est l’objet d’une autre
question. En 1994, entre 10 (en Lituanie) et 536 personnes (aux Etats-Unis)
personnes pour 100.000 habitants étaient placées en probation, et à une
certaine date de l’année, les taux variaient entre 12 (en Slovénie) et 1137
(aux Etats-Unis) pour 100.000 habitants.
Avertissements et admonestations: Là encore, les pays déclarent qu’entre
0 et 50% (Bulgarie, Kazakhstan, Slovénie et Suisse) des sanctions qui y sont
prononcées étaient des avertissements ou des admonestations, y compris
toutes les peines avec sursis, sans que soit exigée une surveillance. (Les
prudences évoquées aux chapitres 1.3. et 5.1.1., relatives à la comparabilité
des statistiques sur les sanction doivent être notées; on peut présumer que
dans de nombreux pays, avertissements et admonestations peuvent être
imposés par la police et le procureur, et peuvent ne pas figurer dans les
statistiques judiciaires.
Amendes: La sanction financière est manifestement une des plus répan-
dues dans les pays d’Europe, en particulier en Europe occidentale. En
Autriche, en Angleterre et au Pays de Galles, en Finlande et en Allemagne,
plus de 70% de sanctions prononcées sont des amendes. A l’autre extrémité
de l’échelle, au Kirghizistan, en Lituanie et en Slovaquie, moins de 10% des
sanctions étaient des amendes. (Les mêmes prudences que celles indiquées
ci-dessus à propos des statistiques relatives aux avertissements et admones-
tations s’appliquent aux amendes).
Service communautaire: De nombreux pays ne reconnaissent pas le
service communautaire comme une sanction prévue par leur système de
justice pénale. Selon les réponses à la Cinquième Enquête des Nations Unies,
les pays qui ont le plus fréquemment recours au service communautaire sont
la Fédération de Russie (environ 15% des peines prononcées), l’Azerbaïdjan
(13%), la Géorgie (12%), les Pays-Bas (8%), l’Ecosse (7%) et l’Irlande du
Nord (6%). A cet égard, il convient toutefois de rappeler que le concept de
service communautaire peut varier sensiblement d’un pays à un autre et, par
conséquent, la prudence est de mise lorsque l’on fait des comparaisons
internationales sur ce sujet. Par exemple, dans plusieurs pays en transition,
au nombre desquels la Fédération de Russie, l’Azerbaïdjan et la Géorgie, le
service communautaire est en fait un “travail éducatif”. Cette sanction
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signifie pour le délinquant qu’il doit continue à travailler en exerçant son
emploi régulier, mais une partie de ses revenus sont déduits au titre de la
sanction.
Parmi les personnes condamnées en 1994, entre 3,5% (au Kazakhstan) et
18,2% (en Autriche) sont des femmes. Dans chaque pays, les différences -
entre 1994 et 1990 - dans la proportion de femmes parmi les délinquants
condamnés sont minces et varient dans les deux sens; on constate des
augmentations dans certains pays et des diminutions dans d’autres.
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ÑîäåðæàíŁå
ˇÿòßØ îÆçîð ˛˛˝
˝àæòîÿøŁØ äîŒºàä îæíîâßâàåòæÿ íà àíàºŁçå íàöŁîíàºüíßı îòâåòîâ â
ðàìŒàı ˇÿòîªî îÆçîðà ˛˛˝. ´ äîŒºàäå îıâàòßâàåòæÿ ïåðŁîä æ 1990 ïî
1994 ª. ˜àííßå ˇÿòîªî îÆçîðà ˛˛˝ ïîäŒðåïºÿþòæÿ äðóªîØ ŁíôîðìàöŁåØ,
âŒºþ÷àÿ, â ÷àæòíîæòŁ, ðåçóºüòàòß Ìåæäóíàðîäíîªî âŁŒòŁìîºîªŁ÷åæŒîªî
ŁææºåäîâàíŁÿ.
˝àæòîÿøŁØ äîŒºàä çíà÷Łòåºüíî îòºŁ÷àåòæÿ îò ïðåäłåæòâóþøŁı. ˜
àííßå ÆßºŁ ïîäâåðªíóòß ŒîºŁ÷åæòâåííîìó àíàºŁçó, â öåºÿı
îïðåäåºåíŁÿ âîçìîæíîæòŁ óæòàíîâºåíŁÿ íàÆîðà ïàðàìåòðîâ äºÿ ºó÷łåªî
ïîíŁìàíŁÿ ðàçºŁ÷ŁØ ìåæäó æòðàíàìŁ â óðîâíå Ł æòðóŒòóðå ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ,
à òàŒæå â ôóíŒöŁîíŁðîâàíŁŁ æŁæòåìß óªîºîâíîªî ïðàâîæóäŁÿ (ŒðàòŒîå
îÆîÆøåíŁå ïðîöåäóðß ïðåäæòàâºåíî â ðàçäåºå 1.5.-1.6; Æîºåå äåòàºüíî
ŁíôîðìàöŁÿ äàíà â ïðŁºîæåíŁŁ). `ßºŁ Łæïîºüçîâàíß ðàçºŁ÷íßå
Łæòî÷íŁŒŁ äàííßı äºÿ âßðàÆîòŒŁ ïàðàìåòðîâ æîîòâåòæòâåííî
îªðàÆºåíŁØ, Œðàæ àâòîìîòîòðàíæïîðòà, íåçíà÷Łòåºüíßı ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ,
òÿæŒŁı ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ, íàæŁºŁÿ â îòíîłåíŁŁ æåíøŁí Ł ŒîððóïöŁŁ (ðàçäåºß
2). ÝòŁ ïàðàìåòðß ðàææìàòðŁâàºŁæü â ŒîíòåŒæòå ïîŒàçàòåºåØ,
ŁæïîºüçóåìßıäºÿîïðåäåºåíŁÿâåðîÿòíîæòŁŁìîòŁâàöŁŁæîâåðłåíŁÿ
ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ (ðàçäåºß 3).
`ßºŁ òàŒæå ðàçðàÆîòàíß ŁíäŁŒàòîðß äºÿ îöåíŒŁ ðåæóðæîâ, ŁìåþøŁıæÿ
â ðàæïîðÿæåíŁŁ æŁæòåìß óªîºîâíîªî ïðàâîæóäŁÿ; æîîòíîłåíŁÿ ïîºîâ â
ïðîôåææŁÿı æŁæòåìß óªîºîâíîªî ïðàâîæóäŁÿ, à òàŒæå äºÿ îöåíŒŁ
äåÿòåºüíîæòŁ ïîºŁöŁŁ æî æòîðîíß ªðàæäàí (ðàçäåºß 4.).
ˇðåäâàðŁòåºüíßå âßâîäß, Œîòîðßå ÆßºŁ æäåºàíß, ìîªºŁ çà÷àæòóþ
ªîâîðŁòü æàìŁ çà æåÆÿ (ŒàŒ ýòî Æßºî â æºó÷àå æ âßâîäîì, ÷òî â æòðàíàı
æ âßæîŒŁì óðîâíåì ïîòðåÆºåíŁÿ àºŒîªîºÿ âßæîŒ Ł óðîâåíü íàæŁºŁÿ).
˝åŒîòîðßå äðóªŁå ïðåäæòàâºåííßå çäåæü ïðåäâàðŁòåºüíßå âßâîäß,
îäíàŒî, åäâà ºŁ ó÷ŁòßâàºŁæü âîîÆøå ïðŁ âßðàÆîòŒå óªîºîâíîØ
ïîºŁòŁŒŁ â ÆîºüłŁíæòâå æòðàí, îıâà÷åííßı îÆçîðîì.
ˇðŁ ÷òåíŁŁ æºåäóþøåªî ŒðàòŒîªî æîäåðæàíŁÿ íàæòîÿòåºüíî
ðåŒîìåíäóåì ÷Łòàòåºÿì ïîìíŁòü î íåäîæòàòŒàı ïðÿìîªî æðàâíåíŁÿ â
ìåæäóíàðîäíîì ìàæłòàÆå æòàòŁæòŁ÷åæŒŁı äàííßı (ðàçäåº 1.3). ´ ýòîØ
æâÿçŁ ìß îòìå÷àåì òîºüŒî, ÷òî ŁæïîºüçîâàíŁå îôŁöŁàºüíßı
æòàòŁæòŁ÷åæŒŁı ïîŒàçàòåºåØ Ł äàííßı îÆçîðîâ îÆðàøàþò íàłå âíŁìàíŁå
â îæíîâíîì íà òðàäŁöŁîííóþ ïðåæòóïíîæòü. ¨ç-çà îòæóòæòâŁÿ äàííßı,
îò÷åò íå ìîæåò ïðîºŁòü ìíîªî æâåòà íà ìàæłòàÆß, íàïðŁìåð,
ýŒîíîìŁ÷åæŒîØ ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ, ýŒîºîªŁ÷åæŒŁı ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ,
îðªàíŁçîâàííîØ ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ Ł íåçàŒîííîªî îÆîðîòà íàðŒîòŁŒîâ.
´ îòäåºüíîì òîìå ïðåäæòàâºåí àíàºŁç ïî æòðàíàì.
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˛Æœåì ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ Ł äåòåðìŁíàíòß ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ
Ìß äåºàåì âßâîä, ÷òî ïàðàìåòðß ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ, Œîòîðßå îæíîâßâàþòæÿ
íà æî÷åòàíŁŁ ðåçóºüòàòîâ îÆçîðà îòíîæŁòåºüíî âŁŒòŁìŁçàöŁŁ íàæåºåíŁÿ
Ł ïîºŁöåØæŒîØ æòàòŁæòŁŒŁ ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ, æâÿçàíß æ ŒðìŁíîºîªŁ÷åæŒŁ
çíà÷ŁìßìŁ æîöŁàºüíî-ýŒîíîìŁ÷åæŒŁìŁ ïîŒàçàòåºÿìŁ. ÒàŒîå
âçàŁìîîòíîłåíŁå ìîæåò Æßòü óæïåłíî ŁíòåðïðåòŁðîâàíî æ ïîìîøüþ
ìîäåºŁ âçàŁìîäåØæòâŁÿ, Œîòîðàÿ îòîÆðàæàåò óðîâíŁ ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ ŒàŒ
ðåçóºüòàò äŁíàìŁ÷åæŒîØ çàâŁæŁìîæòŁ ìåæäó ôàŒòîðàìŁ ìîòŁâàöŁŁ Ł
âåðîÿòíîæòŁ íà ìàŒðîóðîâíå.
´ äâóı æºó÷àÿı, â ÷àæòíîæòŁ, íàæŁºŁå â îòíîłåíŁŁ æåíøŁí Ł
ŒîððóïöŁÿ, ìß æòîºŒíóºŁæü æ îæîÆßìŁ ìåòîäîºîªŁ÷åæŒŁìŁ òðóäíîæòÿìŁ.
ÀíàºŁç ìàŒðî-Œîððåºÿòîâ íàæŁºŁÿ â îòíîłåíŁŁ æåíøŁí îæºîæíÿåòæÿ
îłŁÆŒàìŁ â ŁçìåðåíŁŁ. ˚àŒ îôŁöŁàºüíßå äàííßå (Œîòîðßå
îæíîâßâàþòæÿ íà çàðåªŁæòðŁðîâàííßı ïîºŁöŁåØ ïðåæòóïºåíŁÿı), òàŒ Ł
óðîâíŁ âŁŒòŁìŁçàöŁŁ (Œîòîðßå îæíîâßâàþòæÿ íà ðåçóºüòàòàı îïðîæà
íàæåºåíŁÿ) ïîŒàçßâàþò Œóºüòóðíßå ðàçºŁ÷Łÿ, ŒàæàþøŁåæÿ æîöŁàºüíîªî
æòàòóæà æåíøŁíß. Ìß äåºàåì âßâîä, ÷òî íåîÆıîäŁìî ïðîâåæòŁ
ŁææºåäîâàíŁå â îòíîłåíŁŁ íàæŁºŁÿ ïðîòŁâ æåíøŁí, íî óæå íà æðåçå
Œóºüòóð. ˚îððåºÿòß ýòîªî âŁäà ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ ìîªóò Æßòü àäåŒâàòíî
îïðåäåºåíß íà ìàŒðî óðîâíå, òîºüŒî åæºŁ Æóäóò ïîºó÷åíß Æîºåå
Œà÷åæòâåííßå æðàâíŁòåºüíßå äàííßå (ðàçäåºß 3.1.4. Ł 3.2.3).
ˇîıîæå, ÷òî óðîâåíü ŒîððóïöŁŁ î÷åíü æŁºüíî æâÿçàí æ æîæòîÿíŁåì
ýŒîíîìŁŒŁ. ÝŒîíîìŁ÷åæŒŁå æòðóŒòóðß, íàıîäÿøŁåæÿ â ïåðåıîäíîì ïåðŁîäå,
Ł, â îÆøåì æìßæºå, Æîºåå æºàÆßå ýŒîíîìŁ÷åæŒŁå æòðóŒòóðß îòºŁ÷àþòæÿ
Æîºåå âßæîŒŁì óðîâíåì ïðîÿâºåíŁÿ ŒîððóïöŁŁ æðåäŁ ªîæóäàðæòâåííßı
äîºæíîæòíßı ºŁö. ¨æïîºüçîâàííßå Łç ðàçºŁ÷íßı Łæòî÷íŁŒîâ ïåðåìåííßå
ïîŒàçßâàþò æòðîªóþ çàâŁæŁìîæòü â ýòîì îòíîłåíŁŁ. ÝòŁ ðåçóºüòàòß
ïîçâîºÿþò æäåºàòü âßâîä, ÷òî ŁçìåðåíŁå óðîâíÿ ŒîððóïöŁŁ ìîæåò Æßòü
ìåíåå æºîæíßì, ÷åì ýòî ÷àæòî ïðåäïîºàªàþò (ðàçäåº 2.7 Ł 3.2.3).
˛òäåºüíßå âßâîäß ïî æòðàíàì
ÑîåäŁíåííßå Øòàòß, ˚àíàäà Ł ×åłæŒàÿ —åæïóÆºŁŒà çàíŁìàþò ïåðâßå
ìåæòà ïî óðîâíÿì Œðàæ æî âçºîìîì, Œðàæàì àâòîìîòîòðàíæïîðòà Ł ìåºŒŁì
ïðåæòóïºåíŁÿì. ˚ äðóªŁì æòðàíàì æ îòíîæŁòåºüíî âßæîŒŁìŁ óðîâíÿìŁ
ýòŁı âŁäîâ ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ îòíîæÿòæÿ `îºªàðŁÿ, ÑºîâàŒŁÿ Ł ÝæòîíŁÿ.
ÑòðàíàìŁ æ îòíîæŁòåºüíî íŁçŒŁì óðîâíåì Łìóøåæòâåííßı
ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ ÿâºÿþòæÿ ` åºàðóæü, ØâåØöàðŁÿ, ˝îðâåªŁÿ Ł `ßâłàÿ
ÞªîæºàâæŒàÿ—åæïóÆºŁŒà ÌàŒåäîíŁÿ.
ÒÿæŒŁå íàæŁºüæòâåííßå ïðåæòóïºåíŁÿ îòíîæŁòåºüíî ÷àøå
æîâåðłàþòæÿ â ðåæïóÆºŁŒàı Æßâłåªî ÑîâåòæŒîªî Ñîþçà (òàŒŁı ŒàŒ,
—îææŁØæŒàÿ ÔåäåðàöŁÿ, ÝæòîíŁÿ,  ˚ŁðªŁçŁÿ, ˚àçàıæòàí).
´ ÑîåäŁíåííßı Øòàòàı âßæîŒ óðîâåíü òÿæŒŁı ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ, ÷òî
ŒîíòðàæòŁðóåò æ ªîðàçäî Æîºåå íŁçŒŁìŁ óðîâíÿìŁ â ˚àíàäå Ł æòðàíàı
˙àïàäíîØ ¯âðîïß.
Ñòðàíß æ Æîºåå íŁçŒŁìŁ óðîâíÿìŁ íàæŁºŁÿ îòìå÷àþòæÿ â ˙àïàäíîØ
¯âðîïå. ˛òíîæŁòåºüíî íŁçŒŁå óðîâíŁ íàæŁºŁÿ â ´åíªðŁŁ Ł `ßâłåØ
ÞªîæºàâæŒîØ —åæïóÆºŁŒå ÌàŒåäîíŁÿ.
xxxiv
ÓðîâíŁ íàæŁºŁÿ â îòíîłåíŁŁ æåíøŁí íàŁÆîºåå âßæîŒŁå â ðåæïóÆºŁŒàı
Æßâłåªî ÑîâåòæŒîªî Ñîþçà. ˜îæòàòî÷íî Łíòåðåæíî, ÷òî ŁææºåäîâàíŁå
ïîŒàçàºî òàŒæå íàºŁ÷Łå âßæîŒîªî óðîâíÿ íàæŁºŁÿ â îòíîłåíŁŁ æåíøŁí â
ÑîåäŁíåííßı Øòàòàı, ˚àíàäå Ł íåŒîòîðßı æåâåðîåâðîïåØæŒŁı æòðàíàı.
˛äíàŒî ýòŁ äàííßå ìîªóò Æßòü æºåäæòâŁåì Æîºåå âßæîŒîªî óðîâíÿ
îæîçíàíŁÿ ýòîªî âŁäà ïðåæòóïºåíŁÿ â æòðàíàı æ ÆîºüłåØ
æÆàºàíæŁðîâàííîæòüþ â îòíîłåíŁÿı ïîºîâ. (Ñì. ìàòåðŁàºß ðàçäåºà 3.1.4.).
´ßæîŒŁå óðîâíŁ ŒîððóïöŁŁ îòìå÷àþòæÿ â ÖåíòðàºüíîØ Ł ´îæòî÷íîØ
¯âðîïå Ł â þæíî-åâðîïåØæŒŁı æòðàíàı.
ˇðåæòóïºåíŁÿ ŁäåòåðìŁíàíòß ïðåæòóïíîæòŁâÖåíòðàºüíîØ
Ł ´îæòî÷íîØ ¯âðîïå
´ æâåòå ïàðàìåòðîâ, ŁçÆðàííßı â öåºÿı íàæòîÿøåªî ŁææºåäîâàíŁÿ,
ìîòŁâàöŁÿ Œ æîâåðłåíŁþ ïðåæòóïºåíŁÿ Łìååò Æîºåå âßæîŒŁØ óðîâåíü â
æòðàíàı, ýŒîíîìŁŒà Œîòîðßı ïåðåæŁâàåò ïåðåıîäíßØ ïåðŁîä (æòðàíß
ÖåíòðàºüíîØ Ł ´îæòî÷íîØ ¯âðîïß), ÷åì â ˙àïàäíîØ ¯âðîïå. (˚àŒ óæå
îòìå÷àºîæü, Łæïîºüçîâàííßå â íàæòîÿøåì ŁææºåäîâàíŁŁ äàííßå îòíîæÿòæÿ â
ïåðâóþ î÷åðåäü Œ òðàäŁöŁîííßì ïðåæòóïºåíŁÿì). ˜ºÿ æòðàí ÖåíòðàºüíîØ
Ł ´îæòî÷íîØ ¯âðîïß ŁíäŁŒàòîðß ïîŒàçßâàþò ÿâíî Æîºåå âßæîŒîå
æòðåìºåíŁå äååæïîæîÆíßı ºŁö ìóææŒîªî ïîºà Łæïîºüçîâàòü
âîçìîæíîæòŁ äºÿ Łçâºå÷åíŁÿ äîıîäîâ ïîæðåäæòâîì ïðîòŁâîïðàâíîØ
äåÿòåºüíîæòŁ. ´ ýòŁı æòðàíàı íåäîæòàòî÷íîæòü æîöŁàºüíî-ýŒîíîìŁ÷åæŒŁı
óæºîâŁØ Ł çºîóïîòðåÆºåíŁå àºŒîªîºåì æïîæîÆæòâóþò æîçäàíŁþ ïî÷âß äºÿ
ðàçºŁ÷íßı âŁäîâ íàæŁºüæòâåííßı ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ. ˝àïàäåíŁÿ, óÆŁØæòâà Ł
îªðàÆºåíŁÿ ïðåîÆºàäàþò â æòðàíàı, ªäå ìíîªŁå ìîºîäßå ºþäŁ ìóææŒîªî
ïîºà Łæïßòßâàþò ºŁłåíŁÿ. `îºåå òîªî, â ÆîºüłŁíæòâå æòðàí
ÖåíòðàºüíîØ Ł ´îæòî÷íîØ ¯âðîïß óðîâåíü íàæŁºŁÿ â îòíîłåíŁŁ æåíøŁí
îòíîæŁòåºüíî âßæîŒ. ˇîìŁìî ºŁłåíŁØ Ł çºîóïîòðåÆºåíŁÿ àºŒîªîºåì ýòà
ŒîíŒðåòíàÿ ïðîÆºåìà ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ, âåðîÿòíî, æâÿçàíà æ Æîºåå íŁçŒŁì
æîöŁàºüíßì æòàòóæîì æåíøŁíß. ˝àïðŁìåð, äîºÿ æåíøŁí æ âßæłŁì
îÆðàçîâàíŁåì ªîðàçäî ìåíüłå â ÆîºüłŁíæòâå æòðàí ïåðåıîäíîªî ïåðŁîäà,
÷åì â ªîæóäàðæòâàı-÷ºåíàı ¯âðîïåØæŒîªî æîþçà (ªºàâà 3).
˚îððóïöŁÿ òàŒæå îòìå÷àåòæÿ ÷àøå â ÆîºüłŁíæòâå æòðàí ÖåíòðàºüíîØ Ł
´îæòî÷íîØ ¯âðîïß ïî æðàâíåíŁþ æî æòðàíàìŁ ÑåâåðíîØ ÀìåðŁŒŁ Ł
ÑåâåðíîØ ¯âðîïß.
´ ŒðàòŒîæðî÷íîØ ïåðæïåŒòŁâå ýŒîíîìŁ÷åæŒŁØ ŒðŁçŁæ â —îææŁØæŒîØ
ÔåäåðàöŁŁ, â ÷àæòíîæòŁ, ìîæåò îÆîæòðŁòü æîöŁàºüíî-ýŒîíîìŁ÷åæŒŁå
ïðîÆºåìß â äàííîì ðåªŁîíå. ´ äîºªîæðî÷íîØ ïåðæïåŒòŁâå ýŒîíîìŁ÷åæŒàÿ
æŁòóàöŁÿ ìîæåò óºó÷łŁòüæÿ, íî ýòî âîâæå íå îÆÿçàòåºüíî ïðŁâåäåò Œ
æíŁæåíŁþ ïîòðåÆíîæòŁ â æîâåðłåíŁŁ ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ. ˇîâßłåíŁå óðîâíÿ
æîæòîÿòåºüíîæòŁ ºþäåØ â ýòŁı æòðàíàı, âåðîÿòíî, íå ïðŁâåäåò Œ
æîŒðàøåŁíþ óðîâíÿ ÆåäíîæòŁ, òàŒ â ŒîíòåŒæòå æâîÆîäíîØ ðßíî÷íîØ
ýŒîíîìŁŒŁ íŁçłŁå æîöŁàºüíßå æºîŁ îÆøåæòâà Æóäóò ïîºó÷àòü îò ýòîªî
ìåíüłå, ÷åì Æîºåå âßæîŒŁå æîöŁàºüíßå æºîŁ. Óðîâåíü ÆåçðàÆîòŁöß, ïî
âæåØ âåðîÿòíîæòŁ, Æóäåò îæòàâàòüæÿ âßæîŒŁì íà äîºªŁå ªîäß.
´ ÆîºüłŁíæòâå æòðàí ïåðåıîäíîªî ïåðŁîäà ºþäŁ â ªîðîäæŒŁı ðàØîíàı
îÆß÷íî æŁâóò â ŒâàðòŁðàı, à óðîâåíü âºàäåíŁÿ àâòîòðàíæïîðòîì ïî-
ïðåæíåìó îòíîæŁòåºüíî íŁçîŒ. ÝòŁ ôàŒòîðß, âîçìîæíî, äî æŁı ïîð
xxxv
ïðåäîïðåäåºÿºŁ ðîæò Łìóøåæòâåííßı ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ. ´ ïîæºåäíŁå 10 ºåò â
ÆîºüłŁíæòâå æòðàí ÖåíòðàºüíîØ Ł ´îæòî÷íîØ ¯âðîïß óðîâåíü
ÆºàªîæîæòîÿíŁÿ âîçðîæ. Ýòî, â ÷àæòíîæòŁ, îòìå÷àåòæÿ â ´åíªðŁŁ, ˇîºüłå,
ÑºîâåíŁŁ Ł `àºòŁØæŒŁı æòðàíàı. ¯æºŁ ´˝ˇ â ýòŁı æòðàíàı (Œîòîðßå
íàıîäÿòæÿ æðåäŁ ïåðâßı ŒàíäŁäàòîâ íà âæòóïºåíŁå â ¯âðîïåØæŒŁØ æîþç)
Æóäåò ïðîäîºæàòü ðàæòŁ, òî âåðîÿòåí òàŒæå ðîæò ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ, æâÿçàííßı
æ àâòîìîòîòðàíæïîðòîì, à òàŒæå íåŒîòîðßå âŁäß ìåºŒŁı ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ.
´îçìîæíî òàŒæå âîçðàæòåò óðîâåíü ŒâàðòŁðíßı Œðàæ, åæºŁ â äîìàı
íà÷íóò ïîÿâºÿòüæÿ âæå Æîºåå äîðîªŁå âåøŁ, à ŒàïŁòàºîâºîæåíŁÿ â
îÆåæïå÷åíŁå çàøŁòß îò Œðàæ Æóäóò îæòàâàòüæÿ íåçíà÷ŁòåºüíßìŁ.
Ñî âðåìåíåì, îäíàŒî, âºîæåíŁÿ æðåäæòâ â ïðåäóïðåæäåíŁå óªîíîâ
àâòîòðàíæïîðòà Ł ŒâàðòŁðíßı Œðàæ âîçðàæòóò, Ł óðîâåíü Łìóøåæòâåííßı
ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ æòàÆŁºŁçŁðóåòæÿ. ¯æºŁ Œ òîìó âðåìåíŁ ºŁłåíŁÿ â æðåäå
âçðîæºîªîíàæåºåíŁÿîæòàíóòæÿïðåâàºŁðóþøŁìŁ,ìîæåòîòìå÷àòüæÿ
æìåøåíŁå Œ Æîºåå íàæŁºüæòâåííßì ôîðìàì Łìóøåæòâåííßı
ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ (îªðàÆºåíŁÿ íà óºŁöàı, ıŁøåíŁÿ àâòîòðàíæïîðòà Ł ŒðàæŁ æî
âçºîìîì). ˝åŒîòîðßå Łç ìåíåå òÿæŒŁı Łìóøåæòâåííßı ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ,
ïðåäîòâðàøåííßå îÆåæïå÷åíŁåì óºó÷łåíŁåì æŁæòåìß çàøŁòß, ìîªóò
Æßòü âßòåæíåíß ŁìóøåæòâåííßìŁ ïðåæòóïºåíŁÿìŁ â Æîºåå òÿæŒîØ ôîðìå.
Óðîâåíü ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ â æòðàíàı ïåðåıîäíîªî ïåðŁîäà ìîæåò òîªäà Æßòü
æıîæŁì æ óðîâíåì ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ â ÞæíîØ ÀôðŁŒå, Œîòîðàÿ
ıàðàŒòåðŁçóåòæÿ ŁæŒºþ÷Łòåºüíî âßæîŒŁì óðîâíåì îªðàÆºåíŁØ Ł
ŒâàðòŁðíßı Œðàæ.
Óðîâåíü ŒîððóïöŁŁ â ªîæóäàðæòâåííîØ æôåðå ïðåäæòàâºÿåòæÿ íŁæå â òåı
æòðàíàı, ªäå ýŒîíîìŁ÷åæŒàÿ ðåæòðóŒòóðŁçàöŁÿ íàıîäŁòæÿ íà îòíîæŁòåºüíî
ïðîäâŁíóòîì ýòàïå, íàïðŁìåð, â ÝæòîíŁŁ Ł ´åíªðŁŁ. ˇî æóòŁ óðîâåíü
ŒîððóïöŁŁ â ýòŁı æòðàíàı íŁæå, ÷åì â íåŒîòîðßı çàïàäíßı æòðàíàı. Ýòî
î÷åíü îÆíàäåæŁâàþøŁå âßâîäß. ¯æºŁ ðåæòðóŒòóðŁçàöŁÿ ïðîäîºæŁòæÿ Ł â
äðóªŁı æòðàíàı ðåªŁîíà, òî äîºªîæðî÷íßå ïåðæïåŒòŁâß æíŁæåíŁÿ óðîâíÿ
ŒîððóïöŁŁ Æóäóò äîæòàòî÷íî ıîðîłŁìŁ.
´ öåºîì, îÆøàÿ ŒðŁìŁíîºîªŁ÷åæŒàÿ æŁòóàöŁÿ äºÿ æòðàí  ïåðåıîäíîªî
ïåðŁîäà, íà íàł âçªºÿä, âßªºÿäŁò äîæòàòî÷íî ìðà÷íîØ. ˜àæå åæºŁ
ŁìåþøŁåæÿ ýŒîíîìŁ÷åæŒŁå ïðîÆºåìß Æóäóò ïðåîäîºåíß, óðîâíŁ
íàæŁºüæòâåííßı ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ, ïî âæåØ âåðîÿòíîæòŁ, îæòàíóòæÿ âßæîŒŁìŁ â
æâÿçŁ æ âßæîŒŁìŁ óðîâíÿìŁ ÆåçðàÆîòŁöß æðåäŁ ìîºîäåæŁ Ł âßæîŒŁì
óðîâíåì ïîòðåÆºåíŁÿ ŒðåïŒŁı æïŁðòíßı íàïŁòŒîâ. ˚ðîìå ýòîªî,
òðàäŁöŁîííîå îòíîłåíŁå Œ æåíøŁíàì âðÿä ºŁ ŁçìåíŁòæÿ çà ŒîðîòŒŁØ
ïåðŁîä, Ł íàæŁºŁå ïðîòŁâ æåíøŁí, âŁäŁìî, îæòàíåòæÿ æåðüåçíîØ
ïðîÆºåìîØ.
´ ïðåäæòîÿøŁå ªîäß ïîâßłåíŁå óðîâíÿ ÆºàªîæîæòîÿíŁÿ
íàðîæäàþøåªîæÿ æðåäíåªî Œºàææà, ıîòÿ Ł æòðàäàþøåªî â æâÿçŁ æ îòŒàòîì
íàçàä, íàÆºþäàåìîì â —îææŁØæŒîØ ÔåäåðàöŁŁ, äàæò íîâßØ ðîæò
âîçìîæíîæòåØ äºÿ æîâåðłåíŁÿ ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ. `îºüłåå ŒîºŁ÷åæòâî ºþäåØ
æìîæåò ïîçâîºŁòü æåÆå æŁòü â îòäåºüíßı äîìàı Ł âºàäåòü
àâòîìàłŁíàìŁ. Ñ âðåìåííßì îòæòàâàíŁåì â íåæŒîºüŒî ºåò óðîâåíü
æàìîçàøŁòß Ł ïðåäóïðåæäåíŁÿ ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ íà÷íåò ðàæòŁ, Ł äîºÿ
Œàçóàºüíßı ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ ìîæåò îæòàíîâŁòüæÿ â ðîæòå. ˝à çàìåíó
íåŒîòîðßì ïðåäîòâðàøåííßì ïðåæòóïºåíŁÿì, îäíàŒî, ìîªóò ïðŁäòŁ
ªðàÆåæŁ.
xxxvi
ˇðåæòóïíîæòü Ł åå äåòåðìŁíàíòß â ˙àïàäíîØ ¯âðîïå
ˇîºîæåíŁå æ ïðåæòóïíîæòüþ â Æîºåå ŁíäóæòðŁàºüíî ðàçâŁòßı Ł
ïðîöâåòàþøŁı æòðàíàı ˙àïàäíîØ ¯âðîïß äîºæíî ðàææìàòðŁâàòüæÿ, â
ïåðâóþ î÷åðåäü, â æìßæºå ŒîíŒðåòíßı âåðîÿòíîæòíßı æòðóŒòóð. ´
æòðàíàı, ªäå ºþäŁ â ÆîºüłŁíæòâå æâîåì äºÿ îæóøåæòâºåíŁÿ ïîåçäîŒ
ïîºàªàþòæÿ íà àâòîìîÆŁºŁ,  îòìå÷àåòæÿ Æîºåå âßæîŒŁØ óðîâåíü
ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ, æâÿçàííßı æ àâòîìîòîòðàíæïîðòîì. ´ æòðàíàı, ªäå
íàæåºåíŁå òðàäŁöŁîííî ïðîæŁâàåò â îòäåºüíßı äîìàı, îòìå÷àåòæÿ Æîºåå
âßæîŒŁØ óðîâåíü Œðàæ æî âçºîìîì. ´ ïîæºåäíŁå ªîäß óæŁºŁºŁæü ìåðß ïî
çàøŁòå àâòîìîÆŁºåØ îò óªîíîâ Ł ïðåäîòâðàøåíŁþ Œðàæ Łç àâòîìîÆŁºåØ,
à òàŒæå ïî çàøŁòå æŁºŁø îò âçºîìîâ. ´îçìîæíî, â æâÿçŁ æ ýòŁì - Ł âåðîÿ-
òíî òàŒæå Łç-çà óæŁºåíŁÿ ïðåäïðŁíŁìàåìßı ïîºŁöŁåØ ìåð Ł Æîºåå
æóðîâßı ìåð íàŒàçàíŁÿ ïðàâîíàðółŁòåºåØ  îÆøŁØ óðîâåíü
Łìóøåæòâåííßı ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ íà÷Łíàÿ æ 1995 ªîäà æíŁæàåòæÿ ŒàŒ â
ÑåâåðíîØ ÀìåðŁŒå, òàŒ Ł â ˙àïàäíîØ
¯âðîïå (ªºàâà 3).
ˇàðàäîŒæ, íî íàæŁºüæòâåííßå ïðåæòóïºåíŁÿ  â îæîÆåííîæòŁ
íàæŁºüæòâåííßå ïðåæòóïºåíŁÿ æðåäŁ íåæîâåðłåííîºåòíŁı  Łìåþò
òåíäåíöŁþ Œ ðîæòó â íåŒîòîðßı æòðàíàı-÷ºåíàı ¯âðîïåØæŒîªî æîþçà.
´ íåŒîòîðßı æòðàíàı ðîæò ÷Łæºà îªðàÆºåíŁØ íà óºŁöàı ìîæåò Æßòü
ðåçóºüòàòîì âßòåæíåíŁÿ ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ, Œîòîðßå ÆßºŁ ïðåäóïðåæäåíß
ïîæðåäæòâîìóæŁºåííßıìåðçàøŁòß.˜ðóªŁìîÆœÿæíåíŁåìÿâºÿåòæÿ
íàðîæäåíŁå ýòíŁ÷åæŒîªî íŁçłåªî Œºàææà â Œðóïíßı ªîðîäàı ˙àïàäíîØ
¯âðîïß. Õîòÿ ýòî Ł íåºüçÿ ïîŒà ŒîíæòàòŁðîâàòü æ óâåðåííîæòüþ, íî
óðîâåíü íàïðÿæåííîæòŁ â íåŒîòîðßı ýòíŁ÷åæŒŁı æåªìåíòàı ªîðîäæŒîªî
íàæåºåíŁÿ ìîæåò âåæüìà Æßòü íà ïîäœåìå. ´ æôåðå ïðåäóïðåæäåíŁÿ
ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ îæíîâíîØ ïðîÆºåìîØ äºÿ æòðàí ˙àïàäíîØ ¯âðîïß, ïîıîæå,
ÿâºÿåòæÿæîöŁàºüíàÿŁýŒîíîìŁ÷åæŒàÿŁíòåªðàöŁÿìîºîäßıŁììŁªðàíòîââ
ðàØîíàı óðÆàíŁçàöŁŁ.
´ òî æå âðåìÿ æâîÆîäíßØ îÆðàç æŁçíŁ ìîºîäßı ºþäåØ Ł
îäíîâðåìåííîå óâºå÷åíŁå àºŒîªîºåì Ł íàðŒîòŁŒàìŁ ìîæåò òàŒæå Æßòü
Œàçóàºüíßì ôàŒòîðîì, ïðåäîïðåäåºÿþøŁì óðîâåíü íàæŁºüæòâåííîØ
ïðåæòóïíîæòüþ æðåäŁ ìîºîäåæŁ. ˛äíŁì Łç íàŁÆîºåå çíà÷Łìßı àŒòŁâîâ
â ˙àïàäíîØ ¯âðîïå â ýòîì ŒîíòåŒæòå ÿâºÿåòæÿ îòíîæŁòåºüíî íŁçŒîå
ŒîºŁ÷åæòâî íàıîäÿøåªîæÿ â æîÆæòâåííîæòŁ îªíåæòðåºüíîªî îðóæŁÿ.
¨ìåþòæÿ óÆåäŁòåºüíßå ïîŒàçàòåºŁ, ÷òî ýòî ÿâºÿåòæÿ âàæíßì ôàŒòîðîì,
æïîæîÆæòóþøŁì æîâåðłåíŁþ óÆŁØæòâ. ´ßæîŒŁå óðîâíŁ íàæŁºŁÿ â
îòíîłåíŁŁ æåíøŁí â íåŒîòîðßı çàïàäíßı æòðàíàı, ŒàŒ ïîŒàçßâàþò Ł
ïîºŁöåØæŒàÿ æòàòŁæòŁŒà, Ł ŁææºåäîâàíŁÿ ïî âîïðîæàì âŁŒòŁìŁçàöŁŁ, ìîªóò
Æßòü ðåçóºüòàòîì ïîâßłåííîØ ÷óâæòâŁòåºüíîæòŁ ýòîªî âîïðîæà Ł
îæîçíàíŁÿ ïðîÆºåìß íåïðàâîìåðíîªî îÆðàøåíŁÿ æ æåíøŁíàìŁ æî æòîðîíß
æóïðóªîâ ŁºŁ Łíßı ïàðòíåðîâ â äîìàłíåØ æðåäå. ¯æºŁ äðóªŁå æòðàíß
æòàíóò Æîºåå æÆàºàíæŁðîâàííßìŁ â îòíîłåíŁÿı ïîºîâ, â íŁı Łìåííî ïî
ýòîØ ïðŁ÷Łíå òàŒæå ìîªóò âîçðàæòŁ óðîâíŁ íàæŁºŁÿ ïðîòŁâ æåíøŁí. Ýòî
îÆœÿæíåíŁå â îòíîłåíŁŁ âßæîŒŁı óðîâíåØ â íåŒîòîðßı Łç íàŁÆîºåå
ïðîöâåòàþøŁı Ł æÆàºàíæŁðîâàííßı â îòíîłåíŁŁ ïîºîâ æòðàíàı íå
äîºæíî æòàòü ïðŁ÷ŁíîØ ïðŁíŁæåíŁÿ æåðüåçíîæòŁ ýòîªî âŁäà
ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ. ˝åäàâíåå ÿâºåíŁå âîçðîæłåªî ïðîÿâºåíŁÿ ýòŁı
xxxvii
ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ â ÆîºüłŁíæòâå æÆàºàíæŁðîâàííßı â îòíîłåíŁŁ ïîºîâ
æòðàí ïîä÷åðŒŁâàåò íàºŁ÷Łå âåæüìà çíà÷Łòåºüíßı æŒðßòßı äàííßı â
äðóªŁı ìåæòàı.
˛òíîæŁòåºüíî íŁçŒŁå óðîâíŁ ïðîÿâºåíŁÿ ŒîððóïöŁŁ æî æòîðîíß
ªîæóäàðæòâåííßı æºóæàøŁı âßªºÿäÿò òŁïŁ÷íßìŁ äºÿ æòðàí æ âßæîŒŁì
óðîâíåì äîıîäîâ Ł æî æòàÆŁºüíßìŁ äåìîŒðàòŁ÷åæŒŁìŁ òðàäŁöŁÿìŁ. Ýòî
îòíîłåíŁå ìîæåò òàŒæå ïîíŁìàòüæÿ â æìßæºå âîçìîæíîæòåØ äºÿ
æîâåðłåíŁÿ ïðåæòóïºåíŁÿ.  ´ îòŒðßòßı äåìîŒðàòŁ÷åæŒŁı æîîÆøåæòâàı æ
îòíîæŁòåºüíî æâîÆîäíßìŁ ðßíî÷íßìŁ îòíîłåíŁÿìŁ ó îôŁöŁàºüíßı ºŁö
æóøåæòâóåò ìåíüłå âîçìîæíîæòåØ âßìîªàòü âçÿòŒŁ çà æâîŁ óæºóªŁ.
ˇðåæòóïºåíŁÿ Ł äåòåðìŁíàíòß ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ â ÑåâåðíîØ
ÀìåðŁŒå
ˇî æðàâíåíŁþ æ 1988 ªîäîì óðîâåíü ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ â ÑîåäŁíåííßı
Øòàòàı Ł ˚àíàäå æíŁçŁºæÿ. Ýòî ïîŒàçßâàþò ŒàŒ äàííßå
âŁŒòŁìîºîªŁ÷åæŒîªî ŁææºåäîâàíŁÿ, òàŒ Ł ïîºŁöåØæŒàÿ æòàòŁæòŁŒà. ´ßæîŒ
óðîâåíüîÆåæïå÷åíŁÿæàìîçàøŁòß.ÓðîâåíüíàïðÿæåííîæòŁïðåäæòàâºÿåòæÿ
îòíîæŁòåºüíî íŁçŒŁì.
¨ â ÑîåäŁíåííßı Øòàòàı, Ł â ˚àíàäå â ªîðîäæŒŁı ðàØîíàı
îòìå÷àþòæÿ îòíîæŁòåºüíî âßæîŒŁå óðîâíŁ ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ, æâÿçàííßı æ
àâòîìîÆŁºÿìŁ,
à òàŒæå ŒâàðòŁðíßı Œðàæ.
Óðîâåíü Ł ïðîôŁºü ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ â ÑîåäŁíåííßı Øòàòàı îòºŁ÷àåòæÿ îò
óðîâíÿ Ł ïðîôŁºÿ ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ òàŒŁı æòðàí, ŒàŒ ˚àíàäà, ´åºŁŒîÆðŁòàíŁÿ Ł
˝Łäåðºàíäß, ìåíüłå, ÷åì ïðŁíÿòî æ÷Łòàòü. Óðîâåíü òðàäŁöŁîííßı
ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ â ÑîåäŁíåííßı Øòàòàı íå ÿâºÿåòæÿ ŁæŒºþ÷Łòåºüíî âßæîŒŁì,
òàŒîå æå ïîºîæåíŁå Ł â îòíîłåíŁŁ óðîâíÿ ŒîððóìïŁðîâàííîæòŁ.
˝àŁÆîºåå âàæíßå îòºŁ÷Łÿ ïðîÿâºÿþòæÿ â Æîºåå âßæîŒîì óðîâíå óÆŁØæòâ Ł
îªðàÆºåíŁØ, à òàŒæå â òîì, ÷òî â ÑØÀ ýòŁ ïðåæòóïºåíŁÿ ÷àæòî
æîâåðłàþòæÿ æ ïðŁìåíåíŁåì îªíåæòðåºüíîªî îðóæŁÿ. ˝àŁÆîºåå âåðîÿòíîØ
ïðŁ÷ŁíîØýòîªîîòŒºîíåíŁÿîòåâðîïåØæŒîØ æıåìßÿâºÿåòæÿŁæŒºþ÷Łòåºüíî
âßæîŒŁØ óðîâåíü âºàäåíŁÿ îªíåæòðåºüíßì îðóæŁåì.
—åæóðæßŁäåÿòåºüíîæòüæŁæòåìßóªîºîâíîªîïðàâîæóäŁÿ
˝åæìîòðÿ íà îæòîðîæíîæòü, Œîòîðóþ æºåäóåò Łìåòü â âŁäó, ðàÆîòàÿ æ
ŁìåþøŁìŁæÿ ìåæäóíàðîäíßìŁ äàííßìŁ, ïîæºåäîâàòåºüíîæòü âßâîäîâ â
íàæòîÿøåì ŁææºåäîâàíŁŁ â îòíîłåíŁŁ æŁæòåì óªîºîâíîªî ïðàâîæóäŁÿ ŒàŒ â
¯âðîïå, òàŒ Ł â ÑåâåðíîØ ÀìåðŁŒå â äåØæòâŁòåºüíîæòŁ ïðåäæòàâºÿåò
âîçìîæíîæòü óâåðåííî çàÿâŁòü, ÷òî ìß íà÷Łíàåì æŒºàäßâàòü ïî â åäŁíóþ
ŒàðòŁíó âàæíßå æîæòàâºÿþøŁå ÷àæòŁ çàïóòàííîØ ìåæäóíàðîäíîØ
ªîºîâîºîìŒŁ ïîä íàçâàíŁåì óªîºîâíîå ïðàâîæóäŁå. ˛æíîâíßå âßâîäß
ïî ìàòåðŁàºàì ªºàâ æóììŁðóþòæÿ â æºåäóþøŁı æåìŁ ïóíŒòàı:
(1) ´ ìåæäóíàðîäíîì ŁçìåðåíŁŁ æóøåæòâóþò çíà÷Łòåºüíßå âàðŁàöŁŁ â
óðîâíå ïîºŁöåØæŒŁı, ïðîŒóðîðæŒŁı ðàÆîòíŁŒîâ, æóäåØ Ł ïåðæîíàºà
ïåíŁòåíöŁàðíîØ æŁæòåìß (íà 100 000 íàæåºåíŁÿ), íî ïîðàçŁòåºüíà
ŁíòåðíàöŁîíàºüíàÿ æıîæåæòü â ðàæïðåäåºåíŁŁ æîòðóäíŁŒîâ æŁæòåìß
xxxviii
óªîºîâíîªî ïðàâîæóäŁÿ â îðªàíàı ïîºŁöŁŁ, ïðîŒóðàòóðß, æóäîâ Ł óªîºîâíî-
ŁæïîºíŁòåºüíßı ó÷ðåæäåíŁØ. Õîòÿ â æòðàíàı ÖåíòðàºüíîØ Ł ´îæòî÷íîØ
¯âðîïß îòìå÷àåòæÿ çíà÷Łòåºüíî Æîºåå âßæîŒŁØ óðîâåíü æîòðóäíŁŒîâ,
ðàÆîòàþøŁı â æŁæòåìå óªîºîâíîªî ïðàâîæóäŁÿ, ÷åì â æòðàíàı
¯âðîïåØæŒîªî æîþçà, îŒîºî 82% ïåðæîíàºà æŁæòåìß óªîºîâíîªî
ïðàâîæóäŁÿ â îÆåŁı ªðóïïàı æòðàí çàíÿòß â ïîºŁöŁŁ, ïðŁìåðíî 2% 
â ïðîŒóðîðæŒîØ ïðàŒòŁŒå, 3%  æóäüŁ Ł 13% - â ŁæïðàâŁòåºüíîØ æŁæòåìå.
(2) ˛òìå÷àåòæÿ ïðÿìàÿ çàâŁæŁìîæòü ìåæäó ïðåæòóïíîæòüþ Ł óðîâíÿìŁ
ïåðæîíàºà æŁæòåìß óªîºîâíîªî ïðàâîæóäŁÿ: æòðàíß æ âßæîŒŁì óðîâíåì
ìåºŒŁı Œðàæ, òÿæŒŁı íàæŁºüæòâåííßı ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ Ł óÆŁØæòâ Łìåþò
äîæòàòî÷íî âßæîŒŁØ óðîâåíü æîòðóäíŁŒîâ æŁæòåìß, íåæåºŁ æòðàíß æ
Æîºåå íŁçŒŁìŁ óðîâíÿìŁ ýòŁı ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ.
(3) Óªîºîâíîå ïðàâîæóäŁå â ¯âðîïå Ł ÑåâåðíîØ ÀìåðŁŒå îæòàåòæÿ
ïðîôåææŁåØ, ªäå äîìŁíŁðóþò ìóæ÷Łíß. ˝åò íŁ îäíîØ æòðàíß, ªäå
æåíøŁíß æîæòàâºÿþò ïîºîâŁíó ŁºŁ Æîºåå ïåðæîíàºà ïåíŁòåíöŁàðíîØ
æŁæòåìß Ł ïîºŁöŁŁ, Ł åæòü âæåªî íåæŒîºüŒî æòðàí, ªäå ïîºîâŁíà ŁºŁ
Æîºåå ïðîŒóðîðæŒŁı ðàÆîòíŁŒîâ ŁºŁ æóäåØ ÿâºÿþòæÿ æåíøŁíàìŁ. ´
æòðàíàı ÖåíòðàºüíîØ Ł ´îæòî÷íîØ ¯âðîïß íåæŒîºüŒî âßłå äîºÿ æåíøŁí-
æóäåØ Ł ïåðæîíàºà ïåíŁòåíöŁàðíîØ æŁæòåìß, ÷åì â æòðàíàı ¯âðîïåØæŒîªî
æîþçà. ¨ âæå æå Æóäåò æºŁłŒîì óïðîøåííßì äåºàòü âßâîä, ÷òî â
æòðàíàı ÖåíòðàºüíîØ Ł ´îæòî÷íîØ ¯âðîïß æîîòâåòæòâåííî Łìååòæÿ Æîºåå
æÆàºàíæŁðîâàííàÿ ïî ïîºîâîìó ïðŁçíàŒó ÷Łæºåííîæòü ðàÆîòíŁŒîâ
æŁæòåìß óªîºîâíîªî ïðàâîæóäŁÿ: â íåŒîòîðßı æòðàíàı ïåðåıîäíîªî
ïåðŁîäà ŁíäåŒæ Æàºàíæà ïî ïîºîâîìó ïðŁçíàŒó äîæòàòî÷íî íŁçîŒ, â òî
âðåìÿ ŒàŒ íåŒîòîðßå æòðàíß ¯âðîïåØæŒîªî æîþçà, ˚àíàäà Ł ÑØÀ
çàíŁìàþò ìåæòà â âåðıíåØ ÷åòâåðòŁ ðåØòŁíªà ïî ŁíäåŒæó ïîºîâîªî
Æàºàíæà.
(4) ˇÿòßØ îÆçîð ˛˛˝ Ł Ìåæäóíàðîäíîå âŁŒòŁìîºîªŁ÷åæŒîå
ŁææºåäîâàíŁå äàºŁ ÷àæòŁ÷íî íåïîæºåäîâàòåºüíßå ïîðòðåòíßå îòïå÷àòŒŁ
âàðŁàöŁØ ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ íà ìåæäóíàðîäíîì óðîâíå. ˛äíàŒî, ŒàŒ òîºüŒî â
îòíîłåíŁŁ æòåïåíŁ çàÿâºÿåìîæòŁ î æåðòâàı ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ ïðŁíŁìàþòæÿ
âî âíŁìàíŁå íàöŁîíàºüíßå ðàçºŁ÷Łÿ, íåŒîòîðßå Łç ýòŁı íåæîîòâåòæòâŁØ
Łæ÷åçàþò (Œîªäà âíŁìàíŁå îÆðàøåíî íà ïðåæòóïíîæòü â öåºîì).
(5) Ñóøåæòâóþò çíà÷Łòåºüíßå ðàçºŁ÷Łÿ íà ìåæäóíàðîäíîì óðîâíå â
æòåïåíŁ âåðîÿòíîæòŁ, ÷òî ïîºŁöŁÿ Æóäåò ðåªŁæòðŁðîâàòü ïðåæòóïºåíŁÿ,
ïîïàâłŁå â æôåðó åå âíŁìàíŁÿ. ´ æòðàíàı ÖåíòðàºüíîØ Ł ´îæòî÷íîØ
¯âðîïß ïî æðàâíåíŁþ æî æòðàíàìŁ ¯âðîïåØæŒîªî æîþçà íŁæå æòåïåíü
âåðîÿòíîæòŁ òîªî, ÷òî æåðòâß ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ Æóäóò æîîÆøàòü îÆ ýòîì
ïîºŁöŁŁ, Ł ïîºŁöŁÿ æ ìåíüłåØ ªîòîâíîæòüþ ðåªŁæòðŁðóåò ïðåæòóïºåíŁÿ,
î Œîòîðßı åØ æîîÆøàþò.
(6) ˝à ìåæäóíàðîäíîì óðîâíå âåæüìà ïðîÆºåìàòŁ÷íß Ł òÿæåºß äºÿ
ŁíòåðïðåòàöŁŁ äàííßå î äâŁæåíŁŁ äåºà ïî ýòàïàì æŁæòåìß óªîºîâíîªî
ïðàâîæóäŁÿ, îæîÆåííî Œîªäà àŒöåíò äåºàåòæÿ íà ïðåæòóïíîæòü â öåºîì.
˛÷åâŁäíî, ÷òî â æòðàíàı ¯âðîïåØæŒîªî æîþçà îòìå÷àåòæÿ Æîºåå âßæîŒîå
ïî æðàâíåíŁþ æî æòðàíàìŁ ïåðåıîäíîªî ïåðŁîäà ŒîºŁ÷åæòâî
çàðåªŁæòðŁðîâàííßı ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ, ïîäîçðåâàåìßı, âîçÆóæäåííßı
óªîºîâíßı äåº, æóäŁìîæòåØ Ł âßíåæåííßı ïðŁªîâîðîâ î ºŁłåíŁŁ
æâîÆîäß. ˇîìŁìî ýòîªî óòâåðæäåíŁÿ òðóäíî æäåºàòü ŒàŒŁå-ºŁÆî òâåðäßå
çàŒºþ÷åíŁÿ. —àçºŁ÷Łÿ â óðîâíå âßïàäåíŁÿ äåº (óðîâåíü, ïðŁ Œîòîðîì äåºà
xxxix
Ł ïîäîçðåâàåìßå îŒàçßâàþòæÿ âßæŒîºüçíóâłŁìŁ Łç æŁæòåìß óªîºîâíîªî
ïðàâîæóäŁÿ íà ðàçºŁ÷íßı æòàäŁÿı ïðîöåææà), ïî âæåØ âåðîÿòíîæòŁ, îòðàæàþò
ðàçºŁ÷Łÿ â ïðîöåææóàºüíßı îæîÆåííîæòÿı íàöŁîíàºüíßı æŁæòåì óªîºîâíîªî
ïðàâîæóäŁÿ, ïðàŒòŁŒå ðåªŁæòðàöŁŁ Ł ìåòîäîºîªŁŁ âßíåæåíŁÿ ïðŁªîâîðà, à
íå ðàçºŁ÷Łÿ â Œà÷åæòâå ðàÆîòß, ïðîâåäåííîØ æîòðóäíŁŒàìŁ îðªàíîâ
æŁæòåìß óªîºîâíîªî ïðàâîæóäŁÿ. ˜àííßå î çàâåðłàþøŁı æòàäŁÿı ïðîöåææà,
âŁäŁìî, Æîºåå íàäåæíß, ÷åì äàííßå î íà÷àºüíßı ýòàïàı ïðîöåææà;
æîîòíîłåíŁå ìåæäó óªîºîâíßì ïðåæºåäîâàíŁåì Ł âßíåæåíŁåì
ïðŁªîâîðà (ò.å. æŒîºüŒî ïðåæºåäîâàíŁØ ïðŁâåºî Œ îæóæäåíŁþ) ïîŒàçßâàåò
îòíîæŁòåºüíî îªðàíŁ÷åííóþ âàðŁàíòíîæòü íà ìåæäóíàðîäíîì óðîâíå Ł
ïîýòîìó ìîæåò Æßòü îÆåøàþøŁì îÆœåŒòîì äºÿ Æóäóøåªî àíàºŁçà íà
ìåæäóíàðîäíîì óðîâíå.
(7) ˛öåíŒà ìåæäóíàðîäíßı âàðŁàöŁØ â ôóíŒöŁîíŁðîâàíŁŁ Æîºüłîªî
ŒîºŁ÷åæòâà æŁæòåì óªîºîâíîªî ïðàâîæóäŁÿ îæòàåòæÿ òðóäíîØ, åæºŁ âîîÆøå
ÿâºÿåòæÿðàçðåłŁìîØçàäà÷åØ.¨ìåþøŁåæÿäàííßåïðîæòîíåïðåäæòàâºÿþòæÿ
àäåŒâàòíßìŁ. ÑóÆœåŒòŁâíßå ïîŒàçàòåºŁ ïîºó÷Łòü ºåª÷å, ÷åì
îÆœåŒòŁâíßå æåæòŒŁå ïîŒàçàòåºŁ. ÓðîâíŁ ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ - ıîòÿ Ł
î÷åâŁäíî òåæíî æâÿçàííßå æ ðåçóºüòàòàìŁ äåÿòåºüíîæòŁ æŁæòåì óªîºîâíîªî
ïðàâîæóäŁÿ - ïîºåçíßìŁ ïàðàìåòðàìŁ æ òî÷ŒŁ çðåíŁÿ ïîŒàçàòåºåØ
ôóíŒöŁîíŁðîâàíŁÿ íåÿâºÿþòæÿ.ÑòðàíßïîŒàçßâàþò âîïðåäåºåííîØ
æòåïåíŁ îïîðó íà æıîäíßå ŒàòåªîðŁŁ â îòíîłåíŁŁ ïàðàìåòðîâ
ðåªŁæòðàöŁŁ ïîºŁöŁåØ ïðåæòóïºåíŁØ, ïðîäóŒòŁâíîæòŁ ðàÆîòß (ïîºŁöŁŁ Ł
ïðîŒóðîðæŒŁı ðàÆîòíŁŒîâ, ŁçìåðÿåìîØ ŒîºŁ÷åæòâîì ïîäîçðåâàåìßı Ł
ïîäâåðªíóòßı íàŒàçàíŁþ) Ł íåŒîòîðßå æóÆœåŒòŁâíßå ïîŒàçàòåºŁ (îöåíŒà
ªðàæäàíàìŁ ôóíŒöŁîíŁðîâàíŁÿ ïîºŁöŁŁ, îöåíŒà äîæòàòî÷íîæòŁ æŁæòåìß
Ł îøóøåíŁÿ æòåïåíŁ ÆåçîïàæíîæòŁ, à òàŒæå îòâåòß íà âîïðîæß
îòíîæŁòåºüíî ŒîððóïöŁŁ â ðàìŒàıüåæäóíàðîäíîªî âŁŒòŁìîºîªŁ÷åæŒîªî
ŁææºåäîâàíŁÿ). ˝åŒîòîðßå æòðàíß Łìåþò âßæîŒŁå ïîŒàçàòåºŁ ïî âæåì (ŁºŁ
ïî ÆîºüłŁíæòâó ïàðàìåòðîâ ôóíŒöŁîíŁðîâàíŁÿ: ó äðóªŁı æòðàí íŁçŒŁå
ïîŒàçàòåºŁ ïî âæåì (ŁºŁ ïî ÆîºüłŁíæòâó) ïàðàìåòðàì. Ýòî ïðåäïîºàªàåò,
÷òî ïàðàìåòðß ôóíŒöŁîíŁðîâàíŁÿ, Œîòîðßå ÆßºŁ ðàçðàÆîòàíß äºÿ
íàæòîÿøåªî ŁææºåäîâàíŁÿ, ìîªóò Łìåòü îÆîæíîâàííóþ æòåïåíü ïîºåçíîæòŁ.
˚ðîìå òîªî, óðîâíŁ ïðåæòóïíîæòŁ, î÷åâŁäíî, íå æîâæåì Æåæïîðÿäî÷íî
ðàæïðåäåºÿþòæÿæðåäŁæòðàí,ðàçºŁ÷àþøŁıæÿïîïàðàìåòðàì
ôóíŒöŁîíŁðîâàíŁÿ æŁæòåì óªîºîâíîªî ïðàâîæóäŁÿ. ˝à íàæòîÿøåì íà÷àºüíîì
ýòàïå æºåäóåò ŁçÆåªàòü ºþÆßı âßâîäîâ îòíîæŁòåºüíî ïðŁ÷Łííî-
æºåäæòâåííîØ çàâŁæŁìîæòŁ.
ÑàíŒöŁŁ
ˇîæŁçíåííîå çàŒºþ÷åíŁå. ˙à î÷åíü ðåäŒŁì ŁæŒºþ÷åíŁåì (íàïðŁìåð,
˝îðâåªŁÿ, ªäå ïîæŁçíåííîå çàŒºþ÷åíŁå Æßºî îòìåíåíî â 1981 ªîäó)
ïîæŁçíåííîå çàŒºþ÷åíŁå ìîæåò ïîæºåäîâàòü â ¯âðîïå Ł ÑåâåðíîØ
ÀìåðŁŒå çà îïðåäåºåííßå òÿæŒŁå ïðåæòóïºåíŁÿ. Òåì íå ìåíåå, ŁìåþøŁåæÿ
äàííßå ïîŒàçßâàþò, ÷òî ïîæŁçíåííîå çàŒºþ÷åíŁå æîæòàâºÿåò ºŁłü î÷åíü
ìàºóþ ÷àæòü (ìåíåå îäíîªî ïðîöåíòà âî âæåı æòðàíàı) îò îÆøåªî ÷Łæºà
âßíåæåííßı ïðŁªîâîðîâ.
xl
¸ŁłåíŁå æâîÆîäß. ÒþðåìíîåçàŒºþ÷åíŁåÿâºÿåòæÿ æòàíîâßìıðåÆòîì
æŁæòåìß æàíŒöŁØ âî âæå æòðàíàı ¯âðîïß Ł ÑåâåðíîØ ÀìåðŁŒŁ. ˛íî
æîæòàâºÿåò îŒîºî òðåòŁ îò âæåı âßíåæåííßı ïðŁªîâîðîâ. ˜àííßå ˇÿòîªî
îÆçîðà ˛˛˝ ïîŒàçßâàþò çíà÷Łòåºüíßå âàðŁàöŁŁ â äàííîì ïîŒàçàòåºå íà
100 òßæ. íàæåºåíŁÿ. ˜Łàïàçîí ðàçºŁ÷ŁØ  îò ìåíåå 50 ïðŁªîâîðîâ
åæåªîäíî î ºŁłåíŁŁ æâîÆîäß íà 100 òßæ. íàæåºåíŁÿ â ÀçåðÆàØäæàíå,
íà ˚Łïðå Ł â åˆðìàíŁŁ äî 200 â ˆðåöŁŁ, ØîòºàíäŁŁ Ł ÒóðöŁŁ.
´ öåºîì, ïðŁìåíåíŁå ìåðß ïðåæå÷åíŁÿ â âŁäå ºŁłåíŁÿ æâîÆîäß çà
ïåðŁîä æ 1990 ïî 1994 ª. âîçðîæºî. ´ ðÿäå æòðàí ÷Łæºî âßíåæåííßı
ïðŁªîâîðîâ æ íàºîæåíŁåì íàŒàçàíŁÿ â âŁäå òþðåìíîªî çàŒºþ÷åíŁÿ Ł ÷Łæºî
çàŒºþ÷åíŁØ ïîä æòðàæó çà ýòîò ïåðŁîä óìåíüłŁºîæü. Òåì íå ìåíåå,
ïîıîæå, ÷òî óâåºŁ÷åíŁå æðîŒîâ ºŁłåíŁÿ æâîÆîäß, ðåàºüíî ïðîâåäåííßı
â ðàìŒàı òþðåìíîªî çàŒºþ÷åíŁÿ, ðåàºüíî ŒîìïåíæŁðóåò òàŒîå æîŒðàøåíŁå
÷ŁæºåííîæòŁ çàŒºþ÷åííßı ïîä æòðàæó Ł äàæå íàıîäŁò îòðàæåíŁå â
óâåºŁ÷åíŁŁ ÷Łæºà íàıîäÿøŁıæÿ â çàŒºþ÷åíŁŁ. ˝åŒîòîðßå Łíòåðåæíßå
ŁæŒºþ÷åíŁÿ (ÀâæòðŁÿ, ˚Łïð, ÔŁíºÿíäŁÿ Ł ÑºîâåíŁÿ) ïîŒàçßâàþò, ÷òî
ŒîºŁ÷åæòâî çàŒºþ÷åííßı ìîæåò ŒîíòðîºŁðîâàòüæÿ Ł â ýòîì ïîŒàçàòåºå íåò
îÆÿçàòåºüíîØ ïðåäîïðåäåºåííîæòŁ Œ ðîæòó (ðàçäåº 5.3.)
Ñóøåæòâóþò çíà÷Łòåºüíßå ðàçºŁ÷Łÿ â ìåòîäå ïðŁìåíåíŁÿ
òþðåìíîªîçàŒºþ÷åíŁÿ.. ´ íåŒîòîðßı æòðàíàı íàìåðåííî ïðŁíÿòî
ïîºŁòŁ÷åæŒîå ðåłåíŁå î æîŒðàøåíŁŁ íàŒàçàíŁÿ â âŁäå òþðåìíîªî
çàŒºþ÷åíŁÿ (ŒàŒ ýòî Łìååò ìåæòî â ÔŁíºÿíäŁŁ), â òî âðåìÿ ŒàŒ äðóªŁå
æòðàíß Łìåþò îïðåäåºåííîå ïîºŁòŁ÷åæŒîå ðåłåíŁå îÆ óæŁºåíŁŁ
ŁæïîºüçîâàíŁÿ òþðåìíîªî çàŒºþ÷åíŁÿ ŒàŒ ìåðß ºŁłåíŁÿ æâîÆîäß (ŒàŒ ýòî
Łìååò ìåæòî â ÑîåäŁíåííßı Øòàòàı). ´ íåŒîòîðßı æòðàíàı òîºüŒî äºÿ
ìàºîªî ÷Łæºà ïðåæòóïíŁŒîâ âßíîæÿòæÿ ïðŁªîâîðß, ïðåäóæìàòðŁâàþøŁå
çíà÷ŁòåºüíßØ æðîŒ òþðåìíîªî çàŒºþ÷åíŁÿ, â äðóªŁı Œ íåçíà÷Łòåºüíßì
æðîŒàì òþðåìíîªî çàŒºþ÷åíŁÿ ïðŁªîâàðŁâàåòæÿ Æîºüłîå ŒîºŁ÷åæòâî
ïðàâîíàðółŁòåºåØ, à â òðåòüŁı Œ çíà÷Łòåºüíßì æðîŒàì òþðåìíîªî
çàŒºþ÷åíŁÿ ïðŁªîâàðŁâàåòæÿ Æîºüłîå ŒîºŁ÷åæòâî ïðàâîíàðółŁòåºåØ.
Ñåâåðíßå æòðàíß ¯âðîïß æòîÿò íà îäíîì Œîíöå æïåŒòðà, à æòðàíß
ÖåíòðàºüíîØ Ł ´îæòî÷íîØ ¯âðîïß (çà ðåäŒŁì ŁæŒºþ÷åíŁåì), à òàŒæå
ÑîåäŁíåííßå Øòàòß íàıîäÿòæÿ íà äðóªîì (ðàçäåº 5.6).
`ßºà îòìå÷åíà æâÿçü ìåæäó óðîâíåì çàŒºþ÷åííßı íà 100 òßæ. íàæåºåíŁÿ
Ł ŒîºŁ÷åæòâîì ðåæïîíäåíòîâ ïî æòðàíàì â ðàìŒàı Ìåæäóíàðîäíîªî
âŁŒòŁìîºîªŁ÷åæŒîªî ŁææºåäîâàíŁÿ, Œîòîðßå âßæŒàçàºŁæü â ïîºüçó
òþðåìíîªîçàŒºþ÷åíŁÿ(ðàçäåº5.7.).˛äíàŒîŒîððåºÿöŁÿìîæåòÿâºÿòüæÿ
æºåäæòâŁåì òîªî, ÷òî æóäß ïðîæòî îòðàæàþò ªºàæ íàðîäà, ŁºŁ òîªî, ÷òî
íàæåºåíŁå íà÷Łíàåò âîæïðŁíŁìàòü æóøåæòâóþøóþ ïðàŒòŁŒó âßíåæåíŁÿ
ïðŁªîâîðîâ æóäàìŁ, ŁºŁ äàæå âîçìîæíî, ÷òî Ł ŒîºŁ÷åæòâî íàıîäÿøŁıæÿ â
çàŒºþ÷åíŁŁ,  Ł îÆøåæòâåííîå ìíåíŁå îïðåäåºÿþòæÿ íåŒîòîðßì òðåòüŁì(Ł)
ôàŒòîðîì (ôàŒòîðàìŁ).
ˇîıîæå, ÷òî ïðîäîºæŁòåºüíîæòü æðîŒà òþðåìíîªî çàŒºþ÷åíŁÿ
ÿâºÿåòæÿîæíîâíßìôàŒòîðîì,îÆœÿæíÿþøŁì÷ŁæºåííîæòüíàıîäÿøŁıæÿâ
çàŒºþ÷åíŁŁ. ÑðîŒ ºŁłåíŁÿ æâîÆîäß çàâŁæŁò, â ïåðâóþ î÷åðåäü, îò
ôóíäàìåíòàºüíîØ ïðåäïîæßºŒŁ óªîºîâíîØ ïîºŁòŁŒŁ â îïðåäåºåííîØ
æòðàíå, ÷òî ïî æóòŁ îïðåäåºÿåò, îðŁåíòŁðóåòæÿ ºŁ îíà íà íàŒàçàíŁå ŁºŁ
íåò. ÒàŒŁì îÆðàçîì, äºÿ òîªî, ÷òîÆß óìåíüłŁòü ŒîºŁ÷åæòâî ºŁö,
ºŁłåííßı æâîÆîäß, æŁæòåìà óªîºîâíîªî ïðàâîæóäŁÿ äîºæíà íàØòŁ
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æïîæîÆß æîŒðàøåíŁÿ â æðåäíåì æðîŒîâ çàŒºþ÷åíŁÿ, à íå ïßòàòüæÿ æîŒðàòŁòü
÷Łæºî ºŁłàåìßı æâîÆîäß ºŁö - ıîòÿ æîŒðàøåíŁå ŒîºŁ÷åæòâà
çàŒºþ÷àåìßı ïîä æòðàæó ìîæåò ïðŁâåæòŁ Œ æîŒðàøåíŁþ ÷ŁæºåííîæòŁ
îòÆßâàþøŁı æðîŒ íàŒàçàíŁÿ â òþðüìå.
˚îíòðîºü íà æâîÆîäå. ÌíîªŁå æàíŒöŁŁ ïîäðàçóìåâàþò
çíà÷Łòåºüíóþ æòåïåíü íàÆºþäåíŁÿ Ł Œîíòðîºÿ çà ïðàâîíàðółŁòåºåì.
Ñþäà îòíîæÿòæÿ Ł îòæðî÷åííîå ŁºŁ óæºîâíîå íàŒàçàíŁå æ óæòàíîâºåíŁåì
íàÆºþäåíŁÿ, Łæïßòàòåºüíîªî æðîŒà, ïðŁâºå÷åíŁÿ Œ îÆøåæòâåííî-ïîºåçíîìó
òðóäó, ŁæïðàâŁòåºüíî-òðóäîâßå ðàÆîòß, æïåöŁàºüíßå ôîðìß îÆðàøåíŁÿ Ł
ºå÷åíŁÿ Ł ìåæòíîå îªðàíŁ÷åíŁå â ïðàâàı. ´ æâÿçŁ æ òàŒŁì ðàçíîîÆðàçŁåì
íåò âîçìîæíîæòŁ âßÿâŁòü îÆøóþ òåíäåíöŁþ â äàííßı â îòíîłåíŁŁ ýòîØ
æàíŒöŁŁ. —àçºŁ÷íßå æòðàíß ŁíôîðìŁðóþò, ÷òî â îÆøåì ìàææŁâå æàíŒöŁØ
Œîíòðîºü íà æâîÆîäå æîæòàâºÿåò îò 0 äî 70% (äºÿ ×åıŁŁ Ł ÑºîâàŒŁŁ).
˛äíŁì Łç âîïðîæîâ ˇÿòîªî îÆçîðà ˛˛˝ ÿâºÿºæÿ âîïðîæ î ŒîºŁ÷åæòâå ºŁö,
íàıîäÿøŁıæÿ â óæºîâíîì îæóæäåíŁŁ (ïðîöåäóðà, Œîªäà ïðŁçíàííîå
âŁíîâíßì ºŁöî îæâîÆîæäàåòæÿ æóäîì Æåç íàºîæåíŁÿ íàŒàçàíŁÿ â âŁäå
ºŁłåíŁÿ æâîÆîäß Ł ïîìåøàåòæÿ ïîä íàÆºþäåíŁå îôŁöŁàºüíîªî ºŁöà ŁºŁ
îôŁöŁàºüíî íàçíà÷åííîªî îðªàíà), Ł äðóªîØ âîïðîæ Œàæàºæÿ ŒîºŁ÷åæòâà
ºŁö, íàıîäÿøŁıæÿ â óæºîâíîì îæóæäåíŁŁ íà îïðåäåºåííßØ äåíü. ´ 1994
ªîäó îò 10 (â ¸Łòâå) äî 536 (â ÑîåäŁíåííßı Øòàòàı) ÷åºîâåŒ íà 100
òßæ. íàæåºåíŁÿ íàıîäŁºîæü â óæºîâíîì îæóæäåíŁŁ; à íà îòäåºüíî âçÿòßØ
äåíü ªîäà öŁôðß âàðüŁðîâàºŁæü îò 12 (ÑºîâåíŁÿ) äî 1137 (â
ÑîåäŁíåííßı Øòàòàı) íà 100 òßæ. íàæåºåíŁÿ.
ˇðåäóïðåæäåíŁÿ Łìåðß äŁæöŁïºŁíàðîíîªî âîçäåØæòâŁÿ. ¨ âíîâü â
îòâåòàı æòðàí æîîÆøàºîæü, ÷òî îò 0 äî Æîºåå 50% (â `îºªàðŁŁ,
˚àçàıæòàíå, ÑºîâåíŁŁ Ł ØâåØöàðŁŁ) æàíŒöŁØ îòíîæÿòæÿ Œ ïðåäóïðåæäåíŁÿì
ŁºŁ ìåðàì äŁæöŁïºŁíàðíîªî âîçäåØæòâŁÿ, âŒºþ÷àÿ âæå îòæðî÷åííßå ìåðß
íàŒàçàíŁÿ Æåç îÆÿçàòåºüíîªî íàÆºþäåíŁÿ. (Ñºåäóåò Łìåòü â âŁäó
æïåöŁàºüíóþ îªîâîðŒó â ðàçäåºàı 1.3 Ł 5.1.1 îòíîæŁòåºüíî æðàâíŁìîæòŁ
äàííßı ïî æòàòŁæòŁŒå ìåð íàŒàçàíŁØ; ìîæíî æäåºàòü ïðåäïîºîæåíŁå, ÷òî
âî ìíîªŁı æòðàíàı ïðåäóïðåæäåíŁÿ Ł ìåðß àäìŁíŁæòðàòŁâíîªî
âîçäåØæòâŁÿ ìîªóò íàºàªàòüæÿ ïîºŁöŁåØ Ł ïðîŒóðàòóðîØ, Ł ýòî íå
îÆÿçàòåºüíî âŒºþ÷àåòæÿ â æóäåÆíóþ æòàòŁæòŁŒó).
Øòðàôß. ÌàòåðŁàºüíßå ìåðß íàŒàçàíŁå ÿâºÿþòæÿ îäíŁì Łç æàìßı
łŁðîŒî Łæïîºüçóåìßı â åâðîïåØæŒŁı æòðàíàı, îæîÆåííî â ˙àïàäíîØ ¯
âðîïå. ´ ÀâæòðŁŁ, ÀíªºŁŁ Ł Óýºæå, ÔŁíºÿíäŁŁ Ł åˆðìàíŁŁ Æîºåå 70%
ìåð íàŒàçàíŁÿ æîæòàâºÿþò łòðàôß. Ñ äðóªîØ æòîðîíß łŒàºß  â ˚ŁðªŁçŁŁ,
¸Łòâå Ł ÑºîâåíŁŁ  łòðàôß æîæòàâºÿþò ìåíåå 10% æàíŒöŁØ. (Òà æå
îªîâîðŒà, ÷òî Ł â îòíîłåíŁŁ æòàòŁæòŁŒŁ ïî ïðåäóïðåæäåíŁÿì Ł ìåðàì
äŁæöŁïºŁíàðíîªî âîçäåØæòâŁÿ, æïðàâåäºŁâà Ł â îòíîłåíŁŁ łòðàôîâ).
˛Æøåæòâåííî-ïîºåçíßØ òðóä. ´î ìíîªŁı æòðàíàı îÆøåæòâåííî-
ïîºåçíßØ òðóä â Œà÷åæòâå ìåðß íàŒàçàíŁÿ â ðàìŒàı æŁæòåìß óªîºîâíîªî
ïðàâîæóäŁÿ íå ïðŁçíàåòæÿ. Ñóäÿ ïî îòâåòàì íà ˇÿòßØ îÆçîð ˛˛˝, Œ æòðàíàì,
ªäå íàŁÆîºåå àŒòŁâíî Łæïîºüçóåòæÿ îÆøåæòâåííî-ïîºåçíßØ òðóä , îòíîæÿòæÿ
—îææŁØæŒàÿ ÔåäåðàöŁÿ (îŒîºî 15% âæåı íàŒàçàíŁØ), ÀçåðÆàØäæàí (13%),
ˆðóçŁÿ (12%), ˝Łäåðºàíäß (8%), ØîòºàíäŁÿ (7%) Ł Ñåâåðíàÿ ¨ðºàíäŁÿ (6%).
˛äíàŒî â ýòîØ æâÿçŁ æºåäóåò íàïîìíŁòü, ÷òî ŒîíöåïöŁÿ îÆøåæòâåííî-
ïîºåçíîªî òðóäà â æòðàíàı ìîæåò çíà÷Łòåºüíî îòºŁ÷àòüæÿ, Ł ïîýòîìó
æºåäóåò Æßòü îæòîðîæíßì ïðŁ ïðîâåäåíŁŁ ìåæäóíàðîäíîªî
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æðàâíåíŁòåºüíîªî àíàºŁçà â äàííîØ îÆºàæòŁ. ˝àïðŁìåð, â íåŒîòîðßı
æòðàíàı ïåðåıîäíîªî ïåðŁîäà, âŒºþ÷àÿ —îææŁØæŒóþ ÔåäåðàöŁþ,
ÀçåðÆàØäæàí Ł ˆðóçŁþ, îÆøåæòâåííî-ïîºåçíßØ òðóä ïî æóòŁ ÿâºÿåòæÿ
âîæïŁòàòåºüíßì òðóäîì. Ýòà ìåðà íàŒàçàíŁÿ ïðåäóæìàòðŁâàåò, ÷òîÆß
ïðàâîíàðółŁòåºü ïðîäîºæàº ðàÆîòàòü íà æâîåì ðàÆî÷åì ìåæòå, à ÷àæòü
çàðàÆîòíîØ ïºàòß âß÷Łòàåòæÿ â âŁäå íàŒàçàíŁÿ.
ÑðåäŁ ºŁö, îæóæäåííßı â 1994 ªîäó, äîºÿ æåíøŁí æîæòàâºÿåò îò 3,5%
(â ˚àçàıæòàíå) äî 18,2% (â ÀâæòðŁŁ). ˜ºÿ ŒàæäîØ æòðàíß ðàçºŁ÷Łÿ â
äàííßı 1990 ªîäà Ł 1994 ªîäà â îòíîłåíŁŁ äîºŁ îæóæäåííßı æåíøŁí â
îÆøåì ÷Łæºå îæóæäåííßı ïðàâîíàðółŁòåºåØ ÿâºÿþòæÿ íåçíà÷ŁòåºüíßìŁ Ł
ïîŒàçßâàþò ŁçìåíåíŁÿ äâîÿŒîªî ıàðàŒòåðà: â îäíŁı æòðàíàı îòìå÷àåòæÿ
óìåíüłåíŁå ŒîºŁ÷åæòâà îæóæäåííßı æåíøŁí, â äðóªŁı  óâåºŁ÷åíŁå.
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1 Introduction
Matti Joutsen
1.1 The Fifth United Nations Survey
The United Nations has gathered criminal justice information from Member
States since 1975. The first survey covered the period 1970 through 1975;
the second, 1975 through 1980; the third, 1980 through 1986; the fourth,
1986 through 1990; and the fifth, 1990 through 1994.1
Each of the surveys was designed to obtain quantitative and qualitative
information on crime trends and the operation of national criminal justice
systems. These data include statistics such as the number of crimes reported
to the police, the clearance rate, the number of suspects and offenders dealt
with at the different stages of criminal procedure, sentences and the enforce-
ment of sentences, and the resources available to the criminal justice system.
This report is based on an analysis of national responses to the Fifth United
Nations Survey. It is supplemented by other information available to the
members of the expert group that performed the analysis. This international
group consisted of Dr Carolyn Block (United States), Prof. Jan J.M. van Dijk
(The Netherlands), Dr Matti Joutsen (HEUNI), Ms Kristiina Kangaspunta
(HEUNI), Prof. André Kuhn (Switzerland) and Professor Ineke Haen Mar-
shall (The Netherlands/the United States). Mr Adam Bouloukos (Centre for
International Crime Prevention, United Nations) and Dr Ugljesa Zvekic
(United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute) have
actively assisted the group in their work. Ms Natalia Ollus (Finland) has
overseen the compilation of the data and the editing. Mr John van Kesteren
(the Netherlands) and Ms Lieke Bootsma (the Netherlands) have assisted
with the statistical analysis.
The report differs considerably from its predecessors (HEUNI 1985,
HEUNI 1990 and HEUNI 1995). As noted below (sections 1.2 and 1.5), the
data has been subjected to quantitative analysis in order to test whether a set
1
1 The results of the previous surveys were published in United Nations documents A/32/199 (1977),
A/CONF.121/18 and Corr.1 (1985), the third A/CONF.144/6 (1990) and the fourth A/CONF.169/15
(1995). The European results to the Second Survey were published in “Criminal Justice Systems in
Europe” (HEUNI publication no. 5, Helsinki 1985). The European and North American results to the
Third Survey were published in “Criminal Justice Systems in Europe and North America” (HEUNI
publication no. 17, Helsinki 1990), and to the Fourth Survey in two publications, “Crime and Criminal
Justice in Europe and North America, 1986-1990" and ”Profiles of Criminal Justice Systems in Europe
and North America" (HEUNI publications no. 25 and 26, Helsinki 1995).
of crime and social indicators can be developed that could explain the
differences between the countries. Such an analysis might help in identifying
differences that would otherwise have gone unnoticed in an analysis that
proceeds on a country-by-country basis.
In the Fifth Survey, responses were received from all European and North
American countries except Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Holy See,
Iceland, the Republic of Ireland, Monaco, Poland, San Marino, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
The report consists of six chapters.
Chapter one provides a background to the Fifth Survey itself as well as a
discussion of the problems of international comparison.
Chapters two and three contain an analysis of various factors which appear
to correlate with the amount of crime in the different countries. Chapter two
seeks to identify which countries have a low or, respectively, a high rate of
homicide, other violent crime, crime against women, motor vehicle related
crime, corruption, burglary or petty crime. Chapter three is an analysis of
various factors which appear to correlate with the motivation and opportunity
to commit the types of crime covered by the Fifth United Nations Survey.
Chapter four is an analysis of the data on the resources available to the
criminal justice system. Chapter four also looks at the flow of cases through
the criminal justice system, and at the performance of the criminal justice
system. Chapter five deals with sanctions and their severity.
Chapter six, which is published as a separate volume, contains brief
“criminal justice profiles” of all the European and North American countries
with an independent criminal justice system, even if they did not respond to
the Fifth United Nations Survey. Each profile seeks to provide background
information on the criminal justice system, the trend in crime, resources, and
special issues of concern. Where possible, additional sources of information
have been utilized. The profiles have been prepared by individual members
of the expert group, and sent to the authorities and experts in the respective
countries for review.
1.2 The purpose of the report
The purpose of the report is to describe public safety in the region as a whole
and in the individual countries. “Public safety” is understood as the general
risk of victimization to crime, as shown by the data. The report also seeks to
formulate tentative criminologically-based conclusions and provide an as-
sessment of the situation as a basis for reviewing the application of United
Nations standards and as a basis for technical assistance. These conclusions,
which have been submitted in the hope that they will stimulate constructive
debate both regionally and within the individual countries, have been based
largely on an analysis of the differences between the European and North
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American countries. In the course of this analysis, the members of the expert
group have identified a number of factors that may help to understand the
prevalence of certain forms of crime in some countries, and the low level of
certain forms of crime in other countries. Often, these conclusions may be
self-evident (as is the case with the finding that many countries with a high
consumption of alcohol have a high rate of violence). Some other tentative
findings presented here have scarcely even entered the debate on criminal
policy in many of the countries covered.
The focus of the report is on the period covered by the Fifth Survey
(1990-1994). For this reason, earlier data have not been used in the cross-na-
tional analysis. However, in chapter six (the national criminal justice pro-
files), data covering also earlier years have been used for selected countries
where issues of particular interest arise.
1.3 The pitfalls of using statistics: definitions,
classifications and counting rules
A number of problems have been noted with the United Nations Surveys.
These are problems that, to a large extent, are common to all efforts in
gathering international criminal justice statistics. The major problems in
regards to data analysis are the imprecise definition of the terms, improper
classifications, ambiguous coding structures, and differences in the units of
count used.
The Fifth Survey instrument includes a brief section setting out the key
definitions, for example the definition of “assault”, the definition of “persons
prosecuted” and the definition of “admissions to prison”. This section is a
necessity, since even the basic terms are defined differently in the different
countries. Utilizing lessons learned from earlier Surveys, each successive
Survey instrument has tried to improve on this section.
Despite this section, the problem of imprecise definitions remains.
First, the legal definitions of offences vary considerably from one country
to the next. For example, “assault” may be an independent category in some
jurisdictions, while others may not consider an incident to be an assault
unless it results in bodily injury. Another illustration is the extent to which
negligence affects the determination of criminal responsibility. A third ex-
ample is the extent of criminalization. Matters that in one country are dealt
with by regulatory authorities (such as labour safety authorities) may be
matters for the police in another country. Acts that are criminalized in some
countries (such as the possession of drugs, certain sexual behaviour, and
gambling) may be tolerated elsewhere.
Second, there are considerable procedural differences between countries.
It is not always the police and the lower courts that deal with crime. Certain
cases may be handled with a simplified procedure or by special investigatory
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and adjudicatory bodies. A category such as “persons prosecuted” may be
understood by some respondents to refer only to persons against whom the
public prosecutor brings charges in court, while other respondents may
include cases where the prosecutor takes other action, such as closing the
case with a warning or the arrangement of victim/offender mediation.
Another example of the importance of procedural differences is provided
by traffic offences. In many countries they are not considered “offences,” and
are dealt with by a special branch of the police or through a special procedure
(and, often, are not recorded in the statistics). Without a full appraisal of these
procedural differences, countries that include such petty offences in their
statistics will have considerably higher figures than do countries that do not
include them.
Yet another procedural difference relates to the extent to which discretion
is permitted, either formally or informally. Some countries require criminal
justice agencies to proceed with any prima facie case (the “principle of
legality”). Other countries may allow more discretion (the “principle of
opportunity”, also known as the “principle of expediency”), which in practice
may mean that further measures are waived in a large portion of the cases.
In still other countries, the police and prosecutor will not proceed with certain
types of cases unless the victim requests that measures be instituted. If no
such request is made, the case will generally not be recorded as an offence.
A third difference between countries in respect of definitions is in the
statistical classification of crime.  The classification of theft is a good
example. Depending on the country, it may or may not include burglary or
theft of a motor vehicle. It may or may not include simple or aggravated theft
as defined by the law of the jurisdiction in question, and it may or may not
include shoplifting.
Fourth, the rules for counting offences or offenders vary. Some authorities
in some countries count offenders, others count offences; some count each
separate incident in a series of offences, while others record a series as one
unit. One particular difference which has led to considerable confusion is the
unit used for the successful outcome of police investigations. Some countries
count “arrests”, others use “reported offences”, and still other countries use
“cleared offences”. Any comparison of statistics based on such different units
would be quite misleading.
Another example of differences in counting rules is provided by admis-
sions to prison. Some countries count only those cases where an individual
is admitted to prison the first time, often as a suspect remanded to pre-trial
custody. Other countries may be of the view that for example a change in the
status of an individual from pre-trial detainee to convicted prisoner counts
as a new “admission”. Yet other countries may take the word “admission”
literally, and count every time a prisoner enters the prison doors, for example
on returning from an appearance in court or from a prison furlough.
Fifth, the comprehensiveness of the statistics varies. Some countries
include only the major criminal offences. Others include petty offences,
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violations of tax laws, alcohol laws, administrative regulations and similar
subsidiary legislation. Consequently, any comparisons should be made be-
tween specific categories of offences, and not between aggregate amounts.
In addition to the differences in laws, procedures and statistical routines,
there are also differences in legal terminology. These differences not only
confound comparisons which require translation into a foreign language
(where concepts such as “plea-bargaining” may not exist) but also compari-
sons between jurisdictions which nominally speak the same language. Ex-
amples from English-speaking countries range from differences in spelling
(jail / gaol) to differences in definition (compensation / restitution).
Attempts to reach an international agreement, either formal or informal,
on uniform definitions, classifications, coding structures and units of counts
have consistently been unsuccessful. No country is likely to change its
administrative and statistical practice in order to promote the international
exchange of information. Quite simply, the current statistics have been
prepared by administrators for administrative purposes and, for them, this
purpose will remain the most important.
A more realistic option has been pursued in connection with the United
Nations Surveys. Respondents were asked to compare their usage with a
basic, relatively precise definition of terms, as provided by the United
Nations Secretariat, and note how their definition was different (if there were
differences). Regrettably, few respondents provided this information. Some
experts to whom the draft report was sent for comment specifically noted
that the data the authorities in their country had provided in response to the
Fifth United Nations Survey were misleading, since the definition used
differed. Wherever possible, these comments have been noted in the present
publication.
One final point regarding pitfalls in the use of statistics: official statistics
on reported crime and the operation of the criminal justice system tend to
focus our attention on traditional crime and administrative procedures. No
matter what work is done on the Surveys, some questions shall remain
unanswered. The detection rate for example for drug crimes, economic
crimes and environmental crimes is very low, and so there are few reported
cases. Another example is that, despite the strong interest in Europe and
North America in organized crime, the present report can say little about this
subject. Most of what would be termed organised crime is classified as
homicide, aggravated assault, extortion, aggravated theft and so on, and for
this reason reported organized crime tends to lose its distinctive profile in the
statistics. A third example is that it is difficult to gather data on the “invisible”
facets of criminal justice, such as the use of discretion, or on the possible
differential treatment of ethnic and other minorities. Crossnational studies
based solely on statistics can scarcely come to grips with the operation of
“alternatives” to criminal justice, such as mediation and conciliation pro-
ceedings, informal social control or the operation of private security compa-
nies.
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1.4 Errors and non-response
No country provided data on all of the issues covered by the Survey. There
are several possible reasons for a lack of response. The more important ones
are as follows.
First, it is possible that the data requested simply do not exist. The country
in question does not keep the statistics or conduct the research in question.
Some respondents noted that their statistical system was being developed,
and as a result data from certain years could not be provided.
Second, the information may exist, but not in a coordinated format. It may
be dispersed horizontally (between different departments or agencies) or
geographically (at a regional level with no centralized repository for statis-
tics). (This latter possibility is particularly a problem for federal states such
as Australia, Canada, Germany, and the United States.)
Third, the information may exist, but it is several years out of date. Some
experts commenting on the draft report have expressed surprise that more
recent data available from their countries (covering the years 1995 through
1997) have not been utilized. However, in most countries there tends to be a
long lag in the production of statistics.
It is also possible that the survey instrument simply never got to a person
willing and able to respond. Although the Surveys are available in all six
official United Nations languages, the person(s) who could best respond may
not have been fluent in any of them. Language problems may thus have led
to difficulties in understanding the questions or, in the case of open-ended
questions, difficulties in describing the experience and/or policy of the
country.
Finally, there is the ever present possibility of clerical error when data are
transcribed many times over. This may happen in the country in question
when the data are first entered into the statistics, or later on when the data
are entered into the survey instrument. It may also happen when the data are
analysed for the present report. The United Nations Secretariat had attempted
to reduce the possibility of error by asking the country in question to verify
unusual entries (for example, when there is a jump or drop of over 30% from
one year to the next, or when the number of persons entering prison for a
certain type of offence exceeds the number of persons convicted of that
offence.)
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1.5 Comparing the incomparable: developing
indicators of crime and of performance
The dangers of using statistics as a reflection of crime and crime control in
one’s own country are well documented. We all know that reported crime is
not the same as actual crime and that statistics have been developed for
administrative purposes, not to satisfy research interests. The vagaries of
changing laws, statistical practice and the idiosyncrasies of those involved
in defining criminal incidents make it difficult to draw any conclusions when
comparing statistics from different areas or different times. We also know
that the crimes punished under the penal codes of different countries (the
crimes that are usually noted in the statistics) are generally the “traditional”
offences, which do not necessarily have the greatest economic and social
consequences for society.
International comparisons are even more rife with misunderstandings, as
has been repeated throughout the discussions over the years on the United
Nations Surveys.
At least in the short run, no uniform basis will be developed for international
statistics.Asonereads thecommentson theresultsof theFifthSurveyforEurope
and North America the following caveat must be kept in mind: comparisons will
continue to be fraught with the risk of misinterpretation and overgeneralization.
Although statistical data may be misleading, an attempt can be made to
lessen this risk by using data from different sources to see if they point in the
same direction. In preparing the present report, data has been taken not only
from the Fifth Survey (which is based largely on the official statistics of the
respondent countries), but also for example from the health and mortality
statistics collected by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Centre
for Disease Control (CDC). The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS)
has now been carried out in almost every European and North American
country. The ICVS can thus provide a welcome supplement to statistical data
on reported crime. Selected other studies have also been used in this report.
The key findings of the ICVS are the percentages of the public victimised by
crimeover thepast fiveyears, respectively,duringthe lastyear.Datafromcountries
where the survey was carried out more than once were averaged. Thus, if for
example the surveywas carried out in 1989,1992and 1996, the threevictimisation
rates were averaged. This was done so that the victimisation rates would give
comparable information on the level of crime in the period 1989 to 1996.2
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2 In some cases this approach results in a loss of information, in particular if there has been a major
change in victimization rates from 1989 to 1996. Nonetheless, since the survey has been carried out at
different times in the different countries, the approach adopted here was the most appropriate way to
maximize comparability. Readers interested in the results for the different years are invited to refer to the
source materials on the ICVS.
Both the (averaged) annual rates and the five-year rates were used in the
preparation of this report. The rank numbers for both rates are very similar.
The five-year rates are of course higher than the one-year rates, and therefore
statistically more robust. This can be important for the comparison of rates
of victimisation for those types of crime which occur relatively seldom.
In the preparation of this report, a further distinction has been made
between national rates for urban areas (cities with 100,00 inhabitants or
more), national rates for rural areas and total national rates. For most
countries in transition, only the urban rates are available.
A second way to augment the explanatory power of statistical data is to
seek to measure different dimensions of the same phenomenon. For example,
the number of reported assaults and the number of reported robberies together
measure different dimensions of non-fatal physical violence in a society.
Somewhat similarly, an index of the way in which the public evaluates the
performance of the police can be developed by combining measures of how
often victims of certain types of crime report these to the police, the degree
to which victims who reported an offence to the police are satisfied with how
this was dealt with, and the degree to which members of the public believe
that the police in their society are doing a good job in controlling crime – all
questions that have been asked in the International Crime Victim Surveys.
The analysis carried out by the HEUNI expert group of the responses to the
Fifth United Nations Survey has sought to break new ground by combining both
of these approaches. An attempt has been made to combine as many different
sources of data as possible that deal with the same phenomenon. This was done in
order to maximize the number of countries from which at least some data were
available, and in order to ascertain that the data from different sources pointed in
the same direction. Theoretically, a combination of data from several sources that
deal with the same phenomenon can produce a more reliable and robust index than
what is possible on the basis of individual sources.
Accordingly, three sets of indicators have been developed. The first set
contains indicators of the amount of crime (on, respectively, homicide,
non-fatal  violence, serious  violence, burglary, violence against women,
vehicle-related crime, corruption and petty crime). The second set contains
indicators of motivation and opportunity. The third set contains indicators of
the operation of the criminal justice system (the resources available to law
enforcement, gender balance among criminal justice practitioners, and citi-
zen evaluation of police performance). The structure of these sets and how
they have been used are explained in greater detail in the respective sections
of this report. An overview is provided below.
In most cases, the year selected for analysis is 1994, the last year included
in the Fifth UN Survey. In some cases, an earlier year was used. This was
done, for example, if no data are available for 1994, but several data sets are
available for an earlier year.
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1.6 Those mysterious indices
As has already been noted, one of the difficulties in making international
comparisons is that corresponding data may be lacking from the different
countries, or the data cover different years. On the other hand, the wealth of
data available from a variety of sources that could shed a light on crime and
criminal justice is so large, that at times it is too great to process.
No country has filled out every box in the response to the Fifth Survey.
Often, the country does not have data on the question, or data are available
for only some years. Furthermore, making comparisons on the basis of just
one indicator (such as the number of reported homicides) may well be
misleading for a number of reasons – the definition of homicide varies, the
figures are calculated differently, and so on.
If several indicators can be taken together to form an index, then the
problem with missing data is somewhat eased. These indices are also more
reliable than the raw data, since any flaws in the data are compensated. One
source can give an overly high estimate of the actual situation, another an
underestimate. In this way the indices can also, at least partially, overcome
the problem of “out-liers” (i.e. of country data from a single source that have
values that deviate significantly from those of other sources or other coun-
tries, and thus “skew” the results).
Another advantage of “bundling” together different data sets describing
the same phenomenon is that this reduces the vast amount of data to a more
manageable size and therefore eases the processing of data and the drawing
of conclusions.
The following procedure was used in combining the different sources into
indices:3
1. First, the different data sources describing the same phenomenon are
identified.
2. The rank order is determined for each of the data sources. The country
with the lowest value gets rank 1, the second lowest rank 2 and so on.
3. The rank orders are standardised4 by dividing by the highest rank and
subsequently multiplying by 100.5
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3 There are many different ways to combine several sets of data into a single index, including
complicated multivariate techniques. Experience shows that the results of these exercises are often very
similar. We have chosen the one used here for its simplicity.
More detailed explanations on how the indices have been developed can be found in the relevant sections
of this report: 2.1, 3.1, 4.2.6, 4.2.7 and 4.4.4, and in Appendix B.
4 As already noted, not all data are available for every country. As a result, the highest rank depends on
the number of countries for which that particular data source is available. If we want to use the same scale
to assess each source, we need to standardise these rankings.
5 Example:  if data are  available  for 20 countries,  the initial  rankings are  1 through 20. After
standardisation, the lowest ranking is 5 (100*1/20), and the second lowest is 10 (100*2/20). If data are
available for 50 countries, the lowest ranking is 2 (100*1/50) followed by 4 and 6. In all instances, the
highest standardised ranking is 100.
4. The index is the average of these standardised rankings.
The results are indices on a scale from 1 to 100. The scores are interpreted
as follows:
0–25 very low
25–40 below average
40–60 average
60–75 above average
75–100 very high
Differences of less than 10 are deemed not to be significant.
We are aware that the procedure can well be criticized on at least the
following grounds.
1)  By computing indices we lose the possibility of an absolute interpretation.
The original data may show us, for example, the percentage of the
population that has been victimised or the number of crimes per 100,000
inhabitants. However, the indices are on the ‘ordinal’ level, which means
that they can only be interpreted relative to the scores of other countries
or to other crimes within a country. For instance, if one country has an
index of 60 on, say burglary, and a second country has an index of 40, it
is not justified to say that burglary is 50% higher. On the other hand, it
is justified to say that burglary is higher in the first country (where it is
a bit above average), and lower in the second (where it is a bit below
average). In the same way, if a country has an index of 10 on homicide
and 90 on petty crimes, we cannot conclude that there are nine times more
petty crimes than murders. We can conclude that the rate of petty crimes
in that country is, internationally speaking, among the highest, whilst the
rate of murder is comparatively among the lowest.
2) The procedure assumes that the data are valid and reliable; i.e. that they
describe the phenomenon in question, and that the data have been
correctly compiled and reported. We have assumed – with some reserva-
tions – that the data supplied to us by the Governments, and provided by
various surveys, is proper and correct.
3)  The procedure assumes that data from one country (for example, statistics
on reported crime) can readily be compared with data from another
country. In the case of surveys carried out with much the same method-
ology in different countries, this assumption can justifiably be made
(although again, generally with some reservations). In the case of statis-
tics, which the Fifth Survey in fact is designed to collect, this assumption
is far shakier – so shaky, indeed, that in earlier HEUNI reports on the
United Nations Surveys, we have deliberately down-played the making
of such comparisons. We now believe that sufficient research data and
supplemental statistical data have become available to merit an explora-
tion of the utility of indicators in making cross-national comparisons of
trends in crime and criminal justice. In order to respond to the criticism
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that comparisons should not be made internationally, we note that the
purpose of bundling different sets of data together as an index is indeed
to make a more robust measure – if for example different indicators
suggest that a country has an unusually large amount of violent crime,
then there are reasonable grounds to assume that the indicators are
correct, and that this country does indeed have an unusually large amount
of violent crime.
4)  The procedure assumes that the data on which each index is based are at
least to some degree commensurate. It assumes, for example, that data
on ownership of autos, motorcycles, mopeds and bicycles, data on the
average number of evenings spent away from home for recreational
purposes, data on the number of single-person households and data on
the percentage of females with paid employment all measure dimensions
of the opportunity for property crime, and for this reason they can be
bundled to form an index. This assumption is more difficult to make, but
we have chosen to examine the data in this way, at least so that we can
see where the analysis will lead.6
5)  The procedure assumes that the selection of the data used is criminologi-
cally justified. This is a particularly sensitive issue in respect of the
indicators of motivation and opportunity. There is a burgeoning crimino-
logical literature on the possible link for example between unemploy-
ment and violence, between the prevalence of handguns and violence,
and between the prevailing type of housing and burglaries. Although we
are aware that the selection of factors is a value choice, we believe that
the factors we have included are justified. We are not claiming that these
are the only factors that contribute to crime or that affect the operation
of the  criminal justice  system. According to criminological  theory,
motivation, for example, can be influenced not only by unemployment
but also by (among many other factors) family and peers, the media, and
previous contacts with the criminal justice system. We simply note in this
connection that international data sets that shed a light on such factors
are so far not available. When they do become available, they can be used
in corresponding analyses.
6)  Finally, the procedure assumes that aggregate national data (or, in some
cases, aggregate rural/urban data) can help to shed a light on the preva-
lence of crime or on the structure of criminal justice, when in fact there
are often large regional (and temporal) differences in both. A country
may have a low amount of violence on the national level, but this may
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6 In respect of the crime indices, the strength of the assumption was tested by computing Cronbach’s
alpha (the average correlation between the constituting variables within a scale). This alpha is based on
those countries that have no missing values on any of the constituting variables. The consistency for the
burglary index was 0,55, which is acceptable. The consistency for the homicide index was 0,71, and the
consistency for all other crime indexes was over 0,80; all these can be regarded as good. Please see
Appendix B for details.
mask the fact that it may have some regions with an extraordinarily large
amount of crime. Similarly, a countrymayhave a low rate of unemployment,
but unemployment may be particularly high among young urban males.
The data sets used in computing the different indices were as follows:
A. Crime indices
Burglary index:
– averaged annual ICVS national burglary rate from 1988 to 1995;
– averaged annual ICVS urban burglary rate from 1988 to 1995;
– averaged annual ICVS rural burglary rate from 1988 to 1995; and
– Fifth UN Survey data on burglaries (based on police statistics) for the end
years of the survey, 1990 and 1994.
This is theoretically the most stable index, since there are in general only
minor differences among countries in how the law defines burglary and how
the public understands burglary. Comparing victimization risks for burglary
with rates for other crimes shows that burglary is the best single indicator for
household crimes. The index only includes completed burglaries, not at-
tempts. (However, in some countries “burglary” does not exist as a separate
legal or statistical category, and is subsumed under theft or aggravated theft.)
Homicide index:
– World Health Organization data on deaths (based on medical records)
from 1992;
– Centers for Disease Control data on deaths (again based on medical
records) for one year between 1990 and 1994;
– Interpol data on fatal violence (based on police statistics) for 1994; and
– Fifth UN Survey data on homicide (based on police statistics) for the end
years of the survey, 1990 and 1994.
Non-fatal violence index:
– averaged annual ICVS national assault and threat rate from 1988 to 1995;
– averaged annual ICVS urban assault and threat rate from 1988 to 1995;
– averaged annual ICVS rural assault and threat rate from 1988 to 1995;
– averaged annual ICVS national robbery rate from 1988 to 1995;
– averaged annual ICVS urban robbery rate from 1988 to 1995; and
– averaged annual ICVS rural robbery rate from 1988 to 1995.
The homicide index and the non-fatal violence index together constitute the
serious violence index.
Violence against women index:
– averaged ICVS national violence against women five-year rate, 1984-
1995;
– averaged ICVS urban violence against women five-year rate, 1984-1995;
– averaged ICVS rural violence against women five-year rate, 1984-1995; and
– Fifth UN Survey data on rapes (based on police statistics) for the end years
of the survey, 1990 and 1994.
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Motor vehicle crime index:
– averaged annual ICVS national theft from/of car rate from 1988 to 1995;
– averaged annual ICVS urban theft from/of car rate from 1988 to 1995;
– averaged annual ICVS rural theft from/of car rate from 1988 to 1995;
– HEUNI data set on stolen and misappropriated vehicles per 100,000 in
population; and
– HEUNI data set on stolen and misappropriated vehicles that have not been
traced, per 100,000 in population.
Petty crime index:
– averaged ICVS prevalence rate (proportion victimised over the preceding
year) for the following six offences: vandalism of car, theft of motorcycle
or moped, theft of bicycle, theft of personal belongings, indecent or
offensive behaviour, and threat.
The common denominator for the offences included in the petty crime index is
that the offences in general are regarded by the law – although not necessarily
by the victim – as petty. Reporting rates tend to be low, and so the offences
generally do not appear in the statistics. The source used here in all cases is the
International Crime Victim Survey.
Corruption index:
– averaged annual ICVS national corruption rate from 1988 to 1995;
– averaged annual ICVS urban corruption rate from 1988 to 1995;
– averaged annual ICVS rural corruption rate from 1988 to 1995;
– Transparency International index; and
– the World Competitiveness Yearbook index based on the statement, “Im-
proper practices (such as bribing or corruption) do not prevail in the public
sphere.”
B. Opportunity and motivation indices
Opportunity for crime index:
– ICVS data on ownership of autos, ownership of motorcycles or mopeds
and ownership of bicycles;
– ICVS data on average number of evenings spent away from home for
recreation;
– ICVS data on the number of single-person households; and
– ICVS data on the percentage of females with paid employment.
Motivation for crime index:
– ICVS data on the percentage of the population that is male, young and
either unemployed or dissatisfied with their income
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C. Operation of the criminal justice indices
Law enforcement resources index:
– Fifth UN Survey data on the number of police (both sworn and civilian)
per 100,000 for 1994;
– Dutch Ministry of Justice data on the number of private police per 100,000;
– Fifth UN Survey data on the number of prosecutors per 100,000 for 1994;
– Fifth UN Survey data on the number of judges per 100,000 for 1994; and
– Fifth UN Survey data on the number of correctional personnel (in adult
and juvenile institutions) per 100,000 for 1994.
If 1994 data on law enforcement resources were not available, 1990 data were
used. This was the case with Switzerland for police data, with the United
States for prosecutorial data, with the Netherlands and Switzerland for
judicial data, and with Switzerland and the United States for correctional
personnel data. Where no data were provided in the Fifth UN Survey, data
on police were taken from the survey carried out by the Dutch Ministry of
Justice on private security. This was the case with Germany, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands and Portugal.
Data on financial resources was found to be too unreliable to be used.
Criminal justice practitioner gender balance index:
– Fifth UN Survey data on the female share of police personnel (in percent-
ages)
– Fifth UN Survey data on the female share of prosecutors (in percentages)
– Fifth UN Survey data on the female share of judges (in percentages)
– Fifth UN Survey data on the female share of prison personnel (in percent-
ages)
If 1994 data on the female share of criminal justice personnel were not
available, 1990 data were used. This was the case with Switzerland and the
Netherlands.
Citizen evaluation of police performance index:
– ICVS data on the percentage of victims of contact crimes who reported
their victimization to the police
– ICVS data in the percentage of victims who were satisfied with their report
to the police
– ICVS data on the percentage of all respondents who are satisfied with
police crime control
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1.7 Background to European and North
American criminal justice systems
Any report with so ambitious a scope raises the serious possibility of
misunderstandings due to a variety of reasons. The difficulties of comparing
statistics received from different countries have already been noted. Another
source of concern lies in the differences between systems of criminal justice.
Readers with a background in comparative criminal justice are well aware
of the differences between the Germanic-based, the French-based, the social-
ist and the common law criminal justice systems. They may be reluctant to
give any credibility to attempts at comparison, and understandably so.
Others, in turn, may assume that criminal justice processes are essentially
the same anywhere in Europe and North America. They may overlook the
nuances of the different systems. There is also a third ethnocentric group of
readers who believe that their criminal justice system is the best in the world,
and are disposed to seeing any differences between their system and a foreign
system as proof that the foreign system has fundamental flaws, or at least
serious shortcomings.
Through the mass media, we have also grown accustomed to seeing the
more colourful side of crime control in other countries. Such drama ranges
from images of Cossacks on horseback patrolling areas in the Russian
Federation, to solemn British judges presiding over trials in Old Bailey, to
the carabinieri in Italy making arrests, to the proliferation of victim support
services in the United States. Even the terminology used in other countries
may seem mysterious: actions such as the partie civile and the Adhesions-
verfahren, and agencies such as social courts and investigating magistrates
may well be unfamiliar to readers from other countries.
The diversity of terminology reflects the fact that each country defines and
deals with crime in a unique manner. After all, criminal law is perhaps the
area of law that is most closely bound to national values and interests. It is
certainly the area of law where the naked power of the State is used most
clearly. No two countries define crimes the same way or have quite the same
criminal justice system.
And yet, all countries must deal with basically the same problems of crime
and criminal justice. Most of the cases processed in every country and
considered in this report are thefts, burglaries, assaults and other “traditional
crimes”. The broad outlines of the process are also much the same: the police
investigate in response to a report of a crime, the prosecutor prosecutes, the
court hears the case and, on conviction, imposes a sentence, which is then
enforced.
Historical, political and economic factors explain to a large extent the
structure of the criminal justice system in a given country: the balance of
power between the central government and the local levels, the powers of the
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police, the training of judges and the basic principles of justice. They also
serve to explain changes in the day-to-day operation of the criminal justice.
Since the Second World War, Europe and North America have been
undergoing considerable demographic and social changes. The demographic
changes include the baby-boom generation, an increase in life expectancy, a
lowering of the birth-rate, an increase in single-parent families, and migration
towards the  cities  domestically  and internationally. The social  changes
include industrialization, a changed use of time by the population (including
more leisure time), an improved standard of living, and changes in technol-
ogy and communications.
Such changes have had a considerable impact on crime and on crime
control.
The number of offences has increased, due to the changes in the opportu-
nity for crime (in the number and motivation of potential offenders, in the
number and type of potential targets, and in the absence of capable guardi-
ans). The increase has been most noticeable in respect of property offences,
although also other types of offences have been affected.
There has also been a change in the structure of crime. New criminaliza-
tions have been adopted, for example in the area of environmental crime,
economic crime, computer crime, traffic crime and narcotics crime. More-
over, crime has ceased to be a purely national phenomenon and has become
international.
This combination of the increase in the number of offences and the
increase in the complexity of many offences is overburdening the criminal
justice systems of many European and North American countries. The
responses have been more or less the same from one country to the next:
some decriminalization de facto or de jure, attempts to speed up the process
for petty offences (for example by granting the police and/or prosecutors
powers to settle the matter, or by adopting simplified court procedures), and
attempts to deal with certain serious offences (in particular, narcotics of-
fences) more punitively. There has also been a growing interest in crime
prevention programmes and in revitalizing community-based informal social
control. Finally, attempts are being made across the board to improve the
position of the victim.
Two examples of increasing convergences in criminal justice systems can
be noted. First, the literature commonly refers to two basic principles of
prosecution, the legality principle and the opportunity principle (or expedi-
ency principle). In its extreme form, the legality principle requires that the
prosecutor bring charges whenever there is sufficient evidence of the guilt of
an identifiable suspect. This has traditionally been the established principle
in for example Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Spain, Sweden, most cantons in Switzerland, Turkey, and the
former republics of the USSR and of Yugoslavia. The opportunity principle,
in turn, gives the prosecutor discretion to decide, in any individual case,
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whether there is a public interest (or other overriding interest) in prosecution.
This has traditionally been the established principle in for example Belgium,
Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, England and Wales, France, Iceland, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Scotland, some cantons
in Switzerland, and the United States.
In practice, however, the legality principle has been eroded by granting
the prosecutor discretion in certain (often broadly defined) cases, and the
opportunity principle, in turn, has been made more strict by requiring the
prosecutor to bring charges in certain types of cases. These changes are often
expressed in prosecutorial guidelines. More and more, prosecutorial princi-
ples in the European and North American countries are sharing common
features (see Tak 1986).
The second example is provided by the classic distinction between accu-
satorial and inquisitorial proceedings. In the former, the judge has tradition-
ally been more passive, and it is up to the prosecutor (and the defendant) to
present the case. In the  latter, the  judge is supposedly more active in
marshalling the evidence for and against the guilt of the defendant. Again, in
practice, the differences between the theoretical extremes have often been
eroded.
Furthermore, all European and North American criminal justice systems
share fundamental principles, which have most notably been enshrined in the
first articles of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms: the right to life (article 2), the prohibition of torture and of
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (article 3), the right to liberty
and security (article 5, with its attendant requirements for lawful arrest and
detention, the right of the arrested person to be informed of the reasons for
his or her arrest and of any charges against him or her, and the principle of
habeas corpus), the right to due process (article 6, with its attendant right to
a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a proper
defence), the prohibition of criminalization ex post facto (article 7) and the
prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in the Convention (article 14).
Because the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms has been signed by the 40 member States of the Council of Europe,
the work of the Council of Europe is significant in the present connection.
The Council formulates conventions and recommendations that enshrine
principles that can be regarded as universally respected in Europe. (These
same principles are also widely enshrined in basic legislation in both Canada
and the United States.) There is a strong tendency to review national legisla-
tion to ensure that it accords with the requirements of, for example, the
European Convention.
This impact of the Council of Europe, however, has varied from country
to country, and issue to issue. With perhaps the exception of the criminaliza-
tion of money laundering, which follows upon ratification of the 1990
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Convention, the Conventions and numerous resolutions adopted by the
Council of Europe allow member States considerable leeway in deciding how
to adapt their criminal justice system to the requirements of these Conven-
tions. They do not provide a detailed road map of what steps must be taken.
More recently, the European Union has also been contributing to closer
alignment of criminal justice systems, in order to promote international
cooperation. The European Union was established by the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty, on the basis of the European Economic Communities. It includes
almost all of the Western European countries (with the exception of Iceland,
Norway and Switzerland, and the “mini-States”). Since the European Union
countries work on the basis of the free movement of person, capital, services
and goods, and since the European Union itself has become a source of
subsidies, there is considerable potential for the growth of criminal activity.
As a result, the European Union has paid considerable attention to aligning
the criminal justice systems of its fifteen member states. The EU also works
closely with the eleven candidate countries7 in an effort to ensure that their
legislation, practice and infrastructure meets the demands of membership.8
In this alignment of criminal justice systems, the European Union has
developed a special tool, the so-called “pre-accession pact” which the Euro-
pean Union has signed with the candidate countries (European Union docu-
ment CRIMORG 72, 19 May 1998). This “pact” outlines 15 principles
regarding the strengthening of international cooperation in the prevention
and control of organized crime. Although the pact is not legally binding, it
carries considerable political weight.
The Council of Europe and the European Union are not the only intergov-
ernmental organizations seeking to influence criminal justice reform in
Europe. The United Nations has worked in particular through the United
Nations Centre for International Crime  Prevention, the United Nations
Centre for Human Rights, the United Nations International Drug Control
Programme, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Na-
tions Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and HEUNI. Other
examples include the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, and the G-7/P-8. The Financial
Action Task Force (which was set up by the G-7) has worked to improve the
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7 The candidate countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
8 The European Union has refined the terminology in this respect, largely due to considerable discussion
over how far legal systems can be aligned with one another. Unification - the replacement of national
legal systems by one “European Union system” - has largely (but not entirely) been abandoned.
Harmonization - adoption of similar provisions by the different countries - is being promoted by some
countries and resisted by others. (The disagreement appears to relate largely to the scope and timetable
of such harmonization.) Approximation - co-ordination of different legal provisions or systems by
eliminating major differences and creating minimum requirements or standards - appears to be the
favoured way to go at the moment.
regulation of banking, the adoption of customer identification requirements,
the retention of transaction records for at least five years, the reporting of
unusual and suspicious transactions and the need for the criminalization of
money laundering.
In addition, there has been considerable bilateral activity in the develop-
ment of  criminal  justice systems, activity that has  involved  almost  all
European and North American countries (see Joutsen 1996a).
In a world of increasing diversity, Europe and North America are seeking
greater uniformity in fundamental principles of criminal justice.
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2 The Crime Situation in Europe
and North America
Jan J.M. van Dijk, Carolyn Block and Natalia Ollus1
2.1 Constructing indices of eight different
types of crime
In the previous chapter the construction of the eight crime indices was briefly
described (section 1.6). Here we will elaborate on this description and present
the national scores on these indices.
In the initial stages of our work, the decision was made to focus exclusively
on the countries which, on the basis of available data, could with a high degree
of certainty be qualified as either low crime or high crime countries. Dr Block
selected variables which seemed relevant indicators of the types of crime at
issue (e.g. for burglary both police data on recorded burglaries and ICVS data
on urban and rural areas seemed relevant). She subsequently selected the
countries which showed high scores on most of these variables (which were
called the source variables). If a country had high scores on most source
variables and no low scores on any others, it was classified as a high burglary
country. In other words, countries were classified as high if their source
variables consistently indicated high or at least moderately high levels of that
type of crime. Countries that scored highly on some source variables and low
on others were classified in an intermediate group (a group about which
inconsistent information is available). Countries about which no information
was available on most source variables were classified in a second interme-
diate group (a group about which insufficient data are available). The low
crime category was ascertained in a way comparable to the high crime
category: countries consistently showing low or moderately low scores on
all source variable were classified as low crime countries. This procedure
resulted in dichotomies between low crime and high crime countries for all
eight types of crime.
This procedure has the advantage that certain countries can be classified
with a high degree of certainty as experiencing low or, alternatively, high
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1 We would like to thank Mr John van Kesteren and Ms Lieke Bootsma for their invaluable assistance
with the statistical analysis.
levels of particular types of crime. An important drawback appeared to be
that almost half of the countries could not be categorized as either low or
high. They ended up in one of the two intermediate categories. As a conse-
quence no information was available about the level of crime in half of the
countries. A second drawback is that a dichotomous qualification overlooks
the differences within the high crime or low crime group (for example, no
differentiation is made between countries with very high and those with
moderately high levels). In this way much information about differences in
the crime situation is lost. The possibilities of multivariate analyses of the
correlates of crime indices are severely restricted if the indices only differ-
entiate between low and high crime countries.
After careful consideration, it was decided to explore whether other, more
refined differentiation procedures could be applied. As described in section
1.6 indices were calculated by averaging rank numbers on the source vari-
ables. This procedure results in rank numbers for all countries instead of the
former dichotomy between high and low crime countries with many coun-
tries in intermediate categories. We subsequently checked how the new
ranking compared with the previous dichotomy of high crime and low crime
countries. It was found that the new rankings correlated highly with the old
dichotomous rankings.2 Countries with higher rank numbers were almost
without exception also classified as high crime countries according to the
careful procedure followed by Dr. Block to determine high crime and low
crime countries. This result indicates that although the new ranking proce-
dure may result in erroneous rank numbers for some individual countries,
the over-all ranking seems as valid as the previous high-low dichotomies.
Since the new ranking has, as explained, many advantages over the high-low
dichotomies, the decision was made to use it in the subsequent analyses.
2.2 The crime indices per country:
Introductory remarks
In this chapter we will briefly comment on the ranking of the countries in
terms of the eight indices of crime. The commentary will be largely descrip-
tive. In the next chapter the national crime indices scores will be analysed
against the background of relevant economic and social factors (the oppor-
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2 The correlation coefficients between the dichotomy (with the first intermediate group as an “in between”
category) and the new ranking were as follows: for burglary .68 (n=35; p=0.000), for motor vehicle crime
.81 (n=44; p=.01), for petty crime (n.a.), for non-fatal violence (n.a.), for homicide .87 (n=46; p=0.000),
for serious violence .82 (n=48; p=0.000), for violence against women .83 (n=43; p=0.000), and for
corruption .76 (n=41; p=01). Since the ‘dichotomous’ variable has three categories, the maximum
correlation can never reach 1.00. The highest possible correlation is about 0.92.
tunity and motivation factors). The focus is on those countries whose scores
belong to the ten countries with the highest, and respectively with the lowest
scores.
The reader is reminded that the national scores are not always based on
information on all relevant source variables. In some cases, for example, no
information from the International Crime Victim Survey is available. In such
cases the index may be exclusively based on information on officially
recorded crimes and should be treated with extra caution. The national scores
should be checked against more reliable data, preferably based on future
ICVS results.
The commentary on the scores of individual countries will occasionally
refer to the lack of information on source variables. Information on the index
scores and the source variables available per country is given in appendeces
B and C. Readers who are interested in the crime situation in particular
countries are advised to consult the details given in this appendix.
To facilitate the comparison of national scores on the crime indices, the
HEUNI “Crime Guide” contains information on the quartile to which na-
tional scores belong.3 For instance for burglary, Switzerland belongs to the
lowest quartile (which means that it is among the 25% countries with the
lowest scores) and Estonia belongs to the highest quartile (which means that
it is among the 25% countries with the highest scores). In this chapter average
scores for the countries of the Central and Eastern European countries, for
all Western European countries, for the member states of the European Union
and for the United States and Canada (North America) are presented. These
group averages allow the reader to compare national scores with the scores
of countries belonging to the same geopolitical group.
2.3 Burglaries
Household burglaries
Household burglaries are, even more than other types of crime, a cross-cul-
tural phenomenon. In all Western countries most citizens live alone or with
family members or friends in private homes where many of their private
possessions are stored. These private possessions stored in the house are
suitable targets for burglars. The prevalence of burglary is apparently not to
any considerable extent influenced by country-specific opportunity struc-
tures. The availability of targets is roughly the same everywhere.
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3 This Crime Guide summarizes the data from different sources used in the preparation of the report. The
Crime Guide was used in order to ensure that all members of the group of experts used the same data.
See appendix A.
Previous analyses of the ICVS data have shown that burglary rates are the
best predictors of over-all crime victimisation rates. If burglary rates in a
country are high, the over-all victimisation rate of the public is usually
relatively high as well (Van Dijk, 1998a). It was also found that national
household burglary rates correlate highly with national burglary rates of
business premises (Van Dijk, Terlouw, 1996).
The average score in North America (80) is much higher than those of
Western Europe (45) and Central and Eastern Europe (53).
If we look at the ten highest scores on our index for household burglary,
we see that the highest scores are in Estonia, Bulgaria and Georgia. At the
fourth and fifth place stand England and Wales and the United States. Canada
and Albania are at the sixth/seventh place ex aequo. The other countries
belonging to the “top ten” are Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Kyrgyzstan.
From a geopolitical perspective, the countries with the highest level of
household burglaries constitute a fairly heterogeneous group. The levels of
burglary are the highest in some Central and Eastern European countries as
well as in England and Wales, the United States and Canada. One explanation
for the relatively high rates of England and Wales and North America is the
high proportion of households in these countries living in detached or
Burglary
low
Burglary
high
Central and Eastern
Europe
Central and Eastern
Europe
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Moldova
Romania
4
17
25
27
29
Kyrgyzstan
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Albania
Georgia
Bulgaria
Estonia
68
75
76
79
82
94
98
West
Malta
Switzerland
Cyprus
Germany
Norway
18
18
23
25
25
West
Canada
United States
England/Wales
79
80
81
Central and Eastern Europe mean
Western Europe mean
North American mean
EU mean
53
45
80
52
* Computing the indices see section 1.6 and appendix B
Table 1. Ten countries with the highest and lowest scores on the index for burglary.*
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semi-detached houses rather than in apartment buildings (Mayhew, Van Dijk,
1997). Detached and semi-detached houses have been found to be more
vulnerable for burglary. Another country (not included in this analysis) with
a high proportion of detached houses is Australia. In Australia the rate of
burglaries is even higher than in England and Wales.
Among the countries with the lowest scores we find several Western
European countries (Malta, Switzerland and Norway) but also Belarus and
Romania. Other countries with low scores are some other Central and Eastern
European countries, and Cyprus and Germany. In the latter cases, however,
the index score is based on just one or two source variables and the scores
should be validated before any conclusions are drawn (see appendix C).
2.4 Motor vehicle crimes
Motor vehicle crimes
low
Motor vehicle crimes
high
Central and Eastern
Europe
Central and Eastern
Europe
Tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan
Kazakhstan
Belarus
Romania
Ukraine
FYR Macedonia
4
10
12
16
18
23
23
Czech Republic
Bulgaria
79
92
West
Turkey
Switzerland
Cyprus
6
11
22
West
France
Malta
Luxembourg
Italy
England/ Wales
United States
Denmark
Spain
80
83
89
89
90
93
97
99
Central and Eastern Europe mean
Western Europe mean
North American mean
EU mean
42
55
82
64
Table 2. Countries with the highest and lowest scores on the index for motor vehicle
theft.
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The average scores for motor vehicle crimes - theft of or from a car- are
higher for North America (82) and Western Europe (55) than for Central and
Eastern Europe (42). The highest scores were calculated for Spain, Denmark,
the United States, England and Wales and Italy. The countries with the lowest
scores are mainly situated in Central and Eastern Europe. It seems highly
plausible that the prevalence of car thefts is related to the prevalence of car
ownership. There are few exceptions to this pattern. In Switzerland the level
of motor vehicle theft is low, although the rate of car ownership is among the
highest in the world. Of the Central and Eastern European countries the
Czech Republic and Bulgaria are exceptional in having high scores. In these
countries the car ownership rate in urban areas is somewhat higher than in
most other countries in transition (66 and 64% respectively).
2.5 Petty crimes
In the ICVS all respondents who report victimisations were asked to assess
the seriousness of their own victimisation on a three-point scale (very serious,
somewhat serious, not very serious). The ranking of types of crime in terms
of seriousness showed marked similarity across countries (Van Dijk, 1998a).
The most serious crimes were robberies with a weapon, car theft, sexual
assault, joyriding and burglary with entry (completed burglary). Car vandal-
ism, theft from garages, theft from a car, bicycle theft, indecent behaviour,
attempted burglary, personal theft and threats were considered least serious.
Thefts from cars were included in the index for motor vehicle crimes. Our
index for petty theft consists of the percentage of respondents victimised by
at least one of the six other less serious types of crime or of theft of a
motorcycle (a type of crime rated as moderately serious by the victims). Since
police figures of less serious crime are notoriously unreliable due to widely
varying legal definitions and reporting patterns, no attempt was made to
include official statistics in the index of petty crime.
The average scores are again the highest for North America (77). The
averages of Western Europe (44) and Central and Eastern Europe (52) do not
differ much.
The Netherlands ranks first on the index of petty crime. This position is
largely accounted for by its exceptionally high rates of bicycle theft and car
vandalism (9% and 10% per year respectively). Among the countries with
high scores  are  some countries from Central and Eastern  Europe (the
Ukraine, Czech Republic, Estonia and the Russian Federation) as well as
Canada, the United States and Sweden.
Belarus, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Croatia
and Hungary appear to experience relatively few victimisations by petty
crimes. This is also true for Northern Ireland and Norway. In all these
countries bicycle thefts are relatively rare.
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2.6 Violent crimes
Four different indices were constructed for types of violent crime: non-fatal
violent crime, homicides, serious crime (a combination of the latter) and
violence against women (including serious sexual violence). Since the first
three indices are strongly correlated (see chapter 3), we will only present the
national scores for serious violence and the violence against women index.
The data on non-fatal violence and homicide are summarized below.
Non-fatal violence
This variable is based on the ICVS victimisation rates for assaults and threats
and for robbery. North America has an average score of 80 and Central and
Eastern Europe of 58. The average score of Western Europe is markedly
lower (40).
Estonia shows the highest rate, followed by the United States and the
Russian Federation, Bulgaria and Poland. No Western European country is
among the ten countries with the highest rates.
Austria and Hungary are lowest on this index.
Petty crimes
low
Petty crimes
high
Central and Eastern
Europe
Central and Eastern
Europe
Belarus
FYR Macedonia
Georgia
Croatia
Hungary
Albania
8
11
13
14
17
30
Slovakia
Latvia
Russian Federation
Estonia
Czech Republic
Ukraine
73
74
75
80
90
97
West
Northern Ireland
Norway
Belgium
Spain
4
15
18
27
West
Sweden
United States
Canada
Netherlands
72
76
78
99
Central and Eastern Europe mean
Western Europe mean
North American mean
EU mean
52
44
77
45
Table 3. Countries with the lowest and highest scores on the index for petty crime
(ICVS data).
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Homicide
Central and Eastern Europe shows the highest group score (68), closely
followed by North America (64). The Western European group shows a much
lower score (35).
The homicide rates are highest for the Russian Federation, Estonia, Latvia,
Northern Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the United States. The mean
scores of Central and Eastern Europe (68) and North America (64) are almost
twice as high as that of Western Europe (35). All ten countries with the lowest
scores are situated in Western Europe.
Serious violence
The comprehensive index of homicide and non-fatal violence shows the same
ranking as homicides, with Estonia, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and
the United States on top and Western European countries at the low end (see
table 4).
Ireland stands out as the country with the lowest level of violence. Of the
Central and Eastern European countries, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia shows a remarkably low score on this index.
Violence against women
The violence against women index is based on ICVS data on assaults and
sexual assaults (rapes, attempted rapes and serious sexual harassment) and
official rape statistics. Table 5 shows the countries with high and low scores.
The countries with high scores on the violence against women index can
be divided in three main groups: Central and Eastern European (Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation), North American (the United States
and Canada) and North Western European (Denmark, Finland, Germany and
Sweden). The first two groups show similarly high scores on other indices
of violent crime. This is not true for the third group, however. The Czech
Republic does not fit in any of these groups.
The scores of the four Central and Eastern European countries with the
lowest scores are based on official rape statistics only and need further
scrutiny. Other countries with low scores are situated in Southern Europe
(Malta, Italy, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece and
Spain).
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Serious violence
low
Serious violence
high
Central and Eastern
Europe
Central and Eastern
Europe
FYR Macedonia 30 Azerbaijan
Georgia
Poland
Bulgaria
Kyrgyzstan
Armenia
Kazakhstan
Russian Federation
Estonia
68
70
71
71
73
80
88
93
96
West
Ireland
Cyprus
Turkey
Andorra
Austria
Greece
France
Switzerland
Norway
8
14
17
18
22
28
31
31
32
West
United States 86
Central and Eastern Europe mean
Western Europe mean
North American mean
EU mean
64
36
73
40
Table 4. Ten countries with the highest and lowest scores on the index for serious
violence.
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2.7 Corruption
(taking of bribes by government officials)
The corruption index  is based  on  information from  three  independent
sources. As mentioned earlier, the source variables of this index were highly
intercorrelated. Somewhat surprisingly it was found that even the ICVS
ranking of street level corruption of public officials was strongly correlated
with the Transparency International ranking of corrupt practices as perceived
by the business sector (r=.86; n=11; p=0.001). This finding suggests that
corruption on different levels of society is somehow interrelated. Corruption
at the highest levels seems to go hand in hand with street-level corruption.
The mean scores of Central and Eastern Europe, North America and
Western Europe are 78, 32 and 45. Most countries with the highest scores
are situated in Central and Eastern Europe, with the exception of Italy and
Greece (see table 6).
All countries with low levels of corruption are situated in either North-
Western Europe or North America.
Violence against women
low
Violence against women
high
Central and Eastern
Europe
Central and Eastern
Europe
Armenia
Azerbaijan
FYR Macedonia
Poland
7
10
21
25
Kyrgyzstan
Russian Federation
Kazakhstan
Czech Republic
80
83
84
90
West
Turkey
Cyprus
Malta
Italy
Greece
Spain
5
6
15
16
22
22
West
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Sweden
United States
Canada
74
76
81
82
84
90
Central and Eastern Europe mean
Western Europe mean
North American mean
EU mean
51
45
87
52
Table 5. Ten countries with the highest and lowest scores on the index for violence
against women.
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2.8 General conclusions
The United States, Canada and the Czech Republic rank among the highest
on burglary, motor vehicle theft and petty crimes. Other countries with
relatively high levels of these types of crime are Bulgaria, Slovakia and
Estonia.
Countries with  relatively  low levels  of property crimes are Belarus,
Switzerland, Norway and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Serious violent crimes apparently tend to be most prevalent in the countries
of the former Soviet Union (e.g. the Russian Federation, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan).
Corruption
low
Corruption
high
Central and Eastern
Europe
Central and Eastern
Europe
Lithuania
Latvia
Yugoslavia
Bulgaria
Russian Federation
Georgia
Kyrgyzstan
86
86
87
94
95
98
98
West
Denmark
Netherlands
Finland
Iceland
Sweden
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Norway
Canada
United States
4
6
10
12
19
24
24
25
31
33
West
Greece
Italy
Turkey
88
93
94
Central and Eastern Europe mean
Western Europe mean
North American mean
EU mean
78
45
32
45
Table 6. Ten countries with the highest and lowest scores on the index for corruption.
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The United States stands out with a high level on serious violence, which
contrasts with much lower levels in Canada and the Western European
countries.
Countries with low levels of violence tend to be found in Western Europe.
Hungary and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia also appear to have
relatively low levels of violence.
The levels of violence against women tend to be highest in the countries
of the former Soviet Union. The United States, Canada and several Northern
European countries also show high scores on the index for violence against
women. However, the latter scores might well be an artefact of higher
awareness of this type of crime in the most gender-balanced societies. This
issue will be taken up in section 3.1.4.
High levels of manifest corruption tend to be concentrated in Central and
Eastern Europe and Southern Europe.
In the next chapter national scores on the crime indices will be related to
economic, social and cultural factors.
31
3 Determinants of Crime
Jan J.M. van Dijk
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 The use of comparative studies
Ever since the pioneering studies of the Belgian statistician Quetelet (1796-
1874), criminological researchers have noted that rates of recorded crimes
vary across countries in a consistent way. Year after year certain countries
experience higher levels of crime than others. Generations of criminologists
have searched for the characteristics of societies which are associated with
high (or low) levels of crime. According to the followers of the so-called
French school of environmentalists in the nineteenth century, important
correlates of crime are urbanisation, poverty and high average temperatures.
At the turn of the century, the Dutch criminologist Bonger, building upon
empirical studies carried out by von Mayr and others, argued that in free
market economies socio-economic deprivation was the single most important
determinant of crime.
In the post war area, statistics on officially recorded crimes were no longer
viewed as credible measures of crime. Court and police statistics were shown
to be greatly affected by the reporting patterns of the public and by decision-
making by the police and the courts. Since crime statistics did not reflect the
actual volumes or trends of crime, most criminologists lost their interest in
comparing statistics on recorded crimes across countries. Comparative crimi-
nology in the tradition of Quetelet and Bonger went through a period of
stagnation and decline.
An illustration of this is that police statistics on recorded crime were
treated in previous HEUNI publications on the UN surveys as indicators of
the police work load or of the input to the criminal justice system, rather than
as measures of the level of crime (Kangaspunta, 1995a). Such a situation
might have diminished the relevance of criminology for policy-makers.
In chapter 2 the crime situation in the countries of Europe and North
America was described on the basis of indices for different types of crime.
In constructing these crime indices, the findings of the International Crime
Victim Survey were supplemented by a selection of official statistics on
recorded crime. Although these crime indices cannot be seen as precise
measures of crimes committed per country, they can, in our judgement, be
confidently used for a rough comparison of national crime levels.
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The presentation of these descriptive statistics on crime at the macro level
gives rise to the question of how differences in the level of crime across
countries can be explained. Why, for example is serious violent crime more
prevalent in several Central and Eastern European countries and the United
States than in the EU countries and Canada? Answers to such basic questions
about the ranking of countries in terms of crime may help policy-makers to
put their national crime problems into perspective. Exceptional crime prob-
lems may at least partly be determined by autonomous structural charac-
teristics of societies which lie outside the immediate sphere of influence of
policy-makers responsible for the criminal justice system. In such a case
national crime problems may primarily call for a wide range of preventive
policies. In other countries it may be that no obvious criminological expla-
nation for the existing crime problems is at hand, and a critical reassessment
of crime control policies might be recommended.
Although our analyses of the determinants of crime are largely explorative,
they are guided by a theoretical perspective which brings together insights
from current criminological theories on the causes of crime. National crime
levels will be interpreted as the social result of the convergence within
countries of sufficient numbers of motivated offenders, relatively weak
mechanisms of social control and the presence of suitable targets of crime
(Cohen and Felson, 1979; Van Dijk, 1994a, 1994b). According to this perspec-
tive the level of crime in societies is determined by the interplay between
motivational factors on the one hand and opportunity factors on the other.
Motivational factors can be seen as determinants of the demand side of
national crime markets. To the extent that motivational factors are more
prevalent in a country, there will be more potential offenders, looking out for
opportunities to offend. Structural characteristics which provide viable op-
portunities of crime can be seen as the supply side of the crime market.
Owners of expensive cars and other expensive consumer goods are the
reluctant suppliers of opportunities of crime. In countries where suitable
targets of crime are plenty and the level of social control is reduced, there are
more potential victims of crime.
In the present theoretical view, affluence has a dual impact upon the level
of crime. There is less demand for crime in more affluent countries. Important
motivational factors such as income inequalities, dissatisfaction with income
and unemployment, for example, tend to be lower in more affluent countries.
If levels of affluence rise – and if the newly acquired wealth is not too
unevenly spread – the pool of motivated offenders in a given society de-
creases. This trend will contribute to a reduction of the level of crime. At the
same time affluence goes together with the ownership of commodities which
can be stolen with relative ease, and also with a more outgoing lifestyle which
increases exposure to criminal victimisation by strangers. Higher prosperity
will invite higher levels of opportunistic forms of crime. Affluence, then, acts
as both an important inhibiting factor of certain forms of crime as well as a
catalyst of other forms.
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It follows from the present interactionist perspective that there are no
straightforward, linear relationships between affluence and crime. The dy-
namics of crime at the macro level are further complicated by the increased
employment of (sophisticated) security measures by potential victims in
more affluent, high-crime nations. The use of these measures reduces oppor-
tunities of crime and therefore acts as a negative feed back loop for certain
types of property crime.
The interactionist model described above proved useful in previous analy-
ses of ICVS data (Van Dijk, 1994a; Mayhew, Van Dijk, 1997). Violent crimes
were found to be most strongly associated with indicators of poverty, social
inequality and dissatisfaction with income. Property crimes were found to
be related to several crime-specific opportunity factors which are more
prevalent in affluent nations. In sum, violent crime was found to be poverty-
driven while forms of property crimes were found to be largely opportunity-
driven. Many forms of crime are more common in countries in which large
parts of the population live in large cities. (This is probably because many
forms of informal social control tend to be weaker in an urban setting.)
We will test whether this model can also be used to analyse the correlates
of indices of crime, indices which are based on a combination of police
statistics, ICVS data and other data. Previous studies looked at the macro
correlates of crime across the world (Van Dijk, 1994a; Van Dijk, 1998a) or
among a small group of industrialised nations (Mayhew, Van Dijk, 1997).
The results of the present analysis of industrialised countries and countries
in transition will not necessarily produce identical results. However, if the
perspective is valid, the main results should at least resemble those found in
earlier analyses.
3.1.2 Description of the data set
As explained in the previous chapter, the present study brings together and
uses crime data on forty Western, Central and Eastern European countries as
well as on Canada and the United States. These crime statistics have been
taken from different sources. A spreadsheet (know to the expert group as the
HEUNI “Crime Guide”) was made which includes the national, urban and
rural victimisation rates of the ICVS and the rates of recorded crimes as
collected in the course of the Fifth United Nations Survey, covering 1994 as
well as other sources of data1. Using a combination of data from these various
sources, several indices of types of crime were constructed, as explained in
sections 1.5 and 1.6: non-fatal violence (assaults and robberies), homicides,
serious violence (a combination of the first two), burglary, violence against
women (sexual violence, assaults), vehicle crimes (theft of and from cars),
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1 See appendix A.
corruption and petty crimes (e.g. bicycle theft, motorcycle theft, non-contact
personal theft, car vandalism, non-violent sexual incidents and threats). An
overview of the national scores on these indices was given in chapter 2.
The indicator of violence against women is based on both police statistics
of recorded rapes and ICVS data on sexual and non-sexual assaults on
women. Added to the crime indices is an index of bribery/corruption. The
constituting variables for this are the rate of street level corruption of public
officials according to the ICVS and the ranking of corruption of public
officials with regard to business transactions, according to the rankings of
Transparency International  and  the  World  Competitiveness  study  1997
(based on survey research among business people).
The newly constructed indices cover a wider range of crimes than what is
reflected in the ICVS. Serious crimes of violence in particular are better
represented because police data on recorded homicides and rapes are in-
cluded. The same is true of the more serious forms of corruption. The
indicators of petty crimes and non-fatal violence are exclusively based on
ICVS data since no credible police statistics on these types of crime are
available.
The HEUNI “Crime Guide” includes a selection of criminologically
relevant social indicators. Some of these social indicators are also based on
ICVS items (e.g. handgun ownership, recreational patterns, unemployment,
age structure, types of housing, use of anti-burglary measures, car ownership
and bicycle  ownership). Other items, such as the GNP per capita, the
educational attainment of females and urbanisation were taken from data sets
of the UN, the World Bank, UNESCO and the World Drink Trends2.
3.1.3 Motivational factors
According to conventional criminological theories, serious crime is related
to economic and/or social deprivation or inequalities (so-called strain theo-
ries). In previous analyses of ICVS data the relationships were analysed on
the basis of a large set of socio-economic indicators and levels of victimisa-
tion. Levels of serious crime were found to be strongly related to several
indicators of inequality, poverty and/or socio-economic deprivation. Levels
of crime tend to be higher in countries where GNP per capita is lower and
where more young people are dissatisfied with their income and/or where
more people are unemployed. Multivariate analyses of global data showed
that the most important predictor of high crime rates was the percentage of
the population consisting of young males between 16 and 29 who are
dissatisfied with their income and/or unemployed. Analyses of the present
data set confirmed that this variable is most clearly related to some of the
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2 See appendix A.
crime indices. Income inequality seems less relevant for cross-national
studies of crime.3 4 The percentage of young males dissatisfied and/or out of
work is determined by the proportion of young males in the national popu-
lation as well as by the subjective and objective socio-economic situation of
this group. This measure will be used as an indicator of criminologically
relevant “strain”.
Our measure of strain reflects the size of the pool of people in a country
for whom criminal activities might be economically or psychologically
rewarding and for whom the involvement in criminal activities is a viable
option.5 The national values on this factor will be used as the primary
indicator of criminal motivation (demand). Nations with the highest scores
on this factor are Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, the Russian Federation and
Lithuania. Our hypothesis is that in these nations, a relatively large part of
the population experiences criminogenic “strain”.
Included in the analyses are also two indicators of alcohol consumption
(beer consumption and strong alcohol consumption). Their inclusion was
based on the assumption that alcohol consumption might be a determinant
of crimes of violence.
3.1.4 Gender balance and violence against women
Little comparative empirical research has been done on the macro determi-
nants of violence against women (sexual violence and non-sexual violence).
In previous ICVS studies using global data it was found that violence against
women is associated at the macro level with a high prevalence of strain among
young males and with a low average social status of women (Van Dijk,
1998a). The latter finding confirms conventional feminist theory that women
with low social status are more vulnerable for violent attacks by males. The
ICVS rates of violence against women were for example exceptionally high
in several developing nations (for example Brazil and South Africa). A
subanalysis, however, showed that among industrialised countries violence
against women is positively related to the divorce rate. Divorce rates, in turn,
are positively related to the social status of women. The rates of violence
against women, then, are relatively high in both some of the least gender-bal-
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3 The “Crime Guide” includes an indicator of income inequality, based on the ratio between the income
of the top twenty percent and the bottom twenty percent. Income inequality is inversely related to
affluence: in more affluent nations the ratio is smaller (r=-.50; n=28; p .05). It is not significantly related
to our indicator of strain.
4 The rate of unemployed young males correlates highly with the rate of either dissatisfied or unemployed
young males (r=.93; n=36; p=0.000).
5 As noted in section 1.3, the data collected through the Fifth United Nations Survey focuses on so-called
“traditional” crime, and not for example on economic crime. The expert group is, of course, aware that
the pool of people who have the opportunity and motivation to engage in economic crime and other
“modern” crime may well differ from the pool of people with the opportunity and motivation to commit
property crimes and violent crimes.
anced and some of the most gender-balanced countries. One interpretation
of this paradoxical finding is that in some of these latter countries tensions
around the newly acquired social status of women manifest themselves in
higher rates of male violence against women. An alternative interpretation is
that the positive relationship between high social status of women and high
rates of violence against women is caused by a heightened sensitivity for
violence by males amongst women in more gender-balanced nations (Kan-
gaspunta, 1997). Examples of countries which show this cluster of charac-
teristics (high affluence, high social status of women and high rates of
violence against women) are the United States, Canada, Finland and New
Zealand (not included in this analysis) .
If the latter interpretation is correct, it would mean that the cross-cultural
measurement of violence against women is complicated by differential
responses to standardised survey questions on domestic violence against
women. Precisely in countries where women have high social status and
where domestic violence is supposed to be less prevalent, female respondents
are more likely to define violent act by spouses and other partners as criminal.
In that case, the positive relationship between female social status and
violence against women might be an artefact of the method of measurement.
In order to explore further the relationships between gender-balance and
violence against women among the set of industrialised nations covered by
the present report, indicators of female educational attainment and the
prevalence of divorce were included in the analysis.
3.1.5 Opportunity factors
According to opportunity theory, the level of crime is also determined by the
presence of suitable targets of crime and the extent of informal social control.
Well-documented examples are the relationships between vehicle-ownership
and vehicle-related crime. In some studies types of crimes were also found
to be related to routine activity patterns such as patterns of outdoors recrea-
tion and female labour participation. Included in the analyses were known
risk factors such as the frequency of outdoor visits for recreational purposes,
single occupancy of dwellings (one-person households), composition of
housing stock (apartment buildings or detached houses) and ownership rates
of motor vehicles, motorcycles and bicycles.
In order to reduce the number of relevant variables, one over-all scale was
constructed for criminal opportunities. This overall opportunity scale was
based on three types of vehicle ownership, the frequency of outdoor visits,
proportion of single person households and the percentage of females with
paid employment. These six source variables are strongly intercorrelated.
Factor analysis yields a first factor explaining 50% of the variance. The
country scores on this opportunity factor were entered into the HEUNI
“Crime Guide” as a comprehensive indicator of criminal opportunities. The
five nations with the highest scores were Norway, Germany, Sweden, the
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United States and the Netherlands. In this cluster of nations the “supply” of
criminal opportunities is clearly the highest. Our hypothesis is that in these
nations opportunistic forms of crime will be more prevalent due to the
existing opportunity structures.
Included in the analyses were also the prevalence of the possession of hand
guns – a possible facilitator of crimes of violence – and the prevalence of the
use of anti-burglary devices (e.g. burglary alarms).
3.1.6 Urbanisation
Urbanisation and modernisation are supposedly linked to high crime rates
due to lower levels of social control (Shelley, 1981). In previous analyses of
ICVS data, the level of victimisation by crime was strongly related to the
proportion of the population living in a large city. Information on this
characteristic was based on a survey question about the size of the respon-
dent’s home city. In some cases the official boundaries of one’s city are not
clear. The ICVS data on urbanisation are a measure of urbanisation as
perceived by the respondents. Since ICVS data on the national degree of
urbanisation are available for only twenty nations, other sources were used
to collect data on this variable. Data on urbanisation taken from the UN
Compendium on Human Settlement were entered into the “Crime Guide”.
These data reflect the proportion of the national population living in settle-
ments of 20,000 inhabitants or more. This measure did not clearly correlate
with the ICVS data on the proportion living in cities with 100,000 inhabitants
or more. In the analyses we used the UN measure of urbanisation.
3.2 Results of the analyses6
3.2.1 Affluence and criminogenic factors
As a first step in the analysis, we looked at the relationship between AFFLU-
ENCE (GNP per capita) and the various motivational and opportunity factors.
The results show a clear picture. AFFLUENCE is strongly inversely related to
our indicator of STRAIN among young males (r=-.84; n=33; p=000). In the
more affluent countries many fewer young males express dissatisfaction with
their income and/or are unemployed. In accordance with our hypothesis, there
is less “demand of crime” in more affluent nations.
The consumption of strong ALCOHOL is also inversely related to afflu-
ence (r=-42; n=28; p=05). Consumption levels are the highest in the least
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6 Due to missing values for certain variables, the number of cases varies for each analysis.
affluent countries, in particular some Eastern European countries. High
consumption of strong alcohol is traditionally linked to socio-economic
deprivation. The indicator of “strain” is strongly related to the consumption
rate of strong alcohol (r=.61; n=22; P=.002).
In our set of nations this cluster of motivational factors is the most
prevalent in Central and Eastern European countries with economies in
transition.
Affluence is, conversely, positively related to an outgoing LIFESTYLE
(r=+ 68; n=32; p=.000), ownership rates of motor CARS (r=.69; n=28;
p=.000), ownership of BICYCLES (r=.41; n=28; p=.002), educational attain-
ment of females (r=.63; n=35; p=.000), proportion of divorcees (r=.52; n=30;
p=.005), proportion of detached HOUSES (r=.63; n=32; p=.000) and pro-
portion of burglar ALARMS (r=.58; n=32; p=.001). These results confirm
the hypothesis that affluence goes together with the presence of several
known risk factors of property crimes (high frequency of outdoor visits, high
prevalence of vehicle ownership and high proportion of people living in stand
free, easily accessible houses). To counterbalance their increased exposure
as house dwellers, potential victims in these nations are more likely to
employ sophisticated technical self-protection measures.
The rate of educational attainment of women can be seen as a measure of
the social status of women (GENDER BALANCE). This measure correlates
highly with affluence. In the more affluent nations the social position of
women is stronger. Educational attainment of women also correlates strongly
with divorce rates.
As said, a scale was constructed which combines six different elements of
high exposure to crime. This comprehensive indicator of criminal opportu-
nity is strongly positively related to affluence (r=.80; n=29 ; p=.000). The
hypothesis that affluence increases the “supply of criminal opportunities” is
also confirmed.
Urbanisation, as measured by the UN, is related to affluence in the present
set of nations (r=+. 57; n=49; p=.000). It is inversely related to strain (r=-.46).
Urbanisation is weakly related to a more outgoing lifestyle (r=.36) and more
strongly to car ownership (r=.54). Gun ownership is unrelated to our measure
of urbanisation.
In Europe and North America, people living in more highly urbanised
countries tend to be more affluent, pursue an outgoing lifestyle and use cars
as their main means of transportation.
Affluence appears to be a factor which is related to many important
criminogenic factors. Table 7 shows the correlations between AFFLUENCE
(GNP per capita) and the indicators of the most relevant motivational and
opportunity factors.
By and large the results confirm that affluence has a dual impact on the
(criminological) vulnerability of nations. On the one hand the pool of
potential offenders – consisting of socially marginalized and/or dissatisfied
young males – is much smaller in the more affluent countries of Western
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Europe and North America. In the countries in transition there are, relatively
speaking, more potential offenders. In these countries the rate of consump-
tion of strong alcohol is also higher. The abuse of strong alcohol might
contribute to higher levels of violent crime.
On the other hand, more affluent countries show several characteristics
which make them more vulnerable for certain types of crime, notably crimes
of theft and burglary. In these nations there may be fewer people motivated
to commit crimes but this advantage is offset by the ample prevalence of
opportunities to acquire easy money through the commission of criminal acts
in a anonymous urban setting. In terms of opportunities for crime the more
affluent nations of North America and Western Europe are clearly more at
risk than are the countries with economies in transition.
STRAIN
ALCOHOL
LIFESTYLE
CARS
BICYCLES
GENDER BALANCE
HOUSES
ALARMS
URBANISATION
AFFLUENCE
-.87
(29)
P=0.000
-.41
(27)
P=0.032
+.69
(29)
P=0.000
+.67
(29)
P=0.000
+.39
(29)
P=0.038
+.50
(36)
P=0.002
+.64
(28)
P=0.000
+.61
(29)
P=0.000
+.58
(49)
P=0.000
Table 7. Correlations between affluence and a selection of motivational factors and
opportunity factors; Pearson’s correlation coefficients (r).
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3.2.2 Crime patterns
The ultimate goal of the analysis is to explore the statistical relationships
between the motivational and opportunity factors described above and the
national crime levels. In order to explore the relationships between the
various types of crime we have firstly looked at the correlations between the
eight crime indices. Table 8 provides an overview.
The results show that the three indicators of violent crime are strongly
intercorrelated. The correlation between the homicide indicator and the
indicator of serious violence is near perfect. The serious violence indicator
is, as explained, based on a combination of homicide indicators and ICVS
indicators of assaults and robberies. The (non-fatal) violence indicator is
based on ICVS data on assault and robberies. The correlation with the
homicide indicator is moderately strong. The correlation with the serious
violence indicator is very strong. Since the serious violence index is so
homicide nonfatal
violence
serious
violence
petty
crime
burglary violence
against
women
vehicle
crime
corruption
homicide
nonfatal
violence
serious
violence
petty
crime
burglary
violence
against
women
vehicle
crime
.3380
(34)
p=.051
.8554
(47)
p=.000
.8298
(36)
p=.000
-.0731
(34)
p=.681
.5855
(36)
p=.000
.3965
(36)
p=.017
.2011
(39)
P=.220
.5003
(36)
p=.002
.3161
(41)
p=.044
.3997
(36)
p=.016
.2119
(42)
p=.178
.3618
(36)
p=.030
.3419
(44)
p=.023
.4992
(36)
p=.002
.3086
(41)
p=,050
-.1038
(43)
p=.508
.2963
(36)
p=.079
.0782
(45)
p=.610
.2419
(36)
p=.155
.5459
(40)
p=.000
.1054
(42)
p=.507
.3569
(41)
p=.022
.1708
(36)
p=.319
.2956
(43)
p=.054
-.1059
(36)
p=.539
.1712
(37)
p=.311
-.3654
(39)
p=.022
-.0766
(43)
p=.625
Table 8. Correlation matrix of national scores for eight different indicators of crime.
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strongly related to both other indices of violence, further analyses were
limited to this index.
The index of violence against women is unrelated to the index of homicide.
It is weakly related to the two other indices of violent crime. These results
confirm that the prevalence of violence against women does not necessarily
reflect the level of serious violence in general. A separate analysis of the
social correlates of violence against women is called for.
The homicide index is unrelated to petty crimes, burglaries or vehicle
crimes. The other indices of violence are (weakly) related to petty theft and
burglary.
The indicator of petty crime is fairly strongly related to burglary and,
somewhat surprisingly, to the index of violence against women.
Burglary is most strongly related to vehicle crimes. It is also weakly related
to most other types of crime. This finding is consistent with previous results
which showed that from a global perspective rates of burglary are the best
predictors of over-all levels of crime (Van Dijk, Van Kesteren, 1996).
Corruption is weakly related to serious violence.
In conclusion, the indicators of violence are strongly interrelated. Violence
against women, however, is not clearly related to these other forms of
violence. The rates of petty crimes and of vehicle crimes are weakly and
inconsistently related to the indices of crimes of violence. These results
indicate that nations which suffer from high levels of violence are not
necessarily always also experiencing high rates of property crimes and vice
versa. High rates of burglary seem to go hand in hand with high rates of
vehicle crime. Violence against women and corruption show few clear
relationships with other types of crime and seem to be independent phenom-
ena.
3.2.3 Correlates of crime
In order to explore the determinants of crime, simple correlations were
calculated between the key motivational and opportunity factors and the
indicators of crime.
Violent crime
To reduce the number of analyses, the analysis of violent crime was, as noted,
limited to the index of serious violent crime. Serious violent crime is strongly
related to the prevalence of strain (r=. 57; n=36; p=.000). Since strain was
found to be inversely related to affluence, it follows that serious violence is
inversely related to affluence (r=-.45; n=45; p=.002).
The national rates of serious violence were also positively related to the
consumption rate of strong alcohol (r=.49; n=28; p=.01).
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Previous analyses of global ICVS data have shown that levels of violent
crime are, independently of other factors, related to handgun ownership (Van
Dijk, 1998a). In the present dataset no significant correlation between gun
ownership and the serious violence index was found (r=+.21; n=36; p=.20).
In order to determine the relative strength of the various relationships,
multiple regression analyses were carried out. Regression analyses showed that
strain is the most important predictor of serious violence (multiple regression
coefficient of .57). The second variable chosen in the equation is income
inequality. The multiple regression coefficient is slightly increased by the
inclusion of the second variable (r=.67). This means that 45% of the variance in
the level of serious violence is explained by these two variables. If the strain
variable is excluded from the analysis, the next most important predictor is the
consumption of strong alcohol. The results for homicide are similar.
The results confirmthatviolent crime ismoreprevalent in lessaffluentnations
where there are more young males who experience “strain” and where the
consumption rates of strong alcohol are high. In the case of serious violence,
income inequality may also play a role. The role of gun ownership does not seem
to explain differences in the level of violence in this particular set of countries.
The correlation is positive but does not reach statistical significance.
Burglaries, petty crimes and vehicle crime
Burglaries are not significantly related to any of the indicators included. The
correlation with the proportion of inhabitants living in detached housing is
not significant (r= +.25; n=35; p=.14). If the analysis is limited to the
countries of Western Europe and North America, the proportion living in
detached housing is strongly correlated with the burglary index (r=.70; n=17;
p=.002). In Western Europe and North America, countries where a large
proportion live in apartment buildings rather than in semidetached or de-
tached housing experience fewer burglaries.
The relationship in North America and Western Europe between types of
housing and burglary rates is probably weakened by the strong positive
relationship between the proportion of people living in detached housing and
the use of burglar alarms et al (r=.81; n=35; p-.000). If burglar alarms were
not so prevalent in countries with many detached houses, the relationship
between the factor “proportion living in apartment buildings” and burglaries
would probably be stronger. In the Central and Eastern European countries
the level of burglaries is unrelated to the type of housing. In most of these
countries, living in apartment buildings is the norm in urban areas.
The rate of petty crimes is not significantly related to bicycle ownership
(r=.25; n=36; p=.15). As is to be expected, the rate of vehicle crime is related
to car ownership (r=.49; n=36; p=.003). This type of crime is positively
related to affluence and inversely related to the proportion of people living
in apartment buildings. The rate of vehicle crimes is also related to the degree
of urbanisation (r=.55; n=43 ; p=0.000 ).
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Regression analyses confirm that the independent variables mentioned
(living in apartment buildings, car ownership and bicycle ownership) are the
most important predictors of the three types of property crime.
Violence against women
The rates of violence against women show a pattern of correlations which is
difficult to interpret. The national scores on the index for this type of crime
shows positive relationships with a UNESCO measure of female educational
attainment (r=.39; n=33; p=0.8) and with the proportion of divorced persons
(r=.43; n=33; p=.01). The national scores are also clearly related to bicycle
ownership. High rates of bicycles are mostly found in the more affluent
Western European countries, which tend to be more gender-balanced. In
conclusion, the index of violence against women is positively related to
indicators of gender-balance.
As said, in analyses of global ICVS data the social status of women was
inversely related to violence against women. The present data seem to
contradict this result. However, in the previous ICVS study it was also found
that among industrialised nations rates of violence against women are higher
in nations where females have a higher status. The results of the present
analysis of the correlates of a more comprehensive index of violence against
women confirm the previous finding. One interpretation of this finding is, as
said, that in the latter nations women are more aware of forms of violence
against women than elsewhere and therefore more likely to report it to
interviewers as well as to the police. Since the index of violence against
women is in part based on police rape data this interpretation is plausible.
Rates of recorded rapes for 1994, taken from the Fifth United Nations Survey,
are even more strongly related to female educational attainment (r=.75; n=29;
p=0.000). It seems implausible that the actual prevalence of rapes strongly
increases  with  the  improvement  of the  social position  of women. The
interpretation that more emancipated women are more inclined to condemn
and report sexual violence and non-sexual violence is more credible. This
interpretation is supported by the knowledge that precisely in the Western
countries with the highest scores (Canada, the United States, Norway and
Finland), public awareness about violence against women has been system-
atically raised through information campaigns in the mass media.
To explore this issue further, a split analysis was made of the correlates of
the index of violence against women in Western European and North Ameri-
can countries and in the countries with economies in transition. The two
analyses showed different results. Among the Western nations the educa-
tional attainment of women is strongly related to the index of violence against
women (r=.70; n=15; p=.005). To the extent that countries are more gender-
balanced, the rates of victimisation are higher. Among the nations in Central
and Eastern Europe this relationship is non-existent (r=.04). This finding
suggests that the most gender-balanced nations show relatively high scores
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on the index for sexual and/or non-sexual violence against women because
women are more sensitive to these types of crime and more ready to report
these to interviewers and/or the police. In Southern European countries such
behaviour might still be a taboo subject which is not easily discussed with
interviewers or the police.
Among the Central and Eastern European countries, high rates of victim-
isation are not related to the status of women. In this group of countries the
social status of women is generally lower than in the Western countries,
according to UNESCO indicators of educational attainment. The public
debate about violence against women has only recently started. The relatively
high rates in countries like Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation probably
reflect a high actual prevalence of such crimes. If levels of education and/or
awareness of the seriousness of these type of offences rise, many Central and
Eastern European countries will show even higher scores on indices of
violence against women.
These considerations shed doubts on the validity of the present indicator.
The rates of violence against women in countries where women have low
social status might systematically underestimate the true prevalence of such
acts. This conclusion does not imply that the rates of violence against women
in the more gender-balanced nations do not reflect serious acts of violence.
The ICVS data on seriousness assessments of reported incidents by the
victims show that violence against women is seen as one of the most serious
types of crime across the world (Van Dijk, 1998a). However, since the
indicator is probably biased, it cannot be reliably used for comparative
purposes. We therefore will not include this indicator in our multivariate
analyses.7
Corruption/bribery
The index of corruption is strongly inversely related to affluence (r=-.72;
n=43; p=.000). These types of criminal behaviour are obviously more preva-
lent in the less affluent nations. The prevalence is the highest in the Central
and Eastern European nations with economies in transition. Among these
nations, corruption is the least prevalent in the more prosperous nations, such
as Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary and Poland.
45
7 The correlation between the index of violence against women and female education is fairly strong.
Regression analysis showed that female education explains 14% of the variance in the indicator (B=.46;
p=.000). The residual variance per country was expressed in z-scores. These scores can be seen as an
indicator of violence against women, corrected for female educational attainment. Some Western nations
which showed high scores on the index, such as Canada, Finland, Norway and the United States showed
only moderately high scores on the new indicator.
High levels of corruption are partly determined by the existing political
structures. Corruption problems are exacerbated by undemocratic practices,
lack of transparency and insufficient salaries for officials.
A high level of corruption is itself a factor inhibiting sustainable economic
growth.
3.2.4 Results of a factor analysis
Finally, we conducted a factor analysis in order to characterise the crime
situation in the European and North American countries in terms of both their
victimisation rates and their scores for motivational and opportunity factors.
Building on the results presented above, we singled out the following as the
measures of crime: serious violence, burglary, petty crime and vehicle-re-
lated crimes. We entered into the analysis the most important independent
variables that explained the variance in the victimisation rates. The chosen
variables are: affluence, strain, urbanisation, car ownership and bicycle
ownership.
Factor analysis is a multivariate statistical technique which reduces data
by looking for underlying patterns of factors which represent commonality
in the original variables. In our case it allows us to see how victimisation
rates and their correlates cluster together into “factors”. To understand what
the factors describe or represent, one looks for the variables with the highest
scores (or “loadings,” as they are known). The analysis is limited to the 33
nations for which full information on all relevant variables is available. The
number of cases entered into the analysis is rather low and the results must
be interpreted with due caution.
Three factors emerged which together explain 74.5 percent of the variance in
the nine variables included in the analysis. The results are shown in table 9.
FACTOR 1
strain-related violent
crimes
FACTOR 2
serious property
crimes in urban
settings
FACTOR 3
opportunistic petty
crime
petty crimes
burglary
serious violence
motor vehicle crimes
urbanisation
affluence
strain
car ownership
bicycle ownership
.13
.29
.70
-.25
-.49
-.83
.92
-.82
.49
.29
.73
.14
.87
.65
.25
-.07
.23
-.23
.81
.35
.02
.05
-.15
.03
-.12
-.01
.69
Table 9. Results of factor analysis on victimisation rates and the most important
correlates in 33 countries (after varimax rotation).
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The first factor seems to represent strain-related violent crime (contact
crimes). It is characterised by high loadings on violent crime, strain, affluence
(negatively), car ownership (negatively) and bicycle ownership. A secondary
characteristic, not included in the analysis, is high consumption of strong
alcohol.
The second factor has its highest scores on burglary, vehicle crimes, car
ownership and urbanisation. It has moderately high loadings on affluence.
This factor seems to represent relatively affluent, urbanised nations where
high car ownership rates – and an outgoing lifestyle – invite high levels of
car crimes and burglaries. As we have discussed earlier, burglaries are also
related in the subset of Western nations to the proportion of households living
in detached housing.
The third factor has its highest scores on petty crimes and bicycle owner-
ship rates. This factor seems to represent opportunistic petty crime, notably
bicycle theft.
The results of this factor analysis are very similar to the results of a
previous factor analysis conducted on ICVS data (Mayhew, Van Dijk, 1997).
In the latter study three factors emerged which were described as strain-re-
lated contact crimes (violence and robbery), property crimes in an urban
setting and opportunistic petty crimes. The substitution of data from various
sources on serious violence for ICVS data on contact crimes has not changed
the results. Nations which suffer from high levels of violence show the same
profile, regardless of the measure of violence used.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the main findings of our inquiry of the
determinants of crime at the macro level of nations.
LOW AFFLUENCE STRAIN
hard liquor
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES
detached houses
car ownership
outgoing lifestyle
bicycle ownership
PROPERTY CRIMES
burglaries
car related crime
petty crime
HIGH AFFLUENCE
gun ownership
VIOLENCE
homicides
assaults
robberies
CORRUPTION
URBANISATION
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the main correlates of national crime rates in
Europe and North America.
47
Factor analyses of data on comparative crime rates and criminologically
relevant other social indicators seem to produce fairly consistent results.
There seems firstly to be a distinct cluster of nations where socio-economic
deprivation among groups of the population breeds high levels of various
forms of violent crime. In an analysis of global ICVS data, the same factor
emerged (Van Dijk, 1998a). This global factor showed high loadings on both
assaults/threats and robberies. It was labelled as deprivation-induced violent
crimes. In the present analysis of crime data of European and North American
nations the most serious types of violence were included. Again, a clear-cut
factor emerged which shows high loadings on strain and the indicator of
violence.
National crime rates cannot be understood in terms of strain only. The
analyses consistently show that there are several other criminologically
relevant clusters of nations. One characteristic that these countries have in
common is that, in spite of low levels of strain, their national rates of certain
property crimes are high, due to special criminal opportunity structures.
When criminal opportunities are presented, opportunistic, potential of-
fenders take them up. In recent years the use of self-protection measures has
gone up markedly in all Western nations (Mayhew, Van Dijk, 1997). The
increased use of self-protection measures in more affluent countries can be
seen as an adaptive countermeasure of potential victims which increases the
costs of crime or lowers the benefits of crime by restricting opportunities.
This negative feed-back loop may help to better control the level of oppor-
tunistic crime.
The results confirm the usefulness of the interactionist perspective which
assumes that crime is driven by the dynamic interplay between demand and
supply factors.
3.2.5 Country scores
The results of the factor analysis allow us to assess for each country the
dominant features of their crime profile, by looking at their scores on the
three factors found (in z-scores8). High scores on a factor mean that the
country scores highly (or lowly) on the variables represented by that factor
(e.g. high scores on factor 1 signify high scores on strain and homicide and
low scores on affluence and car ownership). Table 10 gives the results for the
thirty-three nations which could be included in the analysis.
Countries with the highest scores on the factor representing strain-related
violence are Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Estonia, Ukraine, the Russian Federation,
Romania and Latvia. Hungary, Poland and Albania show moderately high
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8 Deviations from the mean, expressed in standard deviations
scores on this factor. Countries which stand out with the lowest scores on
strain-related violence are Norway, Switzerland and the Netherlands.
High scores on the factor representing serious property crime in an urban
setting are found in Bulgaria, England and Wales, the United States, Estonia,
Scotland, Canada, Spain, France and Italy. With the exception of Bulgaria,
these are all affluent countries where relatively many people live in metro-
politan areas and where motor vehicles are the most common means of
transportation. Most countries in transition have low scores.
Strain-related violence Serious property crime
in urban settings
Opportunistic
petty crime
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Czech Republic
England /Wales
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Hungary
Italy
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Norway
Poland
Romania
Russian Fed.
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
United States
-.99
.76
-.86
1.05
-.67
.11
.29
-.75
1.42
-.65
-.77
1.50
.48
-.63
1.80
1.22
1.04
-.11
-.92
-1.07
.08
-1.43
.36
1.19
1.33
-.62
.34
-.44
-.91
-.82
-1.21
1.38
-.61
-1.05
-1.01
.81
1.79
.92
-.72
.75
1.61
1.45
-.88
.89
.76
-.03
.87
-.43
.61
.66
-1.14
.50
.24
.50
-.82
-.24
-.64
.23
.95
.14
-.71
.91
.36
-1.14
.19
1.58
.75
-1.66
-1.24
.02
1.18
-.62
1.53
-.19
1.06
.84
-.59
-1.09
-.88
-.34
.25
.10
-.13
-.53
-1.30
1.98
-1.21
-.94
.68
-1.40
.15
-1.29
1.23
1.15
-1.49
1.39
-.02
.68
.97
Table 10. National scores on three factors describing the crime situation.
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For the third factor, representing opportunistic petty crime, the scores were
highest in the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Slovakia, and
Slovenia.
Each of the three criminologically relevant factors can be characterised in
terms of groups of countries. In the present data set, strain-related violence
is represented by the countries in transition. (In a global perspective African
and Latin American nations show even higher scores.)
The second factor represents vehicle-related crimes and burglaries. Vehi-
cle-related crimes in urban settings are typical of several Anglo-Saxon
countries. (In a global perspective Australia and New Zealand also feature
highly on this list.) As said, these nations are vulnerable to vehicle-related
crime because they rely on motor vehicles for transportation.
Burglaries are typical of a group of Anglo-Saxon and some Central
European countries where people predominantly live in detached housing.
In the first group of countries sophisticated anti-burglary devices are much
more widely used than in the latter. The use of such devices has gone up
significantly since the late 1980s, according to trend data of the ICVS
(Mayhew, Van Dijk, 1997).
Petty  crime is  most prevalent in  some of  the  Northern and  Central
European countries.
Each of the nations for which scores could be calculated can be charac-
terised criminologically in terms of their scores on the three factors. Most
nations score exceptionally high on at least one factor. Detailed information
about national crime profiles and their social backgrounds can be found in
the tables, with national scores given in the appendices.
3.3 Discussion
General conclusions
The analyses have shown that crime indicators which are based on a combi-
nation of survey findings on the public’s experiences of crime, and on police
statistics on recorded  crimes are related  with criminologically relevant
economic and social indicators. These relationships can usefully be inter-
preted with the help of an interactionist model which sees crime rates as the
result of the dynamic interplay between motivational and opportunity factors
at the macro level.
The analysis of the macro correlates of violence against women is com-
plicated by measurement errors. Both official data (which are based on police
recorded crime) as well as victimisation rates (which are based on survey
research among the public) show cultural biases related to the social status
of women. More research should be done on the cross-cultural measurement
of violence against women. It is only when better comparative data become
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available that the correlates at the macro level of this type of criminality can
adequately be determined.
The prevalence of corruption appears to be strongly related to the state of
the economy. Economies in transition and, more generally, weaker econo-
mies appear to experience higher levels of manifest corruption by public
officials. The various source variables used showed strong correlations. This
results suggests that the measurement of corruption might be less compli-
cated than often assumed.
Central and Eastern Europe
In the light of the indicators developed for the study, the motivation to offend
would appear to be greater in the countries with economies in transition (the
countries in Central and Eastern Europe) than in Western Europe. (As noted,
the data used for this study deal primarily with “traditional” offences.) In
Central and Eastern Europe, the indicators suggest that there is clearly more
demand among male adolescents for opportunities to acquire income through
criminal activities. In these countries socio-economic deprivation and alco-
hol abuse appear to help in forming a breeding ground for different forms of
crimes of violence. Assaults, homicides and robberies appear to be more
prevalent in countries where many young males experience strain. Further-
more, in most Central and Eastern European countries violence against
women is relatively high. In addition to strain and alcohol abuse, this specific
crime problem is probably related to the low social status of women. For
example, the percentage of women with higher education is much lower in
most countries in transition than in the European Union member states.
Corruption also appears to be much more common in many Central and
Eastern European countries than in North America and Northern Europe.
In the short  term, the  economic crisis in the  Russian Federation  in
particular might exacerbate existing economic and social problems in the
region. In the longer term the economic prospects might be better but this
will not necessarily reduce the demand for crime. Increased affluence in these
countries will probably not reduce the prevalence of strain because in the
context of a free market economy the lower social strata will profit less from
it than will the higher strata. The rates of unemployment will probably remain
high for many years to come.
In most of the countries in transition people in urban areas typically live
in flats, and car ownership is still relatively rare. These factors may have so
far inhibited further increases of property crimes. Over the past ten years, in
most Central and Eastern European countries the level of affluence has
increased. This has been the case in particular in Hungary, Poland, Slovenia
and the Baltic states. If the GNP of these countries (which are among the first
candidates for entry into the European Union), continues to increase, vehi-
cle-related crimes and some forms of petty crimes are likely to increase as
well. Probably household burglary rates will also increase if households start
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to possess more expensive commodities, and investments in anti-burglary
devices remain low.
Eventually, however, investments in self-protection against car theft and
burglary will increase and the rates of property crimes will stabilise. If at that
time strain among adolescents remains prevalent, there might well be a shift
towards more violent forms of property crimes (street robberies, car-jacking
and household robberies). Some of the less serious property crimes prevented
by improved protection may be displaced in the form of more serious forms.
The crime profile of the countries in transition may start to resemble that of
South Africa which suffers from exceptionally high rates of robberies.
The level of corruption in government circles appears to be lower in the
countries where economic restructuring is relatively advanced, e.g. in Estonia
and Hungary. In fact the level of corruption in these countries is lower than
in some Western countries. These are encouraging findings. If the restructur-
ing in other countries in the region continues, the long-term prospects for
decreasing levels of corruption seem fairly good.
To sum up, the over-all criminological outlook for the countries in transi-
tion in our view is relatively bleak. Even if the current economic problems
are overcome, the rates of crimes of violence will probably remain high, due
to high levels of unemployment among young males and the high consump-
tion of strong alcohol. Also, the traditional attitudes towards females are
unlikely to change in the short term, and violence against women is likely to
remain a serious problem.
In the years to come, the increased affluence of the emerging middle
classes, although currently suffering a set-back in the Russian Federation,
will increase opportunities for crime. More people will be able to afford to
live in detached housing and to own cars. With a time lag of a few years, the
levels of self-protection will go up and the rate of opportunistic crimes might
stop increasing. Some of the crimes prevented, however, are likely to be
displaced to become robberies.
Western Europe
The crime situation in the more industrialised and affluent nations of Western
Europe must primarily be understood in terms of special opportunity struc-
tures. Countries which rely on motor cars for their transportation experience
high rates of vehicle-related crimes. Countries where people traditionally live
in detached housing experience high rates of burglaries. In recent years
protection against car theft, theft from cars and household burglaries has
increased. Probably in relation to this – and perhaps also to intensified
policing and more severe punishment of offenders – the over-all level of
property crimes has been declining in both North America and Western
Europe since 1995 (Mayhew, Van Dijk, 1997).
Paradoxically, crimes of violence - in particular violent juvenile crime -
show an upward trend in several member states of the European Union
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(Joutsen 1996b; Pfeiffer 1997). The increase in street robberies in some
countries might be the result of displacement of crimes prevented by im-
proved protection. Another explanation could lie in the emergence of an
ethnic underclass in the larger cities of Western Europe. Although this cannot
yet be determined with certainty, the level of strain among some ethnic parts
of the urban population might well be on the increase. In the area of crime
prevention, the main challenge for Western European countries seems to be
the social and economic integration of young immigrants in the urban areas.
At the same time, the outgoing lifestyle of young people and the combined
use of alcohol and drugs might also be a causal factor behind juvenile violent
crime. One of the main assets of Western Europe in this context is the
relatively low levels of handgun ownership. There are strong indications that
this is an important factor inhibiting homicides. The high rates of violence
against women in some Western countries, as shown by both police statistics
and ICVS data, might be the result of heightened sensitivity to and awareness
of the maltreatment of women by their spouses or other partners in a domestic
setting. If other countries become more gender-balanced, they may also show
higher rates of violence against women for the same reason. This explanation
for the high rates in some of the most affluent and gender-balanced countries
should be no reason to belittle the seriousness of these incidents. The recent
phenomenon of increased visibility of these crimes in the most gender-bal-
anced nations underlines the existence of very substantial dark numbers
elsewhere.
Relatively low levels of manifest corruption by public officials appear to
be typical of affluent nations with stable democratic traditions. This relation-
ship can also be understood in terms of criminal opportunities. In open
democracies with relatively unregulated markets there are fewer opportuni-
ties for public officials to require bribes for their services.
North America
Since 1988 the level of crime in the United States and Canada has declined,
according to both the ICVS and police data. The level of self-protection
against crime is high. The level of strain appears to be relatively low.
Both the United States and Canada have relatively high levels of car-re-
lated crimes in urban settings, as well as burglaries.
The level and profile of crime in the United States differs less from that
of countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands than
is commonly assumed. The level of conventional crimes in the United States
is not exceptionally high, nor is the level of corruption. The most important
difference appears to be the high level of homicides and robberies, and the
fact that in the United States these often involve the use of guns (see also
Marshall, 1996). The most probable cause of this deviation from the “Euro-
pean” pattern is the exceptionally high rates of gun ownership.
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4 Operation of the Criminal
Justice System1
Ineke Haen Marshall
4.1 Describing the operation of
the criminal justice system
Chapters 4 through 6 discuss a variety of indicators related to the operation
of criminal justice systems in a number of European countries and North
America (the United States and Canada). The two main data sources are the
Fifth United Nations Survey and the International Crime Victim Survey
(ICVS). Occasionally, additional data sources have been used. Lack of
comparability of indicators and missing data are two of the main challenges
facing the international data analysis. The current effort is no exception to
this rule. However, this chapter documents, whenever possible, the peculi-
arities and problems associated with particular data. Furthermore, three
indices (a “Law Enforcement Resources” index, a “Criminal Justice Practi-
tioner Gender Balance” index, and a “Citizen Evaluation of Police Perform-
ance” index) have been created in an attempt to overcome some of the
problems associated with missing and conflicting data.
The purpose of chapter 4 is to provide a general overview of the operation
of criminal justice systems in Europe and North America. In addition to
presenting country-based descriptive data, this chapter also provide simple
summary measures (means and standard deviations, quartiles, ranks) for the
entire region, as well as separately for the fifteen European Union (EU)
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
UK) and the Central and Eastern European countries (Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Geor-
gia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, the former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federa-
tion, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia).
This allows the making of comparisons between groups of nations which are
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1 We wish to express our appreciation to Chris E. Marshall at the University of Nebraska at Omaha for
his help in data management and statistical analysis.
likely to differ in significant respects (the countries in transition vs. tradition-
ally capitalist countries). Lumping a large number of countries together in
broad categories such as the EU or Central and Eastern European countries
risks ignoring important differences that exist between individual countries
that are grouped together.2 Yet, it appears that the benefits of this approach
outweigh its drawbacks for two reasons. First, because of the often question-
able validity of individual country-level data for specific indicators, the use
of comparisons between aggregated means (for groups of countries) provides
a more robust measure, because it minimizes the importance of single data
points. Second, the purpose of the present chapter is to describe international
patterns, similarities and differences in the operation of criminal justice
systems in Europe and North America. The use of aggregate comparisons
facilitate such an attempt.
Section 4.2 provides a description of criminal justice resources, in particular
criminal justice personnel. Section 4.3 provides an overview of the flow of cases
through the different criminal justice systems. Section 4.4 discusses perform-
ance indicators for the criminal justice systems in Europe and North America.
4.2 Criminal justice resources
Crime control is no longer monopolized by government, nor is it limited to
law enforcement. “The various means for the production of security implicate
at least the private sector, other departments of public government than the
police, pressure groups and citizens” (Brodeur 1995, p. 9). An increasing
amount of (public and private) resources is devoted to crime control and
prevention (crime prevention councils, community crime prevention groups,
education programmes) and target hardening (locks, burglary alarms). Polic-
ing is now widely offered by institutions other than the state, most impor-
tantly by private companies on a commercial basis and by communities on
a volunteer basis (Bayley and Shearing 1996, p. 585). Dealing with the
after-effects of crime (i.e., the crime victim) is becoming more and more an
integrated part of criminal justice systems. Law enforcement agencies pro-
vide victim support services, and women’s shelters are available to offer
protection to the victims of domestic abuse. Unfortunately, lack of systematic
international data (with the exception of some data on private security)
prevent the description of these types of criminal justice resources in this
chapter.
Traditionally, criminal justice resources have been conceived of in terms
of personnel, budget, expenditure and capital resources (United Nations
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2 In addition, such a grouping omits the non-EU Western European countries of Andorra, Cyprus, Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway and Switzerland.
Interim Report A/Conf.169/1, 1994, p. 18). There are also less tangible
resources, such as the educational quality and the moral integrity of its
personnel and the sophistication of its organizational structure (cf. Kangas-
punta 1995a, p. 53), and its degree of professionalism (i.e., merit hiring,
training, advanced technology, incorruptability, and equal treatment of citi-
zens and strict adherence to law) (cf. Fairchild 1993).
Commonly, the focus is on the two most tangible resources, personnel and
financial resources. Data on personnel and budget – which are routinely used
for administrative and government purposes – should be among the more
easily obtainable pieces of information, even internationally. The United
Nations surveys prove otherwise. The earlier Surveys obtained resource data
on only a handful of countries. The results of the Fifth Survey are more
encouraging: over 30 of the countries from the region supplied data on these
variables. However, whereas missing data are becoming a less pressing
problem, serious questions remain about the quality and the international
comparability of the resources data. The organizational complexity of law
enforcement in most countries makes answering questions about resources
a true challenge. For example, as the United Nations Interim Report (p. 18)
points out, because the criminal justice systems in most countries are not
centralized units, it is difficult to collect data on the distribution of personnel
to police, prosecution, courts, and prisons.
The financial resources devoted to criminal justice activities and personnel
are not described in the present chapter because of major problems associated
with financial data provided through the Fifth United Nations Survey. First,
the data are only available for a small number of countries. Although 18
countries report on police expenditures, 13 countries report on prosecutorial
expenditures, 13 countries report on court expenditures, and 24 countries
report on prison staff expenditures, only 6 countries report on all four
categories of expenditures. Second, there is the additional problem that the
original data are provided in terms of the local currency. In order to make
international comparisons, UN currency conversion tables need to be used.
Particularly in the countries in transition (Central and Eastern Europe) that
have had a highly fluctuating currency during the period under review, the
resulting figures are questionable and should be approached with great
caution. Bayley (1985, p. 75) argues that expenditures (on policing) are not
a useful yardstick for comparative purposes because of variations in purchas-
ing power over time as well as from place to place.
Criminal justice is a human-resource-intensive industry (cf. United Nations
Interim Report, p. 18); a large portion of the budget is spent on personnel. Thus,
there is a high correlation between personnel and budget because most of the
criminal justice resources throughout the world are expended on personnel (cf.
Bayley 1985, p. 75). The number of criminal justice personnel, therefore, is the
focus of the following discussion of criminal justice resources.
The rest of this section is divided into six subsections. Comparative data on the
police (section 4.2.1), prosecutors (section 4.2.2), judges (section 4.2.3), and
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correctional personnel (section 4.2.4) lay the groundwork for a section (4.2.5)
that provides a descriptive account of the size and composition of the total
criminal justice work force in Europe and North America. The last section
(4.2.6) zeroes in on the gender balance among criminal justice personnel in the
region.
4.2.1 The police
The capacity or strength of the police force may be measured in terms of the
number of officers, budget, equipment, training, recruitment standards, stra-
tegic choices, honesty, and accountability (Bayley 1985, p. 74). The number
of police is the most expedient, relatively straightforward measure, even
though problems arise in classifying functionaries as police (Bayley 1985).
The Fifth United Nations survey instrument defines the police or law enforce-
ment sector as any “[P]ublic agencies whose principal functions are the
prevention, detection and investigation of crime and the apprehension of
alleged offenders” (page 10). In some countries, these functions are performed
by para-military or military forces or national security forces. For this reason,
the administrator responsible for completing the UN questionnaire is asked
to “...try to limit as far as possible replies to the civil police proper as distinct
from national guards or local militia” (p. 10). The UN survey instrument then
asks for the “[N]umber of personnel at the national level. If there are many
local forces, please provide data on them if possible” (p. 10). Specifically, the
question asks for data on “police personnel (sworn/uniform and civilian) by
number and sex” (p. 11). Close examination of the national responses to this
question, as well as comparisons of some of the data with other published
sources (e.g. Hebenton and Thomas 1995, Table 1.1) suggests that the inter-
national police personnel data need to be used with caution.
What are some of the reasons for this “health warning”? First, the distinc-
tion between sworn/uniform and civilian police is problematic. Civilian
police personnel is increasingly important as police officers now are aided
by a far larger number of civilian employees in the police service than in the
past (Reiner 1995). However, what exactly is civilian / police personnel?
Does it include support staff, such as secretaries, computer specialists and
crime lab technicians? Some countries (such as Moldova) indicate that they
have no civilian police personnel (leaving it open to speculation whether this
means in contrast to military, or in contrast to uniformed personnel), while
others (such as Liechtenstein and Northern Ireland) simply leave this part of
the question blank. Second, even when focusing on “total police”, some of
the national figures provided in the responses may be questionable, reflecting
the impossibility of summarizing often very complex systems of policing
(centralized or decentralized, with different structures and organizations,
under different jurisdictions) into one single summary measure. Also, many
agencies that are not thought of as police nonetheless possess police powers
(e.g. the Coast Guard in the U.S.) (Bayley 1985, p. 7). Furthermore, national
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Countries Public
police per
100,0001
Total
public
police
Public
police
(rank)
Private
Police per
100,000
Private
Police
(rank)
Total Police
(public and
private) (per
100,000)7
Ratio
Private/
Public
Police 8
Armenia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
England/W
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
N. Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Fed.
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
USA
405
367 2
344 3
249
670
523
238
347
436
232
349 4
320
383
293
304
488
779
463
190
545
276
318
507
241 5
255
520
231
440
214
1,225
360
352
412
475 6
282
265
190
419
300
15,191
29,474
34,712
72,828
30,159
3,838
12,372
178,336
6,539
11,816
201,696
260,132
39,934
30,041
10,829
278,640
132,582
11,809
59
20,279
1,100
6,807
1,846
10,492
39,216
8,493
10,042
43,459
48,692
1,812,344
18,458
18,834
8,002
185,983
24,759
14,210
116,180
217,298
782,110
25
23
18
8
37
35
6
19
28
5
20
17
24
13
15
32
38
30
2
36
11
16
33
7
9
34
4
29
3
39
22
21
26
31
12
10
1
27
14
75
109
24
193
155
69
121
217
19
143
76
121
201
132
112
26
156
135
184
108
10
582
6
9
3
19
16
5
12
21
2
15
7
12
20
13
10
4
17
14
18
8
1
22
442
453
431
502
301
470
537
402
447
564
666
477
387
343
596
610
466
373
200
882
0.20
0.32
0.81
0.45
0.30
0.35
0.68
0.05
0.47
0.16
0.22
0.73
0.52
0.48
0.35
0.28
0.65
0.41
0.05
1.94
Table 11. Public and Private Police, 1994.
Table 11 continues...
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figures conceal enormous variations in the concentration of police officers
within countries (Bayley 1985). Finally, international data on police strength
do not reflect differences in level of pay and training, and level of available
technological support.
Policing also includes private security or private policing. The private
security industry has grown tremendously over the past thirty years (Bayley
1994, p. 10). In the U.S., the United Kingdom and Canada, there are more
private security agents than public police, and the rate of growth for the
private sector is faster than for the public (Bayley 1994, p. 10). International
Countries Public
police per
100,0001
Total
public
police
Public
police
(rank)
Private
Police per
100,000
Private
Police
(rank)
Total Police
(public and
private) (per
100,000)7
Ratio
Private/
Public
Police 8
Standard Dev.
25% Quartile
Median
75% Quartile
Mean
EU mean
Central and
Eastern Europe
mean
189
265
349
464
390
341
484
116
74
121
163
135
132
57
145
391
460
557
477
472
666
(1 case)
0.41
0.24
0.38
0.62
0.47
0.42
.22
(1 case)
1 Data are Fifth UN Survey data for 1994 (question 1.1), except for Switzerland, in which case the data for 1990 were used. For
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal no Fifth UN Survey data were available, and data were taken from the Dutch
Ministry of Justice study on private security.
2 This figure for Austria includes security guards, criminal and administrative posts, and the uniformed Bundesgendarmerie.
3 Total police figures for Belgium include municipal police, the gendarmerie and the judicial police.
4 The figures for France only include active personnel, i.e. the administrative staff is excluded, as is the staff of schools and youth
performing their national service in the police force of the gendarmerie.
5 The figure for Moldova does not include data about the number of employees at the Security Administration and the Investigatory
Administration since employees of these subdivisions are not related to the police service.
6 This figure includes the gendarme (guardia civil), the three corps of the autonomic regions and the 1,702 municipal corps. All
police personnel are uniformed (“uniformado”) in Spain. Although the state corps (the national police and the gendarme) serve
as the judicial police, they are part of the same corporate structure as the police with security functions. Thus, these figures should
not be evaluated separately.
7 The total figures deviate occasionally from those in the HEUNI “Crime Guide” 2.0 because of adjustments in the figures for the
public police.
8 The private/public police ratio is based on only 20 countries (for which data were available both for the public and the private
police). That is why the summary statistics can not be calculated by using the statistics provided in the first column - police per
100,000 - and the fourth column - private police per 100,000 - which are based on a larger number of cases.
Table 11. ...continues
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data on private security are limited. Table 11 presents data on private police
collected by the Dutch Ministry of Justice. In addition, Table 11 presents data
on public police personnel for Europe, the U.S. and Canada for 1994.
Table 11 shows that data on the number of police are available for 37
European countries, as well as for the United States and Canada. There are,
of course, huge international variations in the size of police force (for
example 1,812,344 in the Russian Federation, vs. 59 in Liechtenstein).
Standardized rates are more meaningful. These are expressed as the number
of police officers per 100,000 population. For example, in the Russian
Federation there were 1,224 police officers per 100,000 people (or one police
officer for every 82 people). The rate per 100,000 varies from this high of
1,224 for the Russian Federation to a low of 190 for Turkey. Countries in the
75% quartile tend to be countries in transition: Croatia, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, and the Russian Federation. The high rates in these countries are
not surprising in view of the fact that the governments of these nations
historically have relied heavily on state security forces to maintain order.
Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Spain and Portugal are the other
countries with high rates. Three Nordic countries Denmark, Finland and
Norway have relatively low rates of police per capita, but so do a few Central
and Eastern European countries, such as Moldova and Romania. Canada, the
Netherlands, Liechtenstein and Turkey also have a relative low per capita
police presence.
The present analysis does not include trend data. However, it is a well-estab-
lished fact that the number of police officers has increased in most countries
over the last thirty years (see e.g. Reiner 1995). For the 39 countries which
provided data, on the average, in 1994 there are 390 police officers per 100,000
people (or one police employee for every 256 people). The mean number of
police officers for the Central and Eastern European countries is 484, compared
to 341 for the EU countries. This observation is consistent withBayley’sanalysis
of 1965 police data which showed that the then-USSR and East Europe were
the most heavily policed region (380 people per officer in 1965).
Data on private police are available for 22 countries. Table 11 shows that
the countries with a higher GNP (such as England and Wales, Germany,
Luxembourg, Sweden and the USA) tend to have a relatively high level of
private police forces. On the other hand, the Czech Republic, Greece, Poland,
and Turkey, less prosperous countries, appear to have a low level of private
security. It should be noted that an exception to this correlation between
prosperity and the number of private police is Finland, a prosperous country
with a relatively low level of private security forces. The mean number of
private police is 135 per 100,000. Since most of the private security data are
collected in countries other than Central and Eastern Europe (the Czech
Republic and Lithuania are exceptions), it is not useful to make comparisons
between EU countries and countries in transition. It should be noted none-
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theless that there is ample anecdotal evidence to suggest that in some Central
and Eastern European countries (for which we lack systematic data) security
is increasingly becoming a private (i.e., commercial) matter rather than a
government responsibility.
For the 20 nations with data on both private and public police, it is possible
to calculate the combined number of (public and private) police. The mean
number of (public and private) police is 477 per 100,000. Countries with the
highest combined security forces are the United States, Portugal, Spain,
Lithuania, and Italy which all rank in the top or 75% quartile. Countries in
the bottom or 25% quartile (i.e., below 391) are Finland, the Netherlands,
Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. It should be recalled that these rankings
are influenced by the limited (and biased) availability of data (particularly
on private policing). Typically, the number of private police is much smaller
than the number of public police. For example, in Austria, the number of
private police is one-fifth that of the public police. In the U.S., on the other
hand, the number of private security workers is almost double that of the
police. The data in Table 11 show no statistically significant relationship
between the level of public police and the level of private police.
International differences in police strength (as measured by the number of
public police personnel per 100,000) may be related to a variety of factors,
such as the level of criminality. The motor vehicle theft index, the burglary
index, and the petty crime index (see section 1.6) are not related to the number
of police officers per capita in Europe and North America in a statistically
significant manner, whereas the corruption index (r = .47, p = .005), the
homicide index (r = .46, p = .004), and the serious violence index (r = .45, p
= .004) are all related to the level of police presence. Thus, countries with a
higher level of corruption, homicide, and serious violence tend to have a
greater number of police officers per capita than countries with a lower level
of corruption, homicide and serious violence.
The level of economic development is another commonly used correlate
of police strength. There is a negative correlation between number of police
and 1994 GNP (r = -.39, p = .02): countries with a higher GNP tend to have
fewer police per capita. A related measure, the Human Development Index
(1994) also shows a weak negative relationship with the number of police (r
= -.28, p = .10): countries which score high on the HDI tend to have fewer
police officers per capita than countries that are less developed. It should be
noted, however, that these are simple bivariate correlations; more sophisti-
cated multivariate analysis is needed in order to address the complex issue
of the determinants of police capacity.
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4.2.2 Prosecutors
Prosecution of criminal cases may be initiated by the police (as in Denmark),
by the Office of Public Prosecution (as in the United States and in England
and Wales), or by the Procurator (as in France) (Reichel 1994, p. 223). In
countries with a common law tradition, discussing public prosecution is
fairly straightforward: one describes the office of public prosecutor (Reichel
1994, p. 224). Matters become more complicated in countries with a civil
law tradition, where there is more emphasis on the investigative stage and
the office of the Procurator. Typically, prosecution in these countries involves
three agents: the judicial police, procurators (prosecutors), and examining
magistrates (judges) (Reichel 1994, p. 225). It is against this background that
information provided on prosecution through the Fifth United Nations Sur-
vey must be interpreted.
According to the UN survey instrument, “’Prosecutor’ refers to a govern-
ment official whose duty is to initiate and maintain criminal proceedings on
behalf of the state against persons accused of committing a criminal offence.
Countries differ in whether a prosecutor is a member of a separate agency,
or a member of the police or judiciary. Please indicate the title of the agency
in your country under which the prosecutor functions. If more than one
criminal justice system operates in your country, for example federal/provin-
cial systems or civilian/martial systems, please provide separate information
about prosecutorial functions in each system” (p. 18). The total number of
prosecutors, by gender, as well as whether the prosecutors are full-time or
part-time (and again by gender) was also asked.
Not surprisingly, the mean number of prosecutors per 100,000 (9) is much
smaller than the mean number of police (390). Also, the standard deviation
(4) is fairly small; the difference between the minimum (2 for Austria) and
the maximum (19 for the Russian Federation) is fairly modest, much more
so than the huge variations for police per 100,000 (for example, 1,225 for the
Russian Federation vs. 190 for Turkey). Countries in the top or 75% quartile
are Belarus, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,
and the Russian Federation. Countries in the bottom or 25% quartile are
Austria, Andorra, England and Wales, Greece, the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, the Netherlands, Scotland, Spain, and Turkey. In Central and
Eastern Europe there are, on the average, almost twice as many prosecutors
per 100,000 in population (11) as there are in the EU countries (6).
Notes of Table 12.
1 Data are Fifth UN Survey data for 1994 (question 6.1), except for the United States, for which the data for
1990 were used.
2 The data on total prosecutors do not include the district prosecutors (the “Bezirkanwalte”).
3 The national judiciary system in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia comprises only professional
(full-time) prosecutors.
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Countries Prosecutors
per 100,0001
Total
Prosecutors
Prosecutors
(rank)
Prosecutors
(Quartile)
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
England/W
Estonia
Finland
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxemburg
FYR Macedonia
Moldova
Netherlands
Portugal
Russian Fed.
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
USA
Standard Dev.
25% Quartile
Median
75% Quartile
Mean
EU mean
Central and
Eastern Europe
mean
5
9
2
16
14
8
7
7
10
8
7
4
8
7
7
7
4
11
19
12
16
10
16
7
6
11
3
10
19
5
10
7
3
8
4
9
4
6
8
11
9
6
11
3
327
200 2
1,232
1,495
774
589
314
71
843
386
2,090
123
334
384
5,375
392
1,153
3,167
539
398
3
588
27
119 3
467
417
1,015
28,514
249
560
142
1,284
717
2,356
22,300
7
22
1
34
31
18
14
13
24
19
17
6
21
10
15
11
4
29
35
30
32
25
33
12
9
28
2
26
36
8
27
16
3
20
5
23
1
3
1
4
4
2
2
2
3
3
2
1
3
2
2
2
1
4
4
4
4
3
4
2
1
4
1
3
4
1
3
2
1
3
1
3
Table 12. Prosecutors, 1994.
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4.2.3 Judges
In the section on courts, the UN survey instrument defines judges and
magistrates as follows: “Judges and magistrates refers to both full and
part-time officials authorized to hear civil, criminal and other cases, includ-
ing appeal courts, and make dispositions in a court of law. Please include also
associate judges and magistrates, who may be authorized as above, within
this category. Lay judges and magistrates refer to persons performing the
same functions as the professional officials but who do not consider them-
selves, and are not normally considered by others, as career members of the
judiciary” (p. 24). The number of professional judges (male/female), full-
time and part-time, lay judges (male/ female), and full-time and part-time
was also asked. In the responses, information on lay judges is frequently
missing (with no indication of whether this means that the country does not
use lay judges, or whether data are unavailable). For this reason, Table 13
presents information on professional judges only.
There are large variations in the number of professional judges per capita,
from a low of 2 (England and Wales), to a high of 70 (Switzerland), with a
mean of 14 and a standard deviation of 12. The mean number of professional
judges in EU countries (13) is very close to the mean number of professional
judges in Central and Eastern Europe (12). Countries with a relatively large
number of judges per capita are Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany,
Hungary, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Slovenia), and Switzerland.
Countries with relatively few judges per capita are Armenia, England and
Wales, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Northern Ireland,  Scotland, and
Sweden.
Notes of Table 13.
1 Data are Fifth UN Survey data for 1994 (question 13.1), except for the Netherlands and Switzerland, for which
1990 data are used.
2 For England and Wales, figures do not include masters or members of Tribunals (neither category deals with
crime), nor do the figures include acting stipendiary magistrates.
3 For Finland, data includes only the professional judges. The number of lay judges has doubled from 1990 to
1994 because of the reform of first instance courts implemented in 1993. As a result of the reform, two different
types of court were unified and a new system of lay judges (encompassing an additional 1.8 million citizens
in jurisdictions with lay judges) was established. The number of part-time lay judges is 2100 in 1990 and 4075
in 1994.
4 These data are for 1995.
5 The judiciary system in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia comprises only professional (full-time)
judges and magistrates. The latter form (magistrates) are municipal. There are three levels: municipal, regional
and supreme.
6 Scotland: The number of professional judges or magistrates includes judges, magistrates, sheriffs and
stipendiary magistrates.
7 United States: includes judges from federal and state courts, but not from lower courts, e.g. municipal and
police courts.
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Countries Judges per
100,0001
Total
Judges
Judges
(rank)
Judges
(Quartile)
Armenia
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
England/W
Estonia
Finland
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxemburg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
N. Ireland
Norway
Portugal
Russian Fed.
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
USA
Standard Dev.
25% Quartile
Median
75% Quartile
Mean
EU Mean
Central and Eastern
3
20
7
12
12
23
9
20
2
12
18
5
27
13
21
7
5
7
26
7
27
19
8
6
8
3
10
13
9
3
21
26
8
4
70
9
4
12
6
9
14
13
12
95
1,589
679
1,197
989
1,034
67
2,059
985 2
185
929 3
249
22,134 4
1,366
2,198
1,142
240
186
8
256
107
399 5
29
242
1,204
44
422
1,248
12,577
137 6
1,118
510
3,063
390
4,296
5,359
11,235 7
2
28
10
22
21
32
19
29
1
23
26
7
36
25
31
11
8
13
33
12
35
27
15
9
16
4
20
24
17
3
30
34
14
6
37
18
5
1
3
2
3
3
4
3
4
1
3
3
1
4
3
4
2
1
2
4
2
4
3
2
1
2
1
3
3
2
1
4
4
2
1
4
2
1
Table 13. Professional Judges, 1994.
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4.2.4 Correctional staff
The UN survey instrument asks for data on the number of persons (at the
national level) defined as “staff of adult prisons (penal and correctional
institutions), by sex and function” and the same for juvenile prisons. The total
number of staff is broken down into management staff, treatment staff,
custodial staff and “other”. In Table 14, data on the total (combined) number
of staff are presented. Several countries either did not provide data on their
juvenile correctional staff, or indicated that there was no separate juvenile
correctional system. In those cases, total prison staff was assumed to be equal
to adult prison staff; in the other cases, the total prison staff was a simple
summation of the adult and juvenile staff.
An additional measure of the investment into the prison system is the
inmate/staff ratio: countries where the inmate/staff ratio is low (close to 1/1)
invest more resources in the prison system than do countries where the
inmate/staff ratio is high. The data for the inmate/staff ratio were taken from
a report prepared for HEUNI (Walmsley 1997), with additional calculations
based on the Fifth United Nations Survey.
Table 14 shows that the countries in the top or 75% quartile of prison staff
per 100,000 are Canada and the United States - the two North American
countries - and the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Russian
Federation - all Central and Eastern European countries - and Scotland and
Northern Ireland. In the bottom or 25% quartile of prison staff per capita are
Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia, Germany, Greece, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Malta. In view of the rather large
international variations, it is not surprising that the EU mean (53) is only
slightly below the Central and Eastern Europe mean (67).
With regard to the inmate/staff ratio, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kyr-
gyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation,
Ukraine and the U.S. have a relatively high inmate/staff ratio (i.e., in the top
quartile). With the exception of the U.S., these are all Eastern and Central
European countries. In the EU countries, there is an average of 1.7 inmates
per correctional employee; in Central and Eastern European countries, the
average number of inmates per prison employee is double that in the EU
countries (3.6). Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Liechtenstein, the Nether-
lands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Slovenia and Sweden rank in the bottom
or 25% quartile of the inmate/staff ratio (1.25). In these countries, there is
roughly one (or more) prison employee for each inmate.
It should be noted that the data do not show any correlation between
number of prison staff per capita and the inmate/staff ratio. However, there
is a statistically significant relation between prison staff per capita and two
property crime indices: the burglary index (r = .42, p = .02) , the petty theft
index (r = .58, p = .001) and the motor vehicle theft index (r = .33, p = .05).
Also, the size of the prison staff is positively correlated to the homicide index
(r = .38, p = .02 ), the serious violence index (r = .38, p = .02) and the violence
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Countries Staff per
100,0001
Total
Staff
Staff
(rank)
Staff
(Quartile)
Ihmate/
Staff
Ratio2
Ihmate/
Staff
Rank
Ihmate/
Staff
(Quartile)
Albania
Armenia
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
England/W
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxemburg
FYR
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
N. Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Fed.
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
28
44
35
52
34
92.7 3
49
29
79
74.8 4
75
176
53
37
37
18
64
53.9 5
80
55
107
46
23
33
58
61
193
53
42
154
86
42
52
39
40
46
140
1,064
3,514
3,611
5,243
2,840
27,103
2,185
216
8,110
3,891
38,435
2,642
2,681
2,009
30,078
1,889
6,568
2,477
2,030
17
3,991
185
500
120
2,523
9,446
3,153
2,281
4,126
228,495
4,426
822
4,521
2,734
24,378
23,720
365,755
3
14
7
19
6
32
17
4
29
28
27
36
21
8
9
1
26
22
30
23
33
16
2
5
24
25
37
20
12
35
31
13
18
10
11
15
34
1
2
1
3
1
4
2
1
4
3
3
4
3
1
1
1
3
3
4
3
4
2
1
1
3
3
4
3
2
4
4
2
2
2
2
2
4
1.4
2.1
13.7
1.4
1.3
3.1
1.5
1.4
1.0
2.5
1.0
1.3
1.7
1.1
2.4
3.8
2.3
2.9
2.1
1.3
0.8
1.2
5.6
5.1
1.1
3.5
2.4
2.7
1.7
4.2
0.9
0.5
0.9
3.0
3.0
5.5
4.3
1.3
1.8
0.8
0.9
2.0
1.9
3.9
4.0
17
26
45
17
14
35
19
17
8
30
8
14
21
10
29
37
27
32
26
14
3
11
44
42
9
36
29
31
21
40
5
1
5
34
34
43
41
14
22
3
5
24
23
38
39
2
3
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
3
1
2
2
1
3
4
3
3
3
2
1
1
4
4
1
4
3
3
2
4
1
1
1
3
3
4
4
2
2
1
1
3
3
4
4
Table 14. Correctional Staff, 1994.
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against women index (r = .59, p = .000). There is also a positive relationship
between the inmate/staff ratio and the corruption index (r = .59, p = .000),
the homicide index (r = .45, p = .003), and the serious violence index (r =
.49, p = .001).
4.2.5 Total criminal justice personnel
Countries differ with regard to the total number of people employed as
criminal justice personnel (police, prosecutors, judges, and prison staff).
Table 15 presents the rate of criminal justice personnel per 100,000 for the
25 countries for which data are available on police, prosecution, courts, and
prisons. Of these countries, the Russian Federation has the highest rate of
criminal justice personnel per capita (1,407), and Turkey the lowest with 242
criminal justice staff per 100,000 people. Countries in the bottom or 25%
quartile with respect to the total number of criminal justice personnel per
100,000 are Finland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, the Netherlands, Sweden, and
Turkey. The Russian Federation, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithu-
ania rank in the top quartile. On the average, these 25 countries have 478
criminal justice personnel per 100,000 population (standard deviation 229).
Countries Staff per
100,0001
Total
Staff
Staff
(rank)
Staff
(Quartile)
Ihmate/
Staff
Ratio2
Ihmate/
Staff
Rank
Ihmate/
Staff
(Quartile)
Standard Dev.
25% Quartile
Median
75% Quartile
Mean
EU mean
Central and
Eastern Europe
mean
41
38
52
77
64
53
67
2.2
1.3
1.9
3.1
2.5
1.7
3.6
1 Data are Fifth UN Survey data for 1994 (question 22.1 and 23.1) . For Switzerland, 1990 was used. For the United States, no
1994 UN data were available, and the data were taken from the 1995 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (p. 85).
2 Most of the data are taken from Walmsley 1997. If the report did not include this type of data for a country, the inmate/staff ratio
was calculated by dividing the total number of persons held in incarceration on a given day (question 16.1) by the total number
of correctional personnel (questions 22.1 and 23.1, Fifth UN Survey, 1994).
3 For Canada, the 1994 data is for 1994-1995 and includes a community corrections staff of 3610 and 1445 full time equivalent
positions in one province (British Columbia).
4 For Denmark, this figure includes staff of all prisons, including the Department of Prisons and Probation and local probation.
5 For Kyrgyzstan, these data do not include the staff of the internal protection section.
Table 14. ...continues
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Central and Eastern European countries have a larger average number of
criminal justice personnel per capita (603) than do those EU countries for
which data are available (398)
Table 15 shows significant international differences in the total number of
people working in criminal justice (per 100,000 population). The size of the
(combined) criminal justice work force, however, only tells part of the story.
That is, a country which scores low on per capita criminal justice personnel
may rank high with respect to the proportion of personnel resources spent on
prison; another country which ranks high on per capita criminal justice
personnel may rank near the bottom with regard to prison staff. How, then
do countries differ with regard to the proportion of their criminal justice
personnel resources spent on either police, prosecution, courts, or prison?
Table 15 shows that all countries devote the bulk of their criminal justice
resources - as measured by criminal justice personnel per capita - to the
police. The mean is 81.1%, with a small standard deviation (7.1). The United
States ranks lowest with 66.2%, followed by Liechtenstein and Estonia. At
the other end, Armenia, Greece and Cyprus rank highest. After police
spending, prison personnel – without exception – represents the second
largest personnel assignment. The mean is 13.9%, with a standard deviation
of 6.7. The United States and Estonia appear to employ almost one-third of
all criminal justice personnel in correctional services, compared to countries
which employ less than 10% of their criminal justice staff in corrections:
Croatia, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia, Portugal, and Slovenia. The numerical importance of judges and
prosecutors is fairly low among the total number of criminal justice person-
nel: judges – on the average – account for 3.29% of all criminal justice staff
(with a standard deviation of 2.4), and prosecutors – on the average – account
for 1.8% of all criminal justice personnel (with a standard deviation of .8).
Liechtenstein reports that 9.2% of the criminal justice work force consists of
judges – an outlier, probably reflecting the very low base numbers for this
small country. The amount of variation between countries is even smaller for
prosecutors, with a high of 3.4% for Moldova, and a low of 0.6% for Austria.
There is a striking similarity in distribution of criminal justice personnel
(among police, prosecutors, judges, and prisons) between the EU countries
(n = 11), and the Central and Eastern European countries (n = 10) (see Figure
2). In the EU countries, 81.9% of all criminal justice personnel is employed
by the police; the comparable figure for the Central and Eastern European
countries is 82.2%. About 2% of the criminal justice work force in both the
EU and the Central and Eastern European countries are working as prosecu-
tors, and a little over 13% of the criminal justice work force in both EU and
Central and Eastern European countries are employed in corrections. There
is a difference of less than 1% between the proportion of the criminal justice
work force employed as judges in EU countries (3.48%) and Central and
Eastern European countries (2.62%). This similarity is even more striking in
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view of the fact that about 1.5 times more people are employed as criminal
justice personnel in the Central and Eastern European countries than in the
EU countries (603.17 vs. 398.3).
The number of criminal justice personnel per capita is not related to the
police/total personnel, prison/total personnel, or prosecutors/total personnel
ratios. Only the judges/total personnel ratio appears to have an association
with the total strength of the criminal justice work force (r = -.41, p = .05).
Countries with a larger number of criminal justice personnel per capita tend
to have a lower proportion of judges, than do countries with a smaller number
of criminal justice personnel. Overall, the size of the criminal justice work
Countries Total CJ
Personnel
(per 100,000)
Police
(%)
Prosecutors
(%)
Judges
(%)
Prison Staff
(%)
Armenia
Austria
Belgium
Croatia
Cyprus
England/W
Estonia
Finland
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Moldova
Netherlands
Portugal
Russian Fed.
Scotland
Slovenia
Sweden
Turkey
USA
Mean (sd)
EU Mean
Central and
Eastern Europe
Mean
445
433
416
748
571
427
633
309
391
418
389
566
281
675
356
365
315
327
505
1,407
453
488
346
242
454
478
398
603
91.1
84.8
82.8
89.5
91.6
81.1
68.9
75.0
81.9
91.6
75.2
81.9
67.8
80.8
77.6
87.0
76.5
77.9
87.1
87.1
79.3
84.4
81.5
78.4
66.2
81.1
81.9
82.2
2.0
0.6
1.9
0.9
1.7
1.0
1.3
2.1
1.7
0.9
2.9
2.8
3.5
2.3
1.9
1.5
3.4
0.8
2.0
1.4
1.1
1.5
2.4
1.6
2.0
1.8
2.0
2.0
0.6
4.6
2.9
3.1
1.6
0.5
2.0
5.9
7.0
3.1
5.5
1.3
9.2
1.0
7.5
5.1
1.8
2.5
2.5
0.6
0.6
5.4
1.3
3.6
1.0
3.2
3.5
2.6
6.4
10.1
12.5
6.5
5.2
17.5
27.8
17.0
9.5
4.3
16.4
14.1
19.5
15.9
13.0
6.4
18.4
18.8
8.3
11.0
19.0
8.7
14.9
16.4
30.9
13.9
13.2
13.2
Table 15. 1994 Total (per 100,000) and Percentage Distribution of Criminal Justice Personnel:
Police, Prosecutors, Judges, and Prison Staff.
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force in a country is not related to variations within a country in the relative
importance of either police, prison, or prosecutors staff.
The picture appears to be clear: in all countries for which we have data in
the region the bulk of criminal justice personnel works as police, followed
by prison staff, with only a rather small proportion of all criminal justice
personnel consisting of judges and prosecutors. The remarkable international
consistency supports the functional view of criminal justice systems which
assumes that there is “more similarity of jobs across systems than there is
among persons performing these duties” (Reichel 1994, p. 11). This is not
surprising considering the very labour-intensive type of work and functions
that the police and prison staff perform. Unlike police and correctional
workers, prosecutors and judges deal with large numbers of cases which may
be processed relatively quickly.
Since the bulk of the criminal justice work force consists of police (see
Table 15), a strong association between the rate of police and total number
of criminal justice personnel is expected. The data in Table 15 support this
(r = .99, p = .00). The number of prosecutors per capita (r = .66, p = .000),
and the number of prison staff per capita (r = .57, p = .01) are also positively
related to the overall level of criminal justice personnel. There is no relation-
ship between the number of judges and total criminal justice personnel levels.
Table 16 provides more information on the interrelationships between levels
of policing, prosecutors, judges, and prison staff.
81,9 %
Police
Judges
Prosecutors
Prison staff
All Countries
EU Countries Central and Eastern Europe
81,1 %
13,9 %
13,1 %13,1 %
3,4 %
1,9 %
3,2 %
1,8 %
2,0 %
2,6 %
82,2 %
aaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaa
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
aaaaa
aaaaa
aaaaa
Figure 2. 1994 Percentage distribution of criminal justice personnel: Police, prose-
cutors, judges,and prison staff.
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The relative size of private security forces has no consistent relationship
with either the police per 100,000 or the prison staff per 100,000. Countries
in the top quartile of police per 100,000 tend to have a higher amount of
prosecutors per 100,000 and prison staff per 100,000. However, the pattern
with regard to judges per 100,000 is different: countries in the top quartile
with respect to police per 100,000 appear to have a lower rate of judges per
100,000 than do countries with a lower rate of policing. Examining the
distribution of countries on the basis of the prison staff per 100,000 also
shows that the mean rate of judges varies in an inconsistent manner. Countries
in the top quartile of prison staff per capita tend to have higher mean rates of
police per capita (512) and prosecutors per capita (12) than do countries with
lower levels of prison staff. As expected, there is a relationship between the
size of the prison staff and the size of the police force (r = .39, p = .05), the
size of the police force and the prosecutors staff (r = .63, p = .000), and the
size of the prison staff and the prosecutors staff (r = .40, p = .05). The number
of judges per capita is not related to the number of prosecutors, police or
prison staff.
The Law Enforcement Resources Index (LERI)
Only about half of the nations (n = 25) in the region provided data on police,
prosecutors, judges and prison staff. Any comments about the variations
within a country with regard to the relative importance of the police, prose-
cution, courts, and prison, as well as about the total number of criminal justice
personnel must, therefore, be limited to those countries for which complete
Police per 100,000
(Quartiles)
Private Police
per 100,00
Prosecutors
per 100,000
Judges
per 100,000
Prison Staff
per 100,000
Bottom (Q1)
Medium (Q2)
Medium (Q3)
Low (Q4)
103
212
93
111
7
7
7
13
13
21
14
9
61
59
60
92
Prison Staff per
100,000 (Quartiles)
Private Police
per 100,00
Police
per 100,000
Prosecutors
per 100,000
Judges
per 100,000
Bottom (Q1)
Medium (Q2)
Medium (Q3)
Top (Q4)
118
122
128
242
409
369
263
512
8
7
8
12
11
24
12
8
Table 16. Relationship between Levels of Police, Prosecutors, Judges, and Prison Staff (mean rate
per 100,000).
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data are available. It is important, however, to attempt to include as many
countries as possible in the overall assessment of the international variability
in the size of the criminal justice work force. In order to accomplish this, the
“law enforcement resources index” (LERI) was created3.
The LERI uses all of the data available, while keeping the number of
countries with missing data as small as possible. The LERI is a composite
indicator consisting of the (adjusted) average of the rankings on several
source variables (private police, public police, prosecutors, judges, and
prison staff). Two major advantages of the LERI are that it does not give
undue weight to one of the components (i.e., the police) over other compo-
nents, and that it minimizes missing cases. Thus, the resulting law enforce-
ment resources index ranking includes all countries (n = 47) for which
information was available on at least one of the source variables (public
police, private police, prosecutors, judges, prison staff). A LERI value could
not be calculated for only 6 countries (Albania, Bosnia, Iceland, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia [Serbia-Montenegro]). This is a considerable
improvement over the 25 countries (with complete information) which were
the focus of the previous section.
Countries ranking in the top quartile on the LERI are Azerbaijan, Croatia,
Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, the Russian Federation,
and Slovakia - all Central and Eastern European countries (see Table 17).
Northern Ireland, Portugal and the United States also rank in the top LERI
quartile. On the other hand, the bottom quartile also has a heavy concentra-
tion of Central and Eastern European countries (Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia,
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Poland and Romania), together
with Andorra, Greece, Turkey, Finland and the Netherlands. The mean
Central and Eastern European value on the LERI (29) obscures the clustering
of these countries in the top and bottom quartiles; as a matter of fact, the
Central and Eastern European mean is fairly close to the EU mean (26). The
EU countries, on the other hand, tend to be clustered in the middle LERI
ranges, with few cases with very low or very high LERI rankings.
The LERI is based on the (average of the) rankings on the level of police
and/or prosecutors and/or judges and/or prison staff. It is only to be expected
that countries that are high on the LERI, also tend to have a relatively high
number of police (r = .59), prosecutors (r = .73) and prison staff (r = .62).
However, the number of judges is not associated with the LERI. The LERI
also fails to show any significant relationship with the ratio measures (i.e.,
% police, % prosecutors, % judges, % prison staff).
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3 See appendix D for a more detailed discussion. The LERI is simply a first attempt to maximize the use
of available data. The LERI cannot make up for the absence of data or for the poor quality of data, of
course. Other limitations of the LERI are discussed in appendix D.
Countries LERI LERI (Rank) LERI (Quartile)
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
England/W
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxemburg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
N. Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Fed.
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
USA
10
18
21
50
23
26
20
28
35
29
30
30
23
38
20
27
15
31
16
36
28
30
40
29
37
30
38
31
19
25
25
21
35
22
10
34
4
45
23
37
32
25
25
25
11
29
32
3
7
12
47
16
22
9
25
38
26
29
30
15
44
10
23
5
34
6
40
24
32
45
27
42
31
43
33
8
17.5
17.5
11
39
13
2
37
1
46
14
41
35
21
19
20
4
28
36
1
1
2
4
2
2
1
3
4
3
3
3
2
4
1
2
1
3
1
4
3
3
4
3
4
3
4
3
1
2
2
1
4
2
1
4
1
4
2
4
3
2
2
2
1
3
4
Table 17. Law Enforcement Resources Index (LERI).
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One would expect the LERI to be related to the level of criminality in the
47 countries in the region. Indeed, countries with a higher rank on the
homicide index (r = .43, p = .002), a higher value on the serious violence
index (r = .36, p = .05), and a higher value on the petty crime index (r = .49,
p = .01) tend to have a higher ranking on the LERI. Thus, countries with a
relatively greater level of investment in criminal justice resources (measured
by personnel) tend to have a higher level of homicides, serious violent crime,
and petty crime than do those of their counterparts which have a lower level
of criminal justice personnel. There is no relationship with the burglary index,
corruption index, violence against women index, or motor vehicle theft
index. Unlike the findings reported in section 4.2.1 (suggesting a negative
relationship between the level of economic development and the level of
policing) there is no statistically significant association between the LERI
and GNP (1994) or the Human Development Index among the 47 countries.
This latter finding may be related to the clustering of the Central and Eastern
European countries (with a lower level of GNP or HDI) in the top and bottom
quartiles of the LERI.
4.2.6 Gender balance in criminal justice personnel
Table 18 presents the rates of female criminal justice personnel per 100,000
population (the four left-hand columns). Just as there are significant interna-
tional differences in the rates of (total) police, prosecutors, judges, and
correctional personnel per 100,000, there are also large variations in female
police (prosecutors, judges, prison personnel) rates. The Russian Federation
has the highest number of female police per capita (261.2); Turkey (5.1) the
lowest. The mean rate of female police is 51.6 (compared to 390 for all police
- see Table 11); the EU mean is 40.3, compared to 66.5 for Central and Eastern
Countries LERI LERI (Rank) LERI (Quartile)
Standard Dev.
25% Quartile
Median
75% Quartile
Mean
EU mean
Central and Eastern Europe
mean
9
21
28
32
27
26
29
Table 17. ... continues
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Countries Female CJ Personnel per 100,000
Population
Female Share of CJ Staff (%)
Police Prosecutors Judges Prison Police Prosecutors Judges Prison
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
England/W
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
N. Ireland
Norway
Portugal
Romania
Russian Fed.
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
67.0
49.8
18.8
58.5
138.2
26.2
46.0
54.5
9.2
21.6
28.9
55.0
81.4
6.5
60.3
16.9
63.7
8.8
22.4
52.3
71.0
20.8
261.2
84.2
27.5
83.5
3.0
94.0
27.3
5.1
15.6
73.2
3.1
0.5
0.4
0.5
2.7
2.5
2.9
2.2
3.3
4.5
3.1
1.9
5.4
0.5
0.4
1.9
0.6
3.8
1.8
9.0
3.2
5.4
1.7
1.5
0.9
3.9
6.4
2.2
4.6
3.3
1.3
2.6
0.4
0.6
3.7
2.7
3.5
8.0
0.8
12.3
0.1
7.5
0.6
7.2
4.9
2.3
1.5
5.2
0.0
2.9
7.6
0.3
1.5
2.5
0.0
1.6
2.8
4.8
0.2
11.1
14.8
1.4
26.9
0.5
5.5
11.3
4.9
12.1
1.2
15.4
58.0
9.1
1.8
14.9
14.8
29.3
3.2
25.6
3.1
3.8
16.5
14.0
45.6
7.6
8.6
17.5
3.2
2.1
3.3
43.0
16.6
13.6
5.5
23.5
20.6
5.0
19.3
23.5
2.6
5.6
9.9
7.1
17.6
3.4
11.1
5.3
12.6
3.6
8.8
10.0
30.7
9.7
21.3
23.4
7.8
20.3
2.3
33.3
10.3
2.7
3.7
24.4
66.7
5.2
16.0
3.1
18.8
32.7
41.4
31.2
33.8
55.4
41.7
47.2
65.9
7.5
5.5
28.9
17.1
20.3
15.4
57.5
33.3
34.4
31.1
14.1
31.2
37.3
33.3
45.8
43.8
45.1
39.8
31.9
10.0
23.2
18.6
41.1
29.1
67.9
9.0
61.6
6.5
60.5
12.9
26.3
37.0
33.6
27.9
71.0
0.0
42.6
40.6
3.5
27.3
31.4
0.0
16.1
22.0
56.6
6.6
53.1
56.5
30.8
38.6
5.2
12.5
32.4
14.7
25.0
4.2
19.6
32.9
24.6
10.2
23.3
27.5
36.8
5.9
23.9
13.2
11.7
28.4
7.3
29.5
8.8
20.3
34.0
8.2
5.2
7.3
30.7
Table 18. Female Criminal Justice Personnel, 1994.
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Europe. Latvia has the highest rate of female prosecutors per 100,000 (9);
and Georgia and Turkey share the lowest rank (0.4). On the average, the
region has 2.7 female prosecutors per 100,000 (compared to 8.7 for all
prosecutors - see Table 12). The EU mean (1.8) is lower than the mean for
Central and Eastern Europe (3.3). Switzerland has the highest rate of female
judges (26.9), followed by Slovenia (14.8). Liechtenstein and Northern
Ireland appear to have no female judges at all. On the average, the region has
4.5 female judges per 100,000 population (compared to 14 for all judges -
see Table 13). The EU average number of female judges per 100,000 (2.9) is
lower than the Central and Eastern European mean (5.6). Estonia has the
highest rate of female prison personnel per 100,000 (58.0); Cyprus ranks at
the bottom (1.2). The average number of female prison staff (per 100,000)
for Europe and North America (the United States only; no data are available
for Canada) is 14.4 (compared to 64.3 for all prison staff - see Table 14). For
the EU countries, there is an average of 8.1 female prison workers (per
100,000 people), which is less than half of the average for the Central and
Eastern European countries (18.2).
Criminal justice is still a male-dominated occupation. The four right-hand
columns of Table 18 (Female Share of Criminal Justice Staff) clearly docu-
ment this. On the average, about 13% of the police are female (data for 32
countries), and 19% of prison staff are female (data for 26 countries). The
maximum proportion of females for both police and prison staff in any of the
countries in the region is about one-third of all personnel. The situation for
prosecutors and judges is rather different: on the average, since almost
one-third of the prosecutors and judges are female. The maximum proportion
Countries Female CJ Personnel per 100,000
Population
Female Share of CJ Staff (%)
Police Prosecutors Judges Prison Police Prosecutors Judges Prison
Standard Dev.
25% Quartile
Median
75% Quartile
Mean
EU mean
Central and
Eastern Europe
mean
49.6
19.3
47.9
70.0
51.6
40.3
66.5
2.0
1.1
2.5
3.5
2.7
1.8
3.3
5.7
0.6
2.7
7.2
4.5
2.9
5.6
14.8
3.3
10.2
16.7
14.4
8.1
18.2
8.8
5.4
10.2
20.5
13.0
13.8
11.9
17.0
16.6
32.7
42.7
31.6
31.4
30.7
20.8
12.9
29.1
42.6
30.9
23.1
45.1
10.5
8.7
19.9
28.7
19.1
16.4
24.0
Table 18. ...continues
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of female prosecutors and judges is about twice as high as that for police and
prison staff, about two-thirds (66,7% in Andorra and 71% in Latvia). The
jobs of judges and prosecutors involve relatively little direct physical human
contact, as contrasted with police and prison work, which are typically
viewed as more masculine jobs.
There is considerable international variation in the female proportion of
the police. In Sweden about one-third of the police force is female, while in
Spain, only one out of four police officers is female. With regard to prosecu-
tors, the international variation is even larger: Andorra reports that two-third
of their prosecutors are female, while in Azerbaijan only about 3% of the
prosecutors are female. In Latvia, 71% of the judges are female, whereas
Liechtenstein and Northern Ireland do not have any female judges. Latvia
also has the highest proportion of female correctional staff (36.8%); Turkey
and Liechtenstein rank lowest with about one female prison worker for every
20 male prison workers.
Female judges appear to be more common in Central and Eastern Europe
than in the EU countries: an average of 45% of the judges in the Central and
Eastern European countries are female, almost double the corresponding
proportion in the EU countries (23.1%). With regard to the prison staff, the
Central and Eastern European countries also appear to have a slightly more
equal gender balance (24%) than do the EU countries (16.4%). The gender
differences are much smaller among the police (in EU countries, the mean
is 13.8%, in Central and Eastern European countries, it is 11.9%), and among
prosecutors (EU countries: 31.4%, Central and Eastern Europe: 30.7%).
Gender Balance index
In order to describe international variations in the gender balance of the total
criminal justice work force, complete data are needed on the police, prose-
cutors, judges, and prison personnel. However, data on the female share of
the work force for police, prosecutors, judges and prison staff are available
for only 13 countries (Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithu-
ania, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Scotland, Slovenia, Sweden, the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey). Thus, a criminal
justice practitioner gender balance index (GBI) was constructed in order to
have a measure which makes use of all available information, minimizes the
missing cases, and reflects the level of gender balance in the different
components of the criminal justice work force4. Forty-three countries were
ranked on the GBI; data on female employment were not available for
Albania, Bosnia, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Poland, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro).
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4 See appendix D for an explanation of the construction of the GBI.
Countries GBI GBI (rank) GBI (Quartile)
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
England/W
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
N. Ireland
Norway
Portugal
Romania
Russian Fed.
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
Standard Dev.
25% Quartile
Median
75% Quartile
Mean
EU mean
Central and Eastern Europe mean
20
21
2
34
23
39
48
34
15
42
40
28
50
27
3
18
21
20
29
23
25
48
12
35
24
18
21
25
12
33
28
23
40
29
35
39
20
40
25
6
10
47
13
20
25
39
28
25
30
10
14
1
29
18
33
40
30
7
38
35
25
42
23
2
8
15
12
26
16
21
41
5
31
19
9
13
20
6
28
24
17
37
27
32
34
11
36
22
3
4
39
1
2
1
3
2
4
4
3
1
4
4
3
4
3
1
1
2
2
3
2
2
4
1
3
2
1
2
2
1
3
3
2
4
3
3
4
2
4
3
1
1
4
Table 19. Criminal Justice Practitioner Gender Balance Index (GBI).
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Azerbaijan, France, Turkey, Ukraine, Liechtenstein, Northern Ireland,
Cyprus, Georgia, Malta and Armenia rank in the bottom (25%) quartile of
the GBI. Four of these countries are countries in transition; there is only one
EU country (France) in this group of nations with the lowest ratio of
females/males in the criminal justice work force. Six Central and Eastern
European countries (Bulgaria, Slovenia, the Russian Federation, the Czech
Republic, Latvia and Estonia) rank in the top (75%) quartile of the gender
balance index, together with two EU countries (Denmark and Sweden),
Canada and the United States. The mean for Central and Eastern European
countries (30) is higher than the EU mean (25). Half of the Central and
Eastern European countries rank in the intermediate range of the GBI,
however. The mean for North America (Canada and the United States) is
almost double that of the EU countries (48).
It is commonly assumed that female victims of violence will be more likely
to report their victimization to the authorities if there are more female
criminal justice employees. Interestingly, the expectation that a higher pro-
portion of females in the criminal justice work force will be related to a
greater likelihood of reporting violence against women to the police is not
supported by the data. On the other hand, there is a relationship between the
gender balance in the criminal justice work force (GBI) and the degree of
female empowerment in society. The data do support a weak positive asso-
ciation between the criminal justice practitioner gender balance index and
the Gender-related Development Index (1994) (r = .30, p =.07), the female
share of earned income (1994) (r =.46, p =.01), and the female economic
activity rate (% male, 1994) (r =.44, p =.01) 5.
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5 Gender-related Development Index (1994), the female share of earned income (1994) and the female
economic activity rate (% male, 1994) are based on the Human Development Report 1997.
4.3 The flow of cases
4.3.1 Trying to describe the flow of cases
There are many national variations in specific criminal justice procedures,
rules, regulations, and practices. However, it is reasonable to argue that in
both Europe and North America the processing of (criminal) cases through
the criminal justice system proceeds according to the following figure (cf.
Maguire et al. 1998):
Data collected at the different stages of the criminal justice funnel - be it
victimization data, self-report offending data, police data, or data provided
by prosecutors, courts, correctional agencies – are all wrought with problems.
This has been documented over and over again.
To a large extent, the concern has been focused on the validity of official
police data as an indicator of the extent and nature of criminality – and
rightfully so. It is important, however, to keep in mind that data produced
within the framework of an organization (such as the data elicited by the
United Nations Surveys) are less questionable and problematic when used
as indicators of organizational processing and decision-making, rather than
as measures of the amount of crime in a particular society. Of course, missing
data and data that appear internally inconsistent remain a serious problem.
Crime Committed
Reported to Police
Recorded by Police
Crime Cleared
Pre-trial Detention
Suspect Prosecuted
Suspect Convicted
Sentenced to Custody
Sentence Length
Time Actually Served
Œ
Œ
Œ
Œ
Œ
Œ
Œ
Œ
Œ
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There are many different ways in which the flow of cases through the
criminal justice system may be portrayed. In this section, three different ways
of describing case flow are presented:
(1) the degree to which police-recorded crime is consistent with the amount
of crime found through victim surveys (section 4.3.2.);
(2) the volume of cases (per 100,000 population) processed at five different
stages of processing (crime recorded, arrest, charge/prosecution, convic-
tion, and prison sentence) (section 4.3.3.); and
(3) the extent of case attrition at the different stages of the criminal justice
process (arrest/offences, prosecutions/arrests, convictions/prosecutions,
and prison/convictions) (section 4.3.4.).
4.3.2 The mismatch between ICVS and Fifth United Nations
Survey data
Crime committed, crime reported to police, and crime recorded by police - these
three sequential events represent the first phases of the flow of cases. In this
section, the degree of mismatch between ICVS data and Fifth United Nations
Survey police data is interpreted as an indicator of police recording practices.
One of the pre-occupations of crime researchers is to make reliable
estimates of the “true” amount of crime in a society (regardless of whether
this is on the neighbourhood, city, region or national level). This is illustrated
by chapter 2, on crime indicators, which makes use of both ICVS data and
Fifth United Nations Survey data to categorize countries based on the amount
of burglary, serious violence, car theft, and so on. The two main sources of
international comparative data (ICVS and the Fifth United Nations Survey)
provide inconsistent portrayals of criminality. This is not surprising in view
of the fact that – at the national level – similar discrepancies (between victim
surveys and police data) have been observed also in other connections
(O’Brien 1985, Junger-Tas 1996). Different interpretations of these incon-
sistent findings exist, the most popular of which is that these two indicators
are actually measuring different dimensions of crime.
Farrington and his colleagues (1992, 1994) have tried to provide national
estimates of the flow of offenders through different criminal justice systems,
from the commission of crimes through police recording and conviction, and
on to imprisonment. They have provided national estimates for six offences
(burglary, assault, vehicle theft, robbery, rape, and homicide) in three coun-
tries (the United States, Sweden and the United Kingdom) between the 1970s
and the 1990s. They make use in a rather ingenious way of both victimization
and police-based data, though they do point out that their figures are only
estimates, limited by numerous assumptions (1994, p. 128). Unfortunately,
we do not have available for the 54 European and North American countries
the detailed information on the many decision points which Farrington and
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Country Three measures of “crime” Three probabilities related to police
crime recording
Column A Column B Column C Column D Column E Column F
% Victims
(ICVS)
Victim-report
adjusted
victimisation
rates (%)
(ICVS)
% Crime
based on
police report
(UN Survey)
P
[Reporting/
Offences]
P
[Recording/
Reporting]
P
[Recording/
Offences]
% Q % Q % Q Proba-
bility
Q Proba-
bility
Q Proba-
bility
Q
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
England & Wales
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Hungary
Italy
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Netherlands
N. Ireland
Norway
Romania
Russian Fed.
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
United States
EU mean1
Central and
Eastern Europe
mean2
27.00
21.10
22.50
38.40
33.00
20.30
31.10
39.70
25.10
28.10
33.40
24.70
31.40
27.40
33.40
33.10
21.60
23.30
38.40
24.40
26.10
29.40
35.00
28.30
35.90
30.30
31.90
30.60
23.60
38.20
35.00
29.60
30.70
2
1
1
4
3
1
3
4
2
2
3
2
3
2
4
3
1
1
4
1
2
2
4
2
4
3
3
3
1
4
4
14.03
6.01
14.33
12.80
18.23
7.81
18.90
13.52
11.16
16.61
7.13
11.81
12.78
5.79
11.40
12.39
8.55
11.83
21.62
15.29
12.33
10.45
9.66
17.45
20.90
12.13
11.90
18.34
13.35
10.45
19.96
15.52
10.72
3
1
3
3
4
1
4
3
2
4
1
2
3
1
3
2
1
2
4
3
2
2
1
4
4
2
2
4
3
1
4
6.28
1.16
5.73
2.36
9.98
1.42
10.21
2.38
7.64
6.79
0.32
3.80
3.80
0.90
1.61
1.58
1.09
2.11
8.48
4.16
5.93
1.04
1.78
10.27
2.58
2.25
1.77
12.67
5.11
1.10
5.37
7.04
1.69
4
1
3
2
4
1
4
2
4
4
1
3
3
1
2
2
1
2
4
3
3
1
2
4
3
2
2
4
3
1
3
0.52
0.29
0.64
0.33
0.55
0.39
0.61
0.34
0.44
0.59
0.21
0.48
0.41
0.21
0.34
0.37
0.40
0.51
0.56
0.63
0.47
0.36
0.28
0.62
0.58
0.40
0.37
0.60
0.57
0.27
0.57
0.53
0.35
3
1
4
1
3
2
4
1
3
4
1
3
2
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
3
2
1
4
4
2
2
4
3
1
4
0.45
0.19
0.40
0.18
0.55
0.18
0.54
0.18
0.68
0.41
0.05
0.32
0.30
0.15
0.14
0.13
0.13
0.18
0.39
0.27
0.48
0.10
0.18
0.59
0.12
0.19
0.15
0.69
0.38
0.11
0.27
0.45
0.16
4
3
3
2
4
2
4
2
4
4
1
3
3
2
1
1
1
2
3
3
4
1
2
4
1
2
2
4
3
1
3
0.23
0.06
0.26
0.06
0.30
0.07
0.33
0.06
0.30
0.24
0.01
0.15
0.12
0.03
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.09
0.22
0.17
0.23
0.04
0.05
0.36
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.41
0.22
0.03
0.15
0.24
0.06
4
2
4
2
4
2
4
2
4
4
1
3
3
1
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
1
2
4
2
2
2
4
3
1
3
1 This is the mean only for those EU countries that are listed in this table.
2 This is the mean only for those Central and Eastern European countries listed in this table.
Table 20. Mismatch between ICVS and Fifth United Nations Survey police crime data as an indicator
of police recording practices (all crimes).
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colleagues collected for the United States, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
However, since we do have some victimization and police-based data for
several countries, it is possible to adopt some of Farrington’s measures. The
results are presented in Table 20, which presents data for 31 countries. The
table consists of 6 main columns (A through F).
Table 20, Column A: % Victims. The first possible estimate of the amount
of crime committed is on the basis of victimization surveys. The ICVS
provides both estimates of the number of offences committed, as well as
estimates of the proportion of households and/or individuals touched by
crime. Table 20 shows that, for example, in Austria, 27.0 % of the households
surveyed by the ICVS (in the city sample) indicated that they had been
victimized by crime (all crimes, averaged 1988-95). ICVS city samples of
31 nations are available.
Table 20, Column B: % Victim-Reported Victimizations. Only a proportion
of all crimes will be reported to the police. This is perhaps one of the
best-known facts about criminal justice. The willingness of citizens to report
the crime to the police depends on a variety of factors, one of which may be
the (lack of) trust that citizens have in the police - an issue to which we will
return later. Typically, the proportion of victimizations reported to the police
(see Column D) is used as a “soft” indicator of police performance. However,
there is a different way in which information about the reporting behaviour
of the public may be used: it allows estimates of the (minimum) number of
victimizations which should (or could) have been recorded by the police. We
arrive at this estimate by multiplying the reporting rate P [Reporting/Of-
fences] (in Column D) by the estimates of the proportion of the population
who were victimized (Column A). We label this “victim-report -adjusted
victimization rate” (Column B). For example, in Austria, 52% of the ICVS
victims reported the crime to the police (Column D), which adds up to (.52
* 27.0) = 14.03 % victim-report adjusted victimization rate.
Table 20, Column C: % Crime – Based on Police Records. This column
reports “crimes reported by the police”6. The police does not make a formal
record of all crime incidents that come to its attention, for a variety of reasons.
Therefore, the volume of formally recorded crime is invariably less than the
amount reported to the police. This may be because of perfectly legitimate
reasons (i.e., an incident reported as a crime was in fact not a crime), but
there may also be more questionable reasons for this lack of police respon-
siveness to victims’ complaints. If the police make a formal record of all the
crimes reported to them by the victims, then the number of crimes reported
by the police should - at the very least - be equal to the number of reported
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6 Question 2.1 in the Fifth United Nations Survey: Number of Crimes Recorded.
victimizations.7 A complicating factor is that there is a mixture of units of
analysis between, respectively, the ICVS (households and individuals who
are victimized) and the Fifth United Nations Survey (recorded crime inci-
dents, and - later on in the criminal justice processing chain – suspects). This
makes any attempt to make direct links between the different data sources
questionable. It is only through the use of assumptions – for example
assumptions about the average number of offenders per victimization or per
recorded offence (cf. Farrington et al 1994) – that it is possible to make more
realistic estimates. Unfortunately, we lack the data needed for such an
endeavour at the present time.
Table 20, Column D: Proportion of Crimes Reported by Victims. This
column presents the percentage of the crime victims who indicated to ICVS
surveyers that they actually reported their victimization to the police. For
example, in Austria, 52% of the ICVS victims reported their victimization
to the police.
Table 20, Column E: Proportion of Reported Crimes Recorded by Police.
It may be argued that the smaller the proportion of (victim) reported crimes
recorded by the police, the less responsive the police is to the needs of
citizens.  The probability  that a reported  crime  will be recorded  (P[re-
corded/reported]) may be computed by dividing the number of police re-
corded offences (Column C) by the number of victim-reported offences
(Column B). For example, in Austria 6.28/14.03 = 0.45 (45%) of the victim-
reported offences were recorded by the police. Most likely this is an inflated
estimate, since this would assume that all police recorded crimes consist of
victim-reported incidents.
Table 20, Column F: Proportion of Committed Crimes Recorded by Police.
The total number of crimes committed may be divided into those that are
reported to the police and those that are not reported to the police. We may
calculate a rough estimate of the probability that any crime ends up in the
formal police records by dividing the total estimate of the proportion of the
population victimized by crime (Column A) by the number of police recorded
crimes (expressed as number of crimes per 100 population). For example,
for Austria this means that 6.28/27.0 = 0.23 (23%) of the victimizations end
up in the police files.
Table 20 suggests the following:
(1) Once we take into account the level of victim reporting – which varies
by country – the rank order of the countries with regard to ICVS
victimization changes (compare columns A and B). Twelve countries
(Belarus, Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the former Yugo-
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7 Of course, there are crimes recorded by the police through channels other than victim complaints, but
there is no way we can weigh the importance of this factor at the present time. It may be possible to make
some estimates, based on existing research on police work.
slav Republic of Macedonia, the Netherlands,  Norway, Romania,
Slovakia and the United States) maintain the same rank. The other 19
countries change rank order, sometimes by one quartile (Austria, Bul-
garia, Canada, England and Wales, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Malta, Slovenia,
Spain and Sweden), sometimes by more than one quartile (Belgium,
France, Georgia, Latvia, Northern Ireland, the Russian Federation, Scot-
land, Switzerland and Ukraine).
(2) When we compare victimization rates (unadjusted for reporting rates -
see column A) to the Fifth United Nations Survey police recorded rates
(column C), there are only five countries which are in the same quartile
(Belarus, Croatia, Italy, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and
the Netherlands). However, a comparison of the victim-report adjusted
victimization rates (column B) with the Fifth UN Survey police rates
(column C), shows that there are twenty countries within the same
quartile (Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, England and Wales, France,
Georgia, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Malta, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Scotland,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine), ten countries differ
by one quartile, and only one country (Finland) differs by two quartiles.
This suggests that – perhaps – police recording practices are not as
unresponsive to victimization as appears at first glance. Indeed, the
police-based rank order is closer to the victimization-based rank order,
once we take into account victim reporting rates.
(3) There is great variability in the probability that a reported crime will be
recorded (column E). It varies from an extreme low of .05 for Georgia to
a high of .69 for Sweden. As suggested earlier, we could interpret the
values in column E as a measure of police recording performance: a low
value reflects a low level of police recording of victim-reported crime, a
high value reflects a high recording level of victim-reported crime.
Austria, Canada, England and Wales, Finland, France, Norway, Scotland
and Sweden are in the top quartile. Countries in the bottom quartile are
Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine.
(4) Comparing column D (reporting rate) and column E (proportion of
reported crime recorded by police) shows that – to some extent – citizens
may be realistic in their assessment of the police. Two of the seven
countries that are in the bottom quartile for the reporting rate (Georgia
and Ukraine) are also in the bottom quartile for the probability that the
police records a reported crime. Four countries in the bottom quartile for
the reporting rate are in the second quartile with respect to the probability
that reported crime will be recorded (Bulgaria, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan and
the Russian Federation). With regard to the top quartile, four of the eight
countries in the top quartile for the reporting rates (England and Wales,
France, Scotland and Sweden) are also in the top quartile for the likeli-
hood that the police makes a record of reported crimes. Three of these
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countries (Belgium, Northern Ireland and the United States) are in the
third quartile for the likelihood that the police makes a record of a
reported crime.
(5) There is great variability with regard to the likelihood that a crime is
recorded by the police (discounting the factor of differential reporting
rates). The information presented in column F shows a low of .01 for
Georgia (but there may be a problem with the accuracy of Georgia’s
crime figures – they are inconsistent with later arrest figures), and a high
of .41 for Sweden.
(6) Finally, comparing column C (police recorded crimes) and column F (the
ratio between police recorded crime and victimizations) shows a fair
degree of consistency in rankings: twenty-three of the countries have
similar rankings on both variables. This is not surprising in view of the
fact that the nominator in this division is the number of crimes; however,
the denominator is the number of victimizations – a figure which fluctu-
ates significantly.
Table 20 also presents the means for overall victimization for the EU
countries (29.6) and the Central and Eastern European countries (30.7); these
two means are quite close to one another. The likelihood that a crime will be
reported to the police (column D) is lower (.35) in the Central and Eastern
European countries than in the EU countries (.53). Thus, the victim report-
adjusted victimization rate for the Central and Eastern European countries
(10.72) is lower than that for the EU countries (15.52). The volume of crimes
reported by the police (column C) in the EU countries is much higher (7.04)
than in the Central and Eastern European countries. Thus, based on the
victim-report adjusted victimization rate, we may conclude that the likeli-
hood that a crime actually will be recorded by the police (column E) is much
lower in the Central and Eastern European countries (.16) than in the EU
countries (.45). Add to that the lower reporting rate (column D) and it should
not surprise us that the ratio between offences and recorded offences (column
A/column C) in the Central and Eastern European countries (.06) is only one
fourth of that in the EU countries (.24). Thus, in the Central and Eastern
European countries, victims are less likely to report, and police are less likely
to record a reported offence, while it appears that the victimization rates do
not differ that much between the two groups of countries.
Table 21 presents comparable data, this time for burglary, for 22 countries.
With regard to burglary, the observations are less clear cut than those with
regard to “total crime”:
(1) Of the 22 countries with complete ICVS and Fifth United Nations Survey
data, 10 countries share the same quartile for self-reported victimization
and police recorded burglaries (column A and column C); three countries
(Lithuania, Norway and Finland) are in the top quartile for one and in
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Country Three measures of “crime” Three probabilities related to police
crime recording
Column A Column B Column C Column D Column E Column F
% Victims
(ICVS)
Victim-report
adjusted
victimisation
rates (%)
(ICVS)
% Crime
based on
police
report
(UN Survey)
P
[Reporting/
Offences]
P
[Recording/
Reporting]
P
[Recording/
Offences]
% Q % Q % Q Proba-
bility
Q Proba-
bility
Q Proba-
bility
Q
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Canada
Croatia
England/W
Finland
France
Hungary
Kyrgyzstan
Lithuania
FYR Macedonia
Netherlands
N. Ireland
Norway
Romania
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United States
EU mean1
Central and
Eastern Europe
mean2
0.20
1.50
2.70
4.00
1.00
4.50
0.40
4.20
2.50
4.00
5.50
2.30
3.50
3.30
4.20
1.10
2.00
6.50
2.80
2.40
2.60
3.90
2.57
3.02
1
1
2
3
1
4
1
4
2
3
4
2
3
3
4
1
2
4
3
2
2
3
0.24
0.76
2.26
3.48
0.67
4.27
0.28
3.69
2.04
2.38
3.47
1.50
3.15
2.41
3.18
0.93
1.87
4.82
1.88
1.55
1.85
3.11
2.16
2.05
1
1
3
4
1
4
11
4
2
3
4
2
3
3
3
1
2
4
2
2
2
3
1.12
0.20
1.53
1.33
0.40
2.45
1.94
0.84
0.77
0.20
0.20
0.44
0.81
1.04
0.09
0.13
1.72
0.81
0.54
0.36
1.61
1.04
1.33
0.41
3
1
4
3
2
4
4
3
2
1
1
2
3
3
1
1
4
2
2
2
4
3
1.00
0.50
0.84
0.87
0.65
0.94
0.73
0.88
0.82
0.60
0.63
0.65
0.90
0.73
0.75
0.86
0.94
0.74
0.68
0.65
0.71
0.79
0.83
0.68
4
1
3
3
2
4
2
4
3
1
1
1
4
2
3
3
4
2
2
1
2
3
4.59
0.26
0.68
0.38
0.61
0.57
7.02
0.23
0.38
0.09
0.06
0.30
0.26
0.43
0.03
0.14
0.92
0.17
0.29
0.23
0.87
0.34
1.81
0.25
4
2
4
3
3
3
4
2
3
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
4
1
2
2
4
3
4.59
0.13
0.57
0.33
0.40
0.54
5.12
0.20
0.31
0.05
0.04
0.19
0.23
0.31
0.02
0.12
0.87
0.12
0.19
0.15
0.62
0.27
1.50
0.17
4
2
4
3
3
3
4
2
3
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
4
1
2
2
4
3
1 This is the mean only for those EU countries that are listed in this table.
2 This is the mean only for those Central and Eastern European countries listed in this table.
Table 21. Mismatch between ICVS and Fifth United Nations Survey police crime data as an indicator
of police recording practices (burglary).
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the bottom quartile for the other, and the remaining nine countries find
themselves in different quartiles (although not in the extreme opposites).
(2) Comparing column B (reporting-adjusted victimization level) and col-
umn C (police recorded burglaries), the situation has not changed much.
There are also ten countries in the same quartile; two countries are in the
bottom quartile for column B and in the top quartile for column C
(Finland, and Lithuania – with low victimization and high police re-
corded burglary), and the remaining ten countries find themselves in
different quartiles (although not in the extreme opposites). The relative
lack of improvement is probably explained by the overall fairly high level
of reporting of burglaries, as well as the relatively low degree of variation
in burglary reporting rates between countries.
(3) The reporting rates – although all fairly high – vary between .50 (Belarus)
and 1.00 (Austria). There appears to be a fairly close match between
column C (police recorded burglaries) and reporting rate (column D).
Ten countries fall within the same quartile for both measures; two of the
five countries in the top quartile for the reporting rate (Scotland, and
England and Wales) are also in the top quartile for police recorded
burglaries; three of the countries in the bottom quartile for reporting
(Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Lithuania) are also in the bottom quartile for
police-recorded burglaries.
(4) Finally, column E (the ratio between recorded and reported burglaries) –
a possible measure of the willingness of the police to record victim
complaints – shows several anomalies. There are two countries where
there are more police-recorded burglaries than there are victim-reported
burglaries (Austria and Finland). This may be explained in part by
burglaries of businesses - which are not part of victimization surveys.
Table 21 also provides the means for the EU countries and for the Central
and Eastern European countries. Interestingly, the percentage of households
victimized by burglary appears to be quite similar in the two groups of
countries (2.57 and 3.02). On the other hand, the official police-reported
burglaries are about three times higher in EU countries than in Central and
Eastern Europe (1.33 vs. .41). Although the willingness to report burglaries
to the police is somewhat lower in Central and Eastern Europe (.68) than in
the EU countries (.83), this factor does not account for the major differences
in reported burglaries. As column E indicates, the likelihood that a burglary
will be recorded by the police is much higher in the EU countries (1.81) than
in Central and Eastern European countries (.25). (It should be noted that these
figures may be inflated because of the extremely high numbers for Austria
and Finland; excluding these, the means are .83 for column D, .54 for column
E, .45 for column F - still considerably higher than in the Central and Eastern
European countries, but not by quite as much.)
89
The level of economic development may be a proxy measure for police
recording capacity. If this is true, then we would expect that indicators of
economic development are associated with the proportion of reported crimes
that are recorded by the police (column E in tables 20 and 21), and the
proportion of committed crimes that are recorded by the police (column F in
tables 20 and 21). Two good indicators of the level of economic development
are the gross national product (World Bank data for 1994), and the ranking
on the 1994 Human Development Index (HDI). The correlation between
1994 GNP and column E (Table 20, for all crimes) is .80 (p = .000), and
between 1994 GNP and column F (Table 20, for all crimes) is .75 ( p =.000).
Correspondingly, the correlation between the 1994 HDI (where low values
reflect a high level of development) and column E is -.76 (p = .000), and
between the 1994 HDI and column F is -.80 (p = .000) (Table 20, for all
crimes). Thus, the higher the GNP and the higher the score on the Human
Development Index, the more likely that the police will record a reported
crime, and the more likely that any crime (reported or otherwise) will be
recorded by the police. These findings increase our confidence in the reason-
ing underlying the calculations in Table 20. However, it should be noted that
the correlations between the two indicators of level of economic development
and burglary (Table 21) are not statistically significant.
4.3.3 The volume of cases (per 100,000 population)
Criminal justice systems process “cases” – individuals and/ or criminal
incidents. The larger the volume of cases a system has to process, the greater
the pressures and demands on the system. Criminal justice systems in large
countries will naturally have to process a larger volume of cases than smaller
countries – as a simple function of population size. In order to allow better
direct comparison between the criminal justice case loads of different na-
tions, we employ the standardized indicator: the number of cases per 100,000
population. To depict the “flow of cases” in any one country is difficult
enough. To try to do this in a cross-national context is even more difficult,
because of the lack of comparability in the legal definitions, differences in
recording practices, and differences in processing procedures (see section
1.3.). Countries vary in where charging decisions are made, what is consid-
ered an official contact, even what a “conviction” is. It is with great caution
that we present some commonly used statistics in this section, emphasizing
that - rather than taking the values as absolute or making comparisons
between individual countries – we will try to describe the overall patterns in
Europe and North America. Extreme caution needs to be exercised in
interpreting the figures presented in Table 22. There is a likely confusion
about whether the numbers reflect the number of individuals involved, or the
number of processing decisions involved (i.e., the number of sentences
imposed or the number of criminal incidents).
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Five processing points are described:
1. The number of crimes recorded in the criminal (police) statistics8. This
overall measure of recorded crimes is a very rough indicator of criminal-
ity. It may reflect more the technical ability of a police force to record
crimes than the true amount of crime. There are large variations between
countries with respect to what is included under “all crimes”. However,
it is the first official measure of the input into a system.
2. The number of persons brought into formal contact with the criminal
justice system 9. Countries vary in what they define as “formal contact
with the criminal justice system”. Not all countries make a record of these
contacts.
3. The number of persons prosecuted10. Some countries responded with the
same figures for questions on the number of persons brought into formal
contact with the criminal justice system and on the number of persons
prosecuted.
4. The number of adults convicted by number and type of sentence (all
crimes)11.
5. The number of adults sentenced to life imprisonment or “deprivation of
liberty”12.
One way of assessing the likely validity of the official processing data is by
examining if the numbers at each processing point decrease - which they
logically should. We assume that countries where the figures do not fit this
pattern have suspect data, and we have eliminated these figures from the body
of Table 22. (These suspect figures are included in a footnote to Table 22.)
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8 Question 2.1 on the Fifth United Nations Survey: Total - all recorded crimes. “Crimes recorded by the
police” refer to the number of penal code offences or their equivalent, i.e. various special law offences,
but excluding minor road traffic and other petty offences, brought to the attention of the police or other
law enforcement agencies and recorded by one of those agencies.
9 Question 5.1 on the Fifth United Nations Survey. “Number of persons brought into formal contact with
the criminal justice system by sex and age. Please specify whether suspected, arrested, or otherwise.”
Sometimes, question 4.13 was used instead: “Total of all persons brought into formal contact with the
criminal justice system first recorded as... (please specify whether suspected, arrestedor otherwise). Grand
total of persons covered ( including those not covered by the specific categories given).”
10Question 8.1 on the Fifth United Nations Survey. “Persons prosecuted refers to alleged offenders
prosecuted against by means of an official charge, initiated by the public prosecutor or the law
enforcement agency responsible for prosecution.” If question 8.1 was not completed, or appeared suspect,
question 7.13 was used instead (“Grand total of persons prosecuted - including those not covered by the
specific categories given”).
11Question 11.1 on the Fifth United Nations Survey. “Persons convicted refers to persons found guilty
by any legal body duly authorized to do so under national law, whether the convictions were later upheld
or not.”
12Question 11.2 on the Fifth United Nations Survey. “Deprivation of liberty includes various forms of
detention, including security measures, combined or split sentence (where at least part of the sentence
involves deprivation of liberty) and all other sanctions involving deprivation of liberty (i.e., where a person
is forced to stay at least one night in an institution of any kind).”
Countries Offences
Recorded
Suspects People
Prosecuted
People
Convicted
Adults
Sentenced to
Prison
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep
Denmark
England/W4
Estonia5
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan8
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
N. Ireland
Norway
Portugal
Romania
Russ.Fed.
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
Yugoslavia
265
6,283
248
1,161
5,733
2,361
9,982
1,422
590
11,878
10,205
2,384
7,641
6,787
323
2,909
3,795
3,800
1,185
895
1,608
1,576
5,254
9
2,114
858
8,483
4,160
5,930
1,042
1,779
10,270
2,582
2,274
1,770
12,671
5,115
10
1,102
5,367
217
2,512
196
638
991
2,402
1,249
375
3
6,214
4,157
1,343
5
2,627
1,165
1,302
639
4,547
524
572
1,124
410
1,578
769
974
885
1,637
587
1,161
10
519
4,557
923
3,057
171
167
2
286
896
610
146
832
3,166
3,750
6,214
1,744
1,545
1,150
1,003
1,051
7
4,547
457
692
383
1,520
654
565
968
625
1,216
794
480
2,700
1,014
160
824
155
457
397
112
365
86
490
1,611
2,302
407
1,501
152
547
758
763
355
477
312
397
368
314
311
643
470
298
549
996
443
324
1,055
1,228
146
109
81
62
151
103
92
109
31
108
102
111
143
81
38
727
99
213
191
115
164
96
259
286
98
116
134
205
220
92
47
194
394
Table 22. Criminal Justice Processing Data (Volume of Cases per 100,000 population), 19941.
Table 22 continues...
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Table 22 shows that:
(1) On the average, countries in the region have over 4,000 police recorded
crimes per 100,000 population; 1,236 suspects per 100,000; 1,045 prose-
cutions per 100,000; 607 convictions per 100,000, and 155 prison sen-
tences per 100,000 people. There are, of course, very large variations
between countries for each of these five variables: the standard deviations
are very large.
(2) With regard to police recorded offences, the median (2,483) is much lower
than the mean, suggesting that there are some extreme high outliers
which influence the mean. The countries in the top quartile (Q3 = 6,019)
Countries Offences
Recorded
Suspects People
Prosecuted
People
Convicted
Adults
Sentenced to
Prison
Standard dev.
25% Quartile
Median
75% Quartile
Mean
EU Mean
Central and Eastern
Europe mean
3,517
1,179
2,483
6,019
4,047
7,206
1,491
1,059
560
948
1,402
1,237
1,908
764
958
455
692
1,183
1,045
1,821
515
482
313
450
778
607
930
364
128
94
111
193
155
205
124
1 “No statistics on the number of juvelines sentenced to prison are available; therefore adult figures for convictions and prison
sentences were used for all countries. On the other hand, the presented rates for suspects per 100,000 and prosecutions per
100,000 are for all persons. Since comparable figures (i.e., adults only for convictions and prison sentences, and all persons for
suspects and prosecutions) are used for all countries, international comparisons should not be misleading since all comparisons
use the same baseline indicators. It needs to be emphasized, however, that any attempt at direct international comparison of
processing data needs to be done with extreme caution.”
2 Belarus provided the figure of 56 for total number of prosecutions. Since this figure appears to be unrealistically low, and not
in line with the number of persons convicted, it was decided not to use the data.
3 Denmark provided two sets of data. The data in the body of the table are those provided by Official Statistics Denmark. The
National Commissioner provided the following data: 134,524 (suspects), 10,507 (offences), 59,596 (prosecutions), and 5,278
(convictions).
4 For England and Wales, it was decided to use the figure from question 7.13 - grand total of persons prosecuted, including those
not covered by the specific categories given (37,497), rather than question 8.1. (99,363).
5 Estonia does not distinguish between suspected, charged and prosecuted individuals. For this reason, the figures for suspects
and prosecutions are the same.
6 Georgia provided the following figures: 14,463 (suspects, defined as “accused”), 4,051 (prosecuted), and 1,537 (brought before
the court). It was decided not to use the figures for suspects (14,463); prosecutions (4,051) was replaced by 1,537 (brought
before the court).
7 Kazakhstan provided two sets of statistics, one from the Ministry of the Interior and one from Goskomstat. It was decided to use
the Goskomstat figures; however, the prosecution statistics are suspect (8,331) and were not used.
8 For Kyrgyzstan, the statistics provided for arrests and prosecutions are the same.
9 For the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the statistics provided for crimes recorded (question 2.1) and number of suspects
(question 5.1) are very close. Since the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia does provide information on the age distribution
of the suspects, it is assumed that this figure is probably correct, and that the number of recorded crimes is not correct. The
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia reported 2,114 recorded offences per 100,000.
10 The statistics on crimes recorded (question 2.10) and suspects (question 5.1) for Turkey are so low that it was decided not to
use them.
Table 22. ...continues
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are Austria, Canada, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, France, the
Netherlands, Scotland and Sweden. The countries in the bottom quartile
(Q1 = 1,179) are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cyprus, Georgia, Kyr-
gyzstan, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine – all Central and Eastern
European, less prosperous countries. Rather than viewing these statistics
as true indicators of crime, it is worth considering that – to a large degree
– these figures reflect the police capacity to record and keep track of
crime.
(3) With regard to suspects (per 100,000), the countries in the top quartile
(Q3 = 1,402) are Austria, Canada, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands,
Slovenia and the United States. The bottom quartile includes Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova and Ukraine; with the
exception of Cyprus, these are all countries in transition.
(4) With regard to prosecutions (per 100,000), there is a wide range between
the high of 3,750 for England and Wales, and the low of 146 for Cyprus.
Andorra, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, the Netherlands, Scot-
land and Turkey are in the top 25% of prosecutions per 100,000. Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova have
the lowest number of prosecutions per 100,000.
(5) With regard to convictions (per 100,000), again there is a wide range
between the lowest (Cyprus with 86) and the highest (Turkey, with
1,228). The countries in the top 25% are Andorra, Denmark, England and
Wales, Finland, Scotland, Switzerland and Turkey. At the low end, there
is Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Mol-
dova and Portugal.
(6) With regard to prison sentences (per 100,000), there is a wide international
range from a low of 31 per 100,000 (Cyprus) to a high of 727 (Greece).
Note that these are sentences, not prison admissions; also, these statistics
do not reflect the length of the sentences. The countries in the top quartile
are Greece, Italy, Moldova, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation,
Scotland, Switzerland and Turkey. The countries in the bottom quartile
are Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia, Germany, Slovakia
and Slovenia. Compared to the earlier processing points (suspects, prose-
cutions, convictions), there is a less clear clustering of countries for this
variable.
Table 22 presents the means for the EU countries and the Central and Eastern
European countries for the five processing points. The Central and Eastern
European countries have a much lower number of police-recorded crimes
(1,491 vs. 7,206 for EU countries, almost five times higher). The EU
countries also have a much higher number of suspects (per 100,000) than do
the Central and Eastern European countries (1,908 vs. 764), and more than
three times more prosecutions per 100,000 (1,821 vs. 515) than do the Central
and Eastern European countries. The EU countries have almost three times
the number of convictions per 100,000 (930 vs. 364) and EU countries also
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more prison sentences per 100,000 (205 vs. 124). Judging on the basis of
these formal statistics, criminal justice personnel in the Central and Eastern
European countries appear to have a lower work load than do their EU
colleagues. (See Figure 3)
One would expect that countries with a high level of police-recorded crime also
have higher volumes at the later stages of processing, since each of these stages
provides the input for the next stage (except the prison sentencing stage). This is
confirmed by the results of the bivariate correlations: the number of police-re-
corded offences (per 100,000 population) is related to the number of suspects (per
100,000 population) (r = .57, p=.002), the number of prosecutions (r = .81, p =
.000), and the number of convictions (r = .74, p = .000). The number of suspects
is related to the number of prosecutions (r = .81, p = .000) and the number of
convictions (r = .82, p = 000). Finally, the number of prosecutions is related to the
number of convictions (r = .91, p = .000).
4.3.4 Case attrition
At each stage of the criminal justice process, a certain number of cases are
funneled away from the system. Not all arrested people are prosecuted; not
all prosecuted people are convicted; and not all convicted people are sen-
Central and Eastern Europe
European Union
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Figure 3. Number of cases, 1994.
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Country A
Suspects/
Offences1
B
Prosecutions
/Offences
C
Convictions
/Offences
D
Prison/
Offences
E
Prosecutions
/Suspects
F
Convictions/
Prosecutions
G
Prison/
Convictions
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep
Denmark
England/W
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
FYR Macedonia
Moldova
Netherlands
N. Ireland
Norway
Portugal
Romania
Russ.Fed.
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
0.82
0.40
0.79
0.55
0.42
0.24
0.88
0.64
0.26
0.54
0.20
0.90
0.31
0.34
0.54
0.51
0.33
0.36
0.48
0.19
0.74
0.55
0.34
0.73
0.33
0.09
0.47
0.85
0.65
0.67
0.12
0.09
0.43
0.25
0.27
0.37
0.26
0.23
0.48
0.26
0.28
0.51
0.28
0.45
0.18
0.16
0.10
0.35
0.12
0.31
0.21
0.61
0.13
0.62
0.39
0.07
0.05
0.04
0.15
0.14
0.23
0.17
0.20
0.47
0.26
0.20
0.09
0.40
0.35
0.25
0.23
0.36
0.08
0.11
0.31
0.10
0.17
0.14
0.21
0.41
0.01
0.25
0.13
0.02
0.04
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.05
0.02
0.25
0.25
0.03
0.06
0.16
0.07
0.10
0.30
0.03
0.02
0.12
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.04
0.79
0.85
0.29
0.37
0.49
0.39
1.00
0.42
0.86
0.81
1.00
0.87
0.62
0.93
0.96
0.64
0.90
0.29
0.33
0.94
0.92
0.39
0.41
0.58
0.59
0.51
0.61
0.65
0.86
0.99
0.48
0.76
0.34
0.69
0.87
0.45
0.81
0.42
0.72
0.31
0.88
0.82
0.56
0.67
0.45
0.14
0.68
0.10
0.40
0.33
0.26
0.82
0.30
0.36
0.22
0.04
0.27
0.10
0.53
0.07
0.96
0.13
0.60
0.40
0.29
0.44
0.31
0.83
0.45
0.21
0.45
0.37
0.22
0.21
0.15
0.18
0.32
Table 23. Case Attrition, 1994.
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tenced. Nations will vary in (a) the degree of overall case attrition (i.e. the
difference between the first stage and the last), and (b) the manner in which
attrition takes place (i.e. at what stage - prosecution, conviction, or sentencing
to prison - the greatest “loss” of cases takes place). Table 23 presents seven
case attrition measures: suspects/offences (column A); prosecutions/offences
(column B); convictions/offences (column C), prison sentences/offences
(column D), prosecutions/suspects (column E), convictions/prosecutions
(column F), and prison sentences/convictions (column G).13
These measures are presented, again, with a number of cautions (noted
below). One general caution is that all of the data have been gathered more
or less independently of one another, and refer to the same calendar year.
Suspects apprehended during one year may not be prosecuted or convicted
(if at all) until the next year. The measures presented below are therefore
based on the assumption that the number of cases remains, by and large,
stable from one year to the next.
Table 23, suspects/offences (column A). This measure mixes two different
units of analysis: individuals (i.e., arrests) and crimes (i.e., incidents). In
order to link these two units, one would need to include estimates about the
Country A
Suspects/
Offences1
B
Prosecutions
/Offences
C
Convictions
/Offences
D
Prison/
Offences
E
Prosecutions
/Suspects
F
Convictions/
Prosecutions
G
Prison/
Convictions
Standard dev.
25% Quartile
Median
75% Quartile
Mean
EU Mean
Central and
Eastern
Europe mean
0.23
0.33
0.47
0.70
0.49
0.37
0.53
0.16
0.18
0.27
0.43
0.31
0.24
0.38
0.16
0.12
0.20
0.34
0.23
0.14
0.31
0.11
0.02
0.04
0.13
0.09
0.05
0.14
0.26
0.41
0.80
0.91
0.65 2
0.73
0.68 2
0.21
0.45
0.61
0.82
0.63
0.54
0.73
0.23
0.19
30.00
0.44
0.35
0.32
0.40
1 This measure is commonly referred to as the “clearance rate”. A comparison with Interpol statistics reveals considerable
inconsistencies.
2 Kyrgyzstan and Estonia have been excluded from the calculation of the mean, because both countries reported identical numbers
of suspects and convictions.
Table 23. ...continues
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13The use of the word “attrition” in connection with the number of persons convicted who are not
sentenced to imprisonment can, of course, be questioned. It is not our intention to suggest the value-laden
position that most convicted offenders “should” be sentenced to imprisonment. Nonetheless, as shown
below, there are significant differences between countries in the extent to which convicted persons are
sentenced to imprisonment.
average number of offenders per crime. Unfortunately, this information is
not available. To calculate this figure, the total number of suspects (question
5.1) is divided by the total number of recorded crimes (question 2.1). The
denominator (i.e., total number of recorded crimes) is a very problematic
statistic when used in international comparisons. It makes much more sense
to use a specific crime (such as burglary or assault) as the baseline for this
type of comparison. The catch-all category of “total offences” includes a
wide diversity of illegal behaviour; some countries include a much more
narrowly defined range of illegal behaviour (e.g., excluding traffic violations,
for example) than others. (This point is reinforced by the fact that the figures
presented in Table 23 deviate in several instances from the Interpol clearance
rate). However, because it is one of the most frequently employed indicators
of case attrition, we decided to include it in the present discussion.
With this “health warning” in mind, some cautious conclusions may be
drawn about international variations in the proportion of criminal incidents
that appear to be “cleared” by an arrest. Countries in the top quartile are
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Greece, Romania, Slovenia and the United
States. The mean for all countries is .49, meaning that – on the average –
countries report having one suspect (arrest, accused) for every two recorded
crimes. The EU mean is .37 and the Central and Eastern Europe mean is .53;
the latter figure may reflect the lower number of police recorded crimes in
the Central and Eastern European countries.
Table 23, prosecutions/offences (column B). On the average, about one
person is prosecuted for every three offences recorded by the police (mean
= .31). Countries in the top quartile of prosecutions/offences are Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova. These are countries
with a relatively low number of police recorded offences. The EU mean (.24)
is lower than the mean for Central and Eastern Europe (.38).
Table 23, convictions/offences (column C). On the average, about one
person is convicted for every four offences recorded by the police (.23). The
top countries are – once again – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova (all countries with low volumes of
recorded crimes). Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, North-
ern Ireland and Scotland have a relatively low convictions/offences ratio.
Again, the EU mean (.14) is much lower than the Central and Eastern
European mean (.31)
Table 23, prison sentences/offences (column D). This measure reflects
which proportion of convictions included some type of prison sentence. Less
than one in ten of the offences recorded by the police - on the average -
resulted in some type of prison sentence (.09). Again, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Greece and Moldova are in the top quartile regarding the
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likelihood that an offence will result in any type of prison sentence. The EU
mean (.05) is almost one-third the mean for Central and Eastern Europe (.14).
Table 23, prosecutions/suspects (column E). Column E (prosecutions/sus-
pects) is likely to reflect international differences in criminal justice proce-
dure and policy (e.g. pre-trial diversion programs). In two countries (Estonia
and  Kyrgyzstan), the  same figures are  provided for both suspects and
prosecutions (and these two countries have been excluded from the calcula-
tions of the mean). The mean of .65 indicates that - over all - about 65 out of
100 accused/suspects are actually prosecuted. The first quartile is .45, which
reflects the fact that only about one-fourth of the countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Slovenia, Canada and Finland) prosecute less than half of the suspects.
Table 23,  convictions/prosecutions (column F). Column F (convic-
tions/prosecutions) may be the most straighforward attrition measure. In-
deed, it appears to be a common objective of all criminal justice systems to
secure a conviction of those who are prosecuted. There may be disagreement
as to whether a person should be arrested or prosecuted, but once prosecuted,
most systems are interested in securing a conviction. On the average, 63%
of the prosecutions end up in a conviction. The mean for EU countries (.54)
is lower than in the Central and Eastern European countries (.73). Countries
where there appears to be a high likelihood of conviction (if the suspect is
prosecuted) are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Latvia, the Russian
Federation and Scotland. Countries where there appears to be a relatively
low likelihood of conviction are Andorra, Bulgaria, Canada, Italy, the Neth-
erlands and Portugal.
About 63% of the prosecutions in the region ended with a conviction (the
median is 61%). Thus, Armenia (.94), Azerbaijan (.92), England and Wales
(.61), Estonia (.65), Finland (.86), Georgia (.99), Hungary (.76), Kyrgyzstan
(.69), Latvia (.87), Moldova  (.81), Northern  Ireland (.72), the  Russian
Federation (.88), Scotland (.82) and Slovenia (.67) are in the top 50% with
regard to likelihood of conviction if the suspect is prosecuted.
Table 23, prison/convictions (Column G). Column G (prison sen-
tences/convictions) reflect cross-national differences in sentencing philoso-
phies and policies. On the average, in the region about one-third of the
convictions involve some kind of deprivation of liberty (.35). Countries in
the top quartile (Q3 = .44) are Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Italy,
Lithuania, Moldova and the Netherlands. The EU mean (.32) is slightly lower
than the mean (.40) in Central and Eastern Europe.
Figure 4 represents the level of case attrition in the region. The interpre-
tation of the degree of case attrition is not straightforward. Is it reasonable
to argue that countries with a low attrition rate perform their task better than
countries where only a relatively small proportion of the cases arrives at the
last processing point (i.e., prison)? Not necessarily so. One of the hallmarks
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of recent developments in criminal justice is the declining reliance on the
courts (judges) in favour of a growing importance of alternative processing
options which take place at the police or prosecutor’s office (see Albrecht,
1998; van de Bunt and Marshall, 1998). A high case attrition rate may,
therefore, mean two totally different things: either the police (prosecutors,
judges) do a poor job at selecting cases for arrest (prosecution, conviction),
or the system has a well-developed system of non-criminal justice system
processing alternatives.
In this section, the primary focus has been on the flow of cases through
the system. We described the degree to which police-recorded crime is
consistent with the amount of crime found through victim surveys, the
volume of cases (per 100,000 population) handled at five different stages of
processing, and the degree of case attrition at the different stages of the
criminal justice process. In section 4.4, we turn to a discussion of interna-
tional variations in the performance of criminal justice systems.
Suspects
Prosecutions
Convictions
Prison Sentences
2000
1000
1500
500
0
Central and Eastern Europe
European Union
All
Figure 4. Case attrition, 1994.
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4.4 Performance of criminal justice system
“The issues raised by performance measurement are both tech-
nical and political. In many public services, perhaps particularly
in the police service, the technical problems involved in measur-
ing performance are daunting. The relationships between inputs,
outputs and outcomes – between the assignment of resources,
what gets done and what effects that activity has – are not
infrequently complex, tenuous, unknown and difficult to know”
(Weatheritt 1993, p. 24)
This was written regarding the situation in the United Kingdom, but there is no
doubt that it holds even more true for attempts at making cross-national
assessments of the performance of criminal justice systems. There is a growing
interest among researchers and practitioners in how to evaluate the performance
of the police, or of the criminal justice system in general, but many unresolved
questions remain. In 1993, a collection of discussion papers on this topic was
published (Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System, by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1993). More recently, a National Institute of Justice
publication (Measuring what Matters: Developing Measures of What the Police
Do, 1997) summarizes discussions by police experts on this topic. A recurrent
theme is the importance of distinguishing between process evaluations (i.e., is
the process efficient and fair? What are the costs of what the police do in relation
to what they achieve?) and outcome evaluations (i.e., is the system effective in
producing a more safe society, with acceptable levels of personal and property
crime, a society where citizens are not afraid of crime?).
Most of the current evaluation efforts focus on the efficiency of the criminal
justice system: what do the police (prosecutors, judges) do, and what are the
costs of this? Measuring what police do is easier than measuring what effect
their activities have had on society (cf. Bayley 1994, p. 97). Weatheritt (1993,
p. 24) gets at the heart of the difficulties involved in performance evaluations:
“The goals of policing are multiple and may conflict, the achievement of
goals for which the police is routinely held accountable (e.g. public tranquil-
lity or the absence of crime) may only be partially, minimally, and to an
unknown extent dependent on police action; and the outputs of policing are
often intangible and not readily identifiable.”
As Bayley (1985, p. 17–18) points out, it is virtually impossible to
determine variations in police effectiveness over time or space: “Judging
police performance is a controversial multivariate process, elements of which
change from place to place and time to time” (p. 18). The prevention of crime
and improvement of public safety is a policing goal the world over; however,
there are other important criteria by which to assess performance: “[A]dher-
ence to law, absence of immoral behaviour, generation of public trust, display
of sympathy and concern, openness to informed scrutiny, capacity for gen-
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eralized problem-solving, protection of the integrity of political processes,
and equitable treatment of persons” (Bayley 1985, p. 17–18).
Most of the data available internationally are measures of process, of the
manner in which (how) the criminal justice system performs its assigned
activities. Data on the outcome (product) of the activities of the criminal
justice system are much harder to come by. Four performance measures are
presented in the following: police recording practices (section 4.4.1); pro-
ductivity (section 4.4.2); citizen satisfaction with the police (section 4.4.3);
and police corruption (section 4.4.4). Section 4.4.5 provides a summary
overview of the used performance indicators.
4.4.1 Police recording performance
An important task of police departments is to keep accurate records of crime.
The integrity of the crime-recording process may be viewed as a measure of
the quality of police work. In section 5.2, the issue of the mismatch between
victimization and police record data was discussed, with the argument that
the probability that a reported crime actually will be recorded by the police
may be used as an indicator of police recording performance. The higher the
recorded/reported crime ratio, the poorer the police recording performance.
Table 20 provides data on 31 countries. Countries that rank high with regard
to police  recording practices are Austria, Canada, England and Wales,
Finland, France, Norway, Scotland and Sweden. Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania,
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine
rank at the bottom with regard to police recording performance.
4.4.2 Productivity
Efficiency means economically applying available resources to accomplish
statutory goals as well as to improve public safety (Greenfeld 1993, p v). One
measure of this may be the cost-effectiveness of the activities of the police,
prosecutors, and judges, calculated on the basis of the per-unit-cost of arrests,
prosecutions, convictions and prison sentences. We already described inter-
national variations in work load (measured as the number of cases - be it
recorded offences, suspects, prosecutions, convictions, and prison sentences
- per 100,000 population) (Table 22). In order to obtain a measure of the
output per unit, the total number of arrests (prosecutions, convictions, prison
sentences) is divided by the total number of police (and prosecutors), and
multiplied by 100. Table 24 presents data on the average number of suspects,
prosecutions, convictions and prison sentences produced by 100 police
personnel (columns A, B, C and D), and comparable data for prosecutors
(columns E, F and G).
Columns A through D provide data on police productivity (per 100 police
officers). On the average, in Europe and North America, 100 police officers
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“produce” 414 suspects (annually), 372 prosecutions, 213 convictions, and
50 prison sentences. The routine activities of most police officers consist of
service-oriented activities and order maintenance, rather than crime control;
the data in Table 24 support this view. “[M]ost of the time the police do not
use the criminal law to restore calm and order. They rarely make arrests,
although the threat of doing so always exists” (Bayley 1994, p. 20). For
example, in Austria there were 668 arrests made for every 100 police officers,
an (annual) average of slightly more than 6 per officer. The figure is higher
for the United States, where for every 100 police officers, a total of 1519
arrests were made (about 15 per officer per year).
Austria, Canada, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands and the United States
are in the top quartile, suggesting that the police forces in these countries -
on the average – “produce” the largest number of arrests (per officer).
Armenia, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Russian Federa-
tion, on the other hand, show the lowest “productivity” (as measured by the
number of arrests made per officer). There are very marked differences
between the EU countries and the Central and Eastern European countries:
the “productivity” of the police in EU countries is about three times higher
than of those in the Central and Eastern European countries (based on
numbers of suspects, prosecutions, convictions, and prison sentences).
The same general picture emerges when focusing on prosecutors. It has
already been shown that there were more prosecutors in the Central and Eastern
European countries than in the EU countries. Table 24 shows that on the average
there are 19,692 prosecutions per 100 prosecutors (about 196 prosecutions
annuallyper prosecutor); in theEU countries, thatnumber isconsiderablyhigher
(38,505). The top countries are Andorra, Denmark, England and Wales,Finland,
the Netherlands and Turkey, and the bottom countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Cyprus, Georgia, Latvia and the Russian Federation.
When focusing on the number of convictions per prosecutor (column F),
the numbers are slightly lower, with an average of 10,915 per 100 prosecutors
(109 per year for each prosecutor). The EU mean is much higher: 21,510
convictions for every 100 prosecutors, about 6 times more than in the Central
and Eastern European countries (3,389). A similar picture emerges for the
number of prison sentences per 100 prosecutors: on the average in Europe
and North America, every 100 prosecutors “produce” 2,770 prison sentences
per year. The number in the EU countries is higher (5,067) than in the Central
and Eastern European countries (1,320).
Table 24 shows that the quantitative “productivity” of prosecutors is
significantly greater (as measured by the number of prosecutions – column
E, the number of convictions – column F, and the number of prison sentences
– column G) than the corresponding quantitative “productivity” of police
officers. This reflects the different nature of the work of criminal justice
officials at this stage of criminal justice processing. Whereas the work of
police officers consist for a large part of service activities and order mainte-
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Country A
Suspects/
Police
B
Prosecutions
/Police
C
Convictions
/Police
D
Prison
Sentences
/Police
E
Prosecutions
/Prosecutors
F
Convictions/
Prosecutions
G
Prison
Sentences/
Prosecutor
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep
Denmark
England/W
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
FYR Macedonia
Moldova
Netherlands
N. Ireland
Norway
Portugal
Romania
Russ.Fed.
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
54
685
964
187
72
142
1,792
385
686
398
276
82
113
105
354
170
619
359
80
251
397
123
412
124
1,519
42
360
91
28
1,332
1,082
142
752
359
342
215
99
218
159
596
126
245
220
51
338
225
116
1,422
40
224
115
146
16
678
664
93
647
171
198
261
73
61
86
68
99
129
252
90
68
45
277
126
79
398
647
27
22
30
44
6
29
25
62
12
190
34
44
25
25
30
30
107
112
19
50
30
17
61
26
11
73
208
66,233
1,963
1,015
4,102
8,745
1,513
10,193
42,693
92,287
7,574
26,608
2,185
17,422
8,922
3,872
2,923
12,464
3,565
56,087
9,370
3,243
25,069
7,578
6,563
70,113
21,967
1,837
33,068
939
3,165
5,175
1,608
885
6,008
21,725
56,649
4,960
22,896
2,157
8,280
20,149
6,793
2,567
2,657
2,540
2,332
5,650
2,896
23,737
2,884
2,852
20,534
4,225
4,429
31,882
3,167
1,247
3,271
374
1,049
1,347
1,319
318
1,320
2,506
1,353
2,187
1,147
571
19,329
879
1,029
738
1,036
1,736
2,409
10,567
1,296
1,064
4,533
881
646
10,243
Table 24. Productivity Police and Prosecutors (per 100), 1994.
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nance which produce few “tangible” outcomes (such as arrests), the activities
of prosecutors are primarily focused on the processing of “dossiers”.
In sum, it seems that the police and prosecutors in the EU countries
“produce” more suspects, prosecutions, convictions, and prison sentences
than do their Central and Eastern European counterparts. Does this mean that
the criminal justice work force in Central and Eastern Europe is less produc-
tive (i.e., less efficient) than their EU counterparts? Not necessarily. Equally
plausible alternative explanations may be the relatively smaller number of
police and prosecutors in EU countries, or the lesser crime problem or poorer
record keeping practices in Central and Eastern European countries.
4.4.3 Citizen satisfaction with the police
Soft or subjective indicators of the performance of the police (or of the
criminal justice system in general) are being used to an increasing extent.
Subjective measures are easier to obtain – commonly through surveys – than
the more elusive objective “hard” measures of police performance. From a
pragmatic policy perspective, it is reasonable to argue that one important
objective of policing is increasing the sense of security and social well-being
among the population, regardless of the objective threat of criminal victimi-
zation. If people feel that the police is performing well, if they feel secure,
if they feel they can trust the police – that is half the battle.
In order to make international comparisons of the subjective assessment
of members of the public of policing and public safety, we constructed the
Citizen Evaluation of Police Performance Index (CEPPI), a subjective per-
formance index, based on data from the International Crime Victimization
Country A
Suspects/
Police
B
Prosecutions
/Police
C
Convictions
/Police
D
Prison
Sentences
/Police
E
Prosecutions
/Prosecutors
F
Convictions/
Prosecutions
G
Prison
Sentences/
Prosecutor
Standard dev.
25% Quartile
Median
75% Quartile
Mean
EU Mean
Central and
Eastern
Europe mean
441
118
267
515
414
621
201
401
116
220
360
372
612
149
209
72
126
261
213
306
99
50
25
30
61
50
59
32
25,389
3,404
8,745
25,838
19,692
38,505
5,660
13,077
2,560
4,694
20,831
10,915
21,510
3,389
4,108
918
1,307
2,482
2,770
5,067
1,320
Table 24. ...continues
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Survey. The purpose of the Citizen Evaluation of Police Performance Index
(CEPPI) is to provide a composite measure which incorporates more than
one single dimension of the concept of citizen evaluation of police perform-
ance
14
. Three ICVS questions are used as the source variables for the CEPPI.
There are both conceptual and empirical justifications (the variables are
intercorrelated) for combining these three variables into one composite
index. The three questions used are:
(1) The percentage of victims of contact crimes who reported their victimi-
zation to the police. Willingness to report contact crimes to the police is
not influenced by the demands of insurance companies (as in the cases
of car theft or burglaries), but rather reflects the willingness of victims
to confide and trust in the police. The higher the reporting rate, the higher
the citizen satisfaction with the police. On the average, 29% of the victims
in the 36 countries reported contact crimes to the police (standard
deviation 11). The minimum value for this variable is 9% (Norway), the
maximum value is 66% (N. Ireland). Victims of contact crimes in the EU
countries are more likely to report their victimization to the police than
are their Central and Eastern European counterparts (32% vs. 24%).
(2) The percentage of victims who were satisfied with the way in which their
report of a crime was handled by the police. This measure is a straight-
forward indicator of the extent to which victims appear to be satisfied
with the manner in which the police responded to their report of victimi-
zation. In the region, on the average, slightly over half of the victims
reported their satisfaction with the way the police handled their case
(51%). The response was most positive in Scotland (84%) and least
positive in Kyrgyzstan (20%). The proportion of people who indicated
satisfaction with the way the police handled their report was about twice
as high in the EU countries (66%) than in the Central and Eastern
European countries (35%).
(3) The percentage of all respondents who are satisfied with police crime
control. This measure is an indicator of the extent to which the general
public appears satisfied with crime control in general. Approximately
half of the people in Europe and North America indicated satisfaction
with the manner in which the police maintained crime control in their
area. People in Canada were most satisfied (88%), and people in Estonia
were least satisfied with crime control in their area (14%). Again, more
people living in EU countries expressed satisfaction with crime control
(68%) than did people living in Central and Eastern European countries
(38%).
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14See appendix D for an explanation of the construction of the CEPPI
Table 25 presents the CEPPI values, ranks and quartile position of 36
countries. Countries with the highest level of overall satisfaction with the
police are Canada, England and Wales, France, the Netherlands, Northern
Ireland, Scotland, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. Respondents
in Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the
Russian Federation and Ukraine rank in the bottom quartile with respect to
their evaluation of police performance. The mean value on the CEPPI for EU
countries (37) is more than twice the mean CEPPI value for Central and
Eastern European countries (17).
It is only to be expected that the subjective evaluation of the police in
countries in transition is different from the corresponding evaluation in the
remainder of Europe and North America. Indeed, “In all of the communist
states the pre 1989–91 police systems were...the most powerful repressive
agents of the state with the principal task of maintaining the rule of a
particular political elite by suppressing dissent” (Gregory 1994, p. 85). The
police systems in the countries in transition have been going through a major
transformation in order to become compatible with the democratic process.
Under communist rule, the police paid less concern to individual liberty and
“were expected to convey party authority to the everyday lives of citizens”
(Wilson and Walsh 1997, p. 45). (See Marenin 1996 for more discussion on
the role of the police in times of major social change.) A related factor may
be that because of the market economies developing in Central and Eastern
European countries, the relative attractiveness of policing as a profession and
means of economic support has decreased, resulting in “increasingly high
attrition rates and difficulties in retaining trained and qualified personnel”
(Wilson and Walsh 1997, p. 53).
Citizen evaluation of police is related to some, but not to all indicators of
criminality. In Europe and North America, countries with a higher score on
the corruption index (r = -.44, p = .06), the homicide index (r = -.84, p = .000),
and the serious violence index (r = -.702, p = .001) tend to have a lower score
on the CEPPI. No such association is found for the burglary index, the petty
crime index, the violence against women index, and the motor vehicle theft
index.
The World Competitiveness Yearbook 1997 ranks 25 countries on two
dimensions that are related to subjective evaluation of the criminal justice
system (0 is low; 10 is high). The first (“security”) measures whether people
have full confidence that person and property are protected; the second
measures whether people have full confidence in the fair administration of
justice in society (“justice”). There is an association between CEPPI and
“security” (r = .67, p = .003), and between CEPPI and “justice” (r = .66, p =
.005). The World Competitiveness Survey includes only four countries in
transition (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Russian Federation)
all of which rank below any of the other countries on both the “security” and
the “justice” questions.
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Countries CEPPI CEPPI (Rank) CEPPI (Quartile)
Albania
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Czech Rep
England/W
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany (W)
Hungary
Italy
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Netherlands
N. Ireland
Norway
Poland
Romania
Russian Fed.
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
United States
Yugoslavia
Standard Dev.
25% Quartile
Median
75% Quartile
Mean
EU mean
Central and Eastern Europe
mean
28
26
13
37
21
47
18
23
44
13
33
41
13
33
23
27
3
11
14
28
25
42
43
30
15
12
4
50
32
25
32
45
50
14
46
18
13
14
26
40
27
37
17
21
18
7
27
13
34
11
15
31
6
26
28
5
25
15
19
1
3
9
21
16
29
30
22
10
4
2
35
23
17
24
32
36
9
33
12
3
2
1
3
2
¤
2
2
4
1
3
4
1
3
2
3
1
1
1
3
2
4
4
3
2
1
1
4
3
2
3
4
4
1
4
2
Table 25. Citizen Evaluation of Police Performance Index (CEPPI).
108
4.4.4 Police corruption
The ICVS includes a question on corruption among public officials: “In some
countries, there is a problem of corruption among government or public
officials. During 1995, has any government official, for instance a customs
officer, a police officer or inspector in your country asked you, or expected
you to pay a bribe for his service?” Urban respondents in 31 countries
answered this question. The mean for the 31 countries is 8.39% (standard
deviation: 7.97). The countries in the top quartile are Bulgaria (19.1%
answered yes), Croatia (16%), Georgia (29.9%), Kyrgyzstan (21.3%), Latvia
(14%), the Russian Federaton (18.7%), and Slovakia (13.9%). Very low
levels of corruption were reflected in the responses from Canada (0.7%),
England and Wales (.02%), Finland (0.0%), the Netherlands (0.6%), North-
ern Ireland (0.0%), Sweden (0.4%), and Switzerland (0.3%). The mean for
the Central and Eastern European countries (n = 19) is 13.01 (standard
deviation = 6.81); that is, on the average, 13% of the respondents indicated
that they had direct personal experience with corruption among public
officials. In the 7 EU countries included in the ICVS, on the other hand, less
than 1% (.89%) of the respondents indicated problems with corruption
(standard deviation: 1.09).
There is a strong negative association between perceived problems of
corruption among public officials and CEPPI (r = -.75, p = .000), “justice”
(-.93, p = .000), and “security” (r = -.85, p = .001). In other words, countries
where people perceive a corruption problem among public officials (includ-
ing the police) tend to have a much lower citizen’s evaluation of police
performance, less confidence that people’s person and property is protected,
and less confidence that the administration of justice is fair.
4.4.5 Overview of performance indicators in Europe and
North America
None of the measures discussed so far truly measure performance of the
criminal justice system. Experts have great difficulty accomplishing such a
feat nationally; trying to do this internationally is an even greater challenge.
At most, we have provided a limited description of what police do (i.e. police
recording practices), how much police and prosecutors do (i.e., productivity),
what people think of the police (CEPPI), how secure people feel (security),
people’s opinion about the fairness of the system (justice), and people’s
self-reported exposure to corrupt public officials (corruption). Thus far, we
have not mentioned the most frequently used objective measure of the
effectiveness of the criminal justice system: crime rates. Crime rates are the
product of a complex set of social, political and economic factors; most likely,
the quality of the work done by the criminal justice system has no – or only
a minor – effect on the extent and seriousness of crime in a society. Crime
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Countries Police
Rec-
ording
Productivity Subjective Measures Crime Rates
Police Prosecu-
tors
CEPPI Security Justice Lack of
Corrup-
tion
Serious
Violence
Petty
Crime
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep
Denmark
England &W
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
N. Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Fed.
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
4
3
3
2
4
2
4
2
4
4
1
3
3
2
1
1
1
2
3
3
4
1
2
4
1
2
2
4
3
1
4
4
2
1
2
4
3
4
3
3
1
1
1
3
2
4
3
1
2
3
2
3
4
1
1
2
3
1
3
4
4
2
4
1
3
3
2
1
3
2
4
3
1
3
2
2
3
2
1
3
2
4
2
2
4
1
3
4
1
3
2
3
1
1
1
3
2
4
4
3
2
1
1
4
3
2
3
4
4
4
2
4
1
4
4
1
3
3
1
2
1
3
2
3
1
2
1
3
2
4
4
1
3
1
4
4
2
3
2
2
3
1
3
3
4
1
2
1
2
3
4
2
3
2
1
3
1
1
2
4
3
4
3
1
3
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
2
2
1
4
1
3
4
4
3
1
4
1
4
3
2
4
3
3
1
2
2
2
4
3
1
4
2
1
2
2
4
4
4
3
1
1
1
3
2
3
1
4
3
3
4
2
3
3
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
3
4
1
4
3
4
2
2
1
1
2
3
4
3
1
2
1
4
1
3
2
4
2
4
3
1
3
3
Table 26. Overview of Performance Indicators (Quartiles).
Table 26 continues...
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rates should definitely not be used as an indicator of criminal justice per-
formance (Weatheritt 1993; Bailey 1994). Yet, because of the interrelation-
ship between crime rates and criminal justice operations, it is reasonable to
include crime rates (the serious violence index and the petty crime index) in
the summary overview of the performance measures (Table 26).
Table 26 presents country quartile values on police recording practices,
productivity (police and prosecutors), subjective measures (CEPPI, security,
justice and lack of corruption), and crime rates (the serious violence index
and the petty crime index). High values (3 or 4) indicate a high level of system
performance; low values (1 or 2) reflect lower levels of system performance.
For the two crime indices, high values (3 or 4) indicate a higher level of crime,
and lower values (1 or 2) reflect a relatively lower level of crime. A “perfect”
system would have high values in the first 7 columns (police recording,
productivity, subjective measures), and low values in the 2 right-hand col-
umns (crime rates). There are several countries that score high (3 or 4) on all
the available performance indicators (Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway,
Scotland) and low (1 or 2) on the crime indices. There are also several
countries that score low (1 or 2) on all the available performance indicators
(Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova,
Poland, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Yugoslavia) and high (3 or 4)
on the crime indices. There are high crime countries which score high on the
performance indicators: both Canada and the United States score high on all
the performance indicators (with the exception of a ‘2’on the justice measure
for the United States), and on the two crime indices. There are also countries
which score poorly on the performance indicators, yet have a low level of
crime (Cyprus).
Countries Police
Rec-
ording
Productivity Subjective Measures Crime Rates
Police Prosecu-
tors
CEPPI Security Justice Lack of
Corrup-
tion
Serious
Violence
Petty
Crime
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
Yugoslavia
1
3
2
4
4
1
4
2
2
3
1
2
2
3
1
1
4
4
3
4
4
2
Table 26. ...continues
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4.5 Concluding remarks
The observations made in this chapter are based primarily on the results of
the Fifth United Nations Crime Survey and the International Crime Victim
Survey, the two main international data sources on crime and criminal justice.
Although both data sources have improved significantly since they were first
started years ago, they still remain open to serious criticism. Some of the
problems cannot be solved by currently available methods (i.e., differences
in legal definitions, differences in procedures, differences in the manner in
which criminal justice data are collected, differences in cultural context),
others may be lessened by careful handling and cautious interpretations, and
by avoiding overemphasizing single data points or observations. One cer-
tainly can make a strong case for the argument that multiple international
data sources used simultaneously are an important step in the right direction.
The results of this chapter support this contention.
It is the purpose of Chapter 4 to provide a general overview of the operation
of criminal justice systems in Europe and North America. It is admittedly a
snapshot picture, since trend data have not been included. We describe
international patterns, similarities and differences between the countries in
the region. Comparisons are made between Central and Eastern European
countries (countries in transition) and European Union (traditionally capital-
ist) countries, because these two groups of nations – although varying widely
between and among themselves – also differ in significant ways from each
other. The comparisons and statistical analyses are straightforward, mostly
descriptive. It should be kept in mind that many of the analyses are based on
different numbers and combinations of countries, because of missing data.
Whenever appropriate, simple bivariate analyses have been done. Undoubt-
edly, more complex analyses and comparisons could have been accom-
plished; however, the nature of the data as well as the complicated character
of international analyses using large numbers of countries suggest that simple
descriptions and comparisons are an important and reasonable first step.
Despite the cautions needed when working with the available international
data, the consistency in the observations in these sections does provide
confidence that we are beginning to piece together some important parts of
the intricate international puzzle of criminal justice. The more striking
observations are summarized in the following seven points.
(1) There are large international variations in the rate of police, prosecutors,
judges, and prison staff (per 100,000 population), but there is a striking
international similarity in the distribution of criminal justice personnel
among the police, prosecution, the judiciary, and corrections. Although
Central and Eastern European countries have a significantly higher rate
of population employed in criminal justice than do the EU countries,
about 82% of criminal justice personnel in both groups of countries are
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employed by the police, approximately 2% in prosecution, 3% in the
judiciary, and 13% in corrections.
(2) There appears to be a correlation between crime and the levels of criminal
justice personnel: countries that have a higher level of petty theft, serious
violence and homicide tend to have rather high levels of criminal justice
personnel than do countries with lower levels of these crimes.
(3) Criminal justice in Europe and North America remains a male-dominated
profession. There is not a single country where half or more of the prison
staff and police are female, and there are very few countries where
females make up more than half of the prosecutors or judges. Central and
Eastern European countries have a somewhat higher proportion of female
judges and prison employees than do the EU countries. Yet, it is an
oversimplification to conclude that Central and Eastern European coun-
tries consistently have a more gender-balanced criminal justice work-
force: several of the countries in transition rank rather low on the gender
balance index, whereas some EU countries, Canada and the United States
rank in the top quartile of the gender balance Index.
(4) The Fifth United Nations Survey and the International Crime Victimiza-
tion Survey provide partially inconsistent portrayals of international
variations in criminality. However, once national differences in the level
of victim-reporting are taken into consideration, some of these inconsis-
tencies disappear (when the focus is on “total crime”).
(5) There are large international variations in the likelihood that the police
will record crimes that come to their attention. In the Central and Eastern
European countries crime victims are less likely to report the crime to
the police and the police appear less likely to record a reported offence
than is the case in the EU countries.
(6) International data on case flow are problematic and difficult to interpret,
particularly when the focus is on “total crime”. It is clear that EU
countries have a significantly larger number of recorded offences, sus-
pects, prosecutions, convictions, and prison sentences than do the coun-
tries in transition. Beyond that statement, it is difficult to draw any firm
conclusions. Differences in case attrition (the rate at which cases and
suspects appear to “drop out” of the criminal justice system at different
stages of the process) likely reflect differences in national criminal justice
procedures, recording practices and sentencing philosophy, rather than
differences in the quality of work performed by criminal justice employ-
ees. Data on the later stages of processing are likely to be more reliable
than those on the early stages; the ration between prosecutions and
convictions (i.e. how many prosecutions lead to a conviction) shows
relatively limited international variation and may, therefore, be a prom-
ising candidate for future international analysis.
(7) Assessment of international variations in the performance of a large
number of criminal justice systems remains a difficult, if not impossible
task. The data are simply not adequate. Subjective measures are more
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easily available than objective, “hard” measures. Crime rates - although
obviously closely interlinked with the operations of criminal justice
systems - are not useful performance indicators. Countries do appear to
show (to a certain extent) a clustering on similar ranks in respect of the
measures of police recording performance, productivity (of police and
prosecutors, measured by number of suspects and prosecutions), and
several subjective measures (the citizen evaluation of police performance
index, evaluations of the fairness of the system and of the sense of
security, and ICVS responses on corruption). Some countries are high on
all (or most) performance indicators; other countries tend to be low on
all (or most) performance indicators. This suggests that the performance
indicators that have been developed for this study may have a reasonable
degree of usefulness. Also, crime rates are apparently not completely
randomly distributed among countries differing on the performance
indicators. Any conclusions at this early stage about cause-and-effect
should be avoided.
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5 Sanctions and their Severity
André Kuhn
5.1 Sanctions imposed
The three main types of decisions made by the courts in formal adjudication
are acquittal, dismissal and conviction. The Fifth United Nations Survey
provided only perfunctory data on the first two but several questions were
designed to obtain data on convictions and on the sanctions imposed (al-
though essentially only on adults).
5.1.1 The comparability of data on sanctions imposed
The courts in different countries have a wide range of sanctions at their
disposal, and what is a court-imposed sanction in one country may be
imposed by the prosecutor or even the police in another country. A sanction
can be defined by its nature, by the body responsible for the decision, or by
its administrative consequences, such as an entry into the criminal records.
Thus, the number and structure of sentences in each country will inevitably
depend on the definition of the sentences.
Even if one could create a uniform definition of a sentence at the interna-
tional level, one would still face the constraints of the existing statistical
systems, such as the different modalities of recording offences. Some sen-
tences may or may not be recorded, depending on the type of court and the
type of proceedings in which they have been passed.
For these reasons, the data provided by the different countries concerning
the number and type of sentences delivered cannot easily be summarized in
the form of tables. Nevertheless, we shall seek to look at the data provided
through the Fifth United Nation Survey and the Council of Europe and provide
some indications about the sentencing practices in Europe and North America.
5.1.2 The Fifth United Nations Survey and data on sanctions
In the Fifth United Nations Survey instrument, the classification used for
sanctions was as follows:1 life imprisonment, corporal punishment, depriva-
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1 Question 11 in the Fifth Survey questionnaire “Adults convicted by number and type of sentence (all
crimes): 11.1 Total, 11.2 Life Imprisonment, 11.3 Corporal punishment, 11.4 Deprivation of liberty, 11.5
Control in freedom, 11.6 Warning, admonition, 11.7 Fine, 11.8 Community service orders, 11.9 Other.
tion of liberty (including combined or split sentences where a part of the
sentence involves deprivation of liberty), control in freedom (including
probation and conditional sentences with an additional supervision require-
ment), warning or admonition (including suspended sentences, conditional
sentences without supervision requirement, finding of guilt without sanc-
tions, formal admonitions, formal warnings, conditional dismissal and con-
ditional discharge), fine, and community service orders.
Life imprisonment: With a very few exceptions (such as Norway, where
life imprisonment was abolished in 1981), life imprisonment is possible
throughout Europe and North America for certain serious offences. Never-
theless, the available data show that life imprisonment represents only a very
small part (less than one % in all the countries) of the total number of
sentences imposed.
Corporal punishment: Corporal punishment is almost unknown in Europe
and North America. Due to the way the table was structured – no line was
provided for the sanction of capital punishment – it is probable that the only
two countries in Europe and North America which filled in this line (Estonia,
with about 2 cases a year, and Kyrgyzstan, with 3271 cases in 1990, 4173 in
1992, and 7710 in 1994) may in fact have been referring at least in part to
capital punishment. This is true at least for Estonia (the death penalty was
subsequently abolished in Estonia). It may be noted here that, during the
period under review, several Central and Eastern European countries, as well
as the United States used capital punishment. (A de facto moratorium on
capital punishment has been in force in all Council of Europe member states
since 1 January 1997.)
Deprivation of liberty: Imprisonment is the backbone of the system of
sanctions of all countries in Europe and North America. It represents about
one-third of all imposed sanctions and will therefore be analysed below. How-
ever, in order to provide a preliminary idea of the use by courts of deprivation
of liberty as a sanction, it may be noted that – as was the case with the Fourth
United Nations Survey (Kangaspunta 1995a, p. 40) – the Fifth United Nations
Survey data show large variations when calculated per 100,000 inhabitants. The
range goes from less than 50 sentences of deprivation of liberty per 100,000
inhabitants each year in Azerbaijan, Cyprus, and Germany, to over 200 in
Greece, the Netherlands, Scotland, and Turkey (see table 27).
Control in freedom: Many sanctions involve considerable supervision and
control of the offender. These include suspended or conditional imprison-
ment with supervision, probation, community service, reformative and edu-
cative labour, special forms of treatment, and local banishment. Because of
this variety, it is not possible to find a common trend in the data on this
sanction. The different countries report that between zero and about 70 %
(for the Czech Republic and Slovakia) of their total number of sanctions
consist of “control in freedom”. A question in the Fifth United Nations
Survey refers to the number of persons placed on probation (a procedure
whereby an individual found guilty of an offence is released by the court
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without imprisonment, and placed under the supervision of an official or
officially sanctioned body), and another question asks for the number of
persons on probation on a given day. In 1994, between about 10 (in Lithuania)
and 536 (in the United States) persons per 100,000 inhabitants were placed
on probation, and on a given day in the year the rates oscillated between 12
(in Slovenia) and 1137 (in the United States) per 100,000 population.
Warning and admonition: Here again, there is an enormous amount of
international variation. The countries report that between zero and more than
50 % (in Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Slovenia and Switzerland) of their sanctions
were warnings or admonitions, including all suspended sanctions without a
supervision requirement.
Fine: The financial sanction is clearly one of the most popular among
European countries, especially in the western part of Europe. In Austria,
England and Wales, Finland and Germany more than 70% of all sanctions
are fines. At the other end of the scale, in Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania and Slovakia
less than 10% of sanctions were fines. (Again, the cautions noted in sections
1.3 and 5.1.1 on the comparability of statistics on sanctions should be noted;
it can be assumed that in many countries, fines may be imposed by the police
and the prosecutor, and may not be entered into the statistics as fines.)
Community service: Many countries do not recognize community service
as a sanction in their criminal justice system. According to the survey, the
countries which make the greatest use of community service are the Russian
Federation (about 15% of all sentences), Azerbaijan (13%), Georgia (12%),
the Netherlands (8%), Scotland (7%), and Northern Ireland (6%). However,
in this connection it should be recalled that the concept of community service
can be substantively different from one country to the other and therefore
caution is needed in making international comparisons on the topic. For
example in several countries in transition (including, during the period under
review, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan and Georgia), “educative labour”
has been defined as community service. This sanction requires the offender
to continue working at his or her regular employment, but a part of the wages
are deducted as a sanction.
Among the convicted persons in 1994, between 3.5% (in Kazakhstan) and
18.2% (in Austria) are women. In each country, the differences between 1990
and 1994 in the proportion of women among the convicted offenders are slight
and go both ways; there are increases in some countries and decreases in others.
With regards to trends, table 272 shows that in most countries for which
data are available in Europe, the use of deprivation of liberty by courts
appears to have increased between 1990 and 1994, although in about one-
third of the countries (Andorra, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Northern Ire-
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2 The data is from question 11.4 in the Fifth Survey questionnaire; Adults convicted to deprivation of
liberty
land, Slovenia and Switzerland) there appears to be a decline during this same
time period. In 1990, on the average 107 sentences of deprivation of liberty
were imposed; in 1994, the mean number of sentences of incarceration had
increased to 141 per 100,000 inhabitants.
Country 1990 1992 1994 Trend1
Andorra
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
England/Wales
Estonia
Finland
Georgia
Germany
Hungary
Italy
Kazakhstan
Latvia
Lithuania
FYR Macedonia
Moldova
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Portugal
Russia
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Switzerland
Turkey
Variance
Standard deviation
25 % quartile
Median
75 % quartile
Mean
EU mean
Central and Eastern
Europe mean
245
83
28
75
100
28
55
81
58
224
40
34
105
111
93
86
76
70
166
282
111
106
121
188
63
75
205
81
4428
66.6
66.5
84.5
116
107
135.6
79.9
290
82
38
96
100
30
72
84
78
215
29
34
126
191
106
110
83
81
145
263
100
128
136
202
87
199
319
6103
78.1
81
100
191
126
144,3
90,8
146
81
62
151
92
31
108
101
111
143
81
38
99
213
191
115
164
96
258
286
98
134
205
220
92
47
194
394
6674
81.7
92
113
192.5
141
146.0
120.1
Ø
Ø
Ú
Ú
Ø
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ø
Ú
Ú
Ø
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ú
≈
Ø
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ø
Ø
Ú
1 In all the following tables, two criteria have been taken into account in determining if a trend goes up or down: a steady up or
down trend or a 5% difference between the first and the last year.
Table 27. Deprivation of liberty imposed by courts, per 100,000 inhabitants, 1990–1994.
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5.1.3 The Council of Europe data on sanctions
The Council of Europe S.PACE data base includes data on sanctions imposed
by courts. The questions are somewhat more detailed than those in the United
Nations Surveys. Therefore, it is of interest to have a look at these data. Since
deprivation of liberty is the backbone of European criminal justice systems,
the results of the Council of Europe survey can be summarized by calculating
the ratio between other sanctions and unsuspended prison sentences.
Table 28 shows that where day-fines do exist, they are often applied. For
example, in Finland, there are 31.5 times more day-fines imposed than
unsuspended prison sentences. Also, in Germany, day-fines are used about
17 times more frequently than are unsuspended prison sentences, and in
Northern Ireland, the ratio between day-fines and unsuspended prison sen-
tences is 11:1. Suspended sentences are also a frequent way of avoiding the
imposition of a sentence of imprisonment. As table 28 shows, in Switzerland,
for  every  one  unsuspended prison sentence, there  are  more than  three
suspended prison sentences. Correspondingly, in Cyprus, Finland, France,
Germany, and Turkey, the number of suspended prison sentences outweigh
the number of unsuspended prison sentences. Other forms of probation
appear to be a frequently used alternative to a prison sentence in Luxembourg,
and in England and Wales, and to a lesser degree, in Denmark and Sweden.
Country Total
suspension
Partial
suspension
Deferred
sentence
Other
forms of
probation
Day fine Commu-
nity
service
Exemption
of
punishment
Belgium
Cyprus
Denmark
England/Wales
Finland
France
Germany
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Northern Ireland
Romania
***Scotland
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
—
169
36
7
136
204
225
96
54
—
—
***
***
307
224
—
—
8
***
***
13
***
***
18
***
***
***
***
***
***
45
—
***
***
***
—
***
0
0
—
***
***
***
—
***
***
—
25
103
***
***
—
***
504
***
—
***
55
***
***
***
—
—
***
3150
4
1701
***
***
1102
—
***
172
6
***
***
—
4
82
5
15
***
***
0
26
18
34
3
—
***
***
182
1
235
14
8
12
47
***
228
150
***
—
***
— Data not available *** Not applicable
Table 28. The weight of the various sanctions and measures imposed in 1993 per 100 unsuspended
prison sentences.
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5.2 Calculating prison populations
Prison populations and particularly prison overcrowding are important concerns
in almost all European and North American countries. The undesirable effects
of overcrowding are legion, including increases in corrections costs, delays
before imprisonment, and deterioration in living and working conditions for
inmates and correction officers. Overcrowding depends as much on the number
of available cells (i.e., the prison capacity), as on the number of inmates. Both
of these factors vary through time and space.The former factor will be discussed
only in brief here because it merely addresses the result of the problem (section
5.3). Since a real solution to a problem can only be found by trying to cope with
the causes of the problem, the latter factor (i.e. the number of inmates) will be
the main focus of this section (see also section 5.4). The main indicator of the
number of inmates is the prisoner rate. This indicator is obtained by calculating
the number of prisoners on a specific date (or as an annual average) and relating
it to the number of inhabitants in a certain country. The prisoner rate is therefore
a so-called statistic of stock. The prisoner rate is generally expressed as the
number of inmates per 100,000 inhabitants. In 1994 it varied from about 25 in
Cyprus to 580 in Russia (see Table 30).
In order to obtain a more dynamic view of the populations under study, it
is also of interest to have a look at the imprisonment rate, i.e. the number of
persons admitted into prison (also called the flow of prisoners) per 100,000
inhabitants and at the length of the imposed sentences (section 5.5.). As a
matter of fact the prisoner rate is a composite of the imprisonment rate and
the length of the sentences: Stock = (Flow times Length).
5.3 Prison capacity
The main indicator of prison capacity in the Fifth United Nations Survey
is the total number of space (beds) available in penal or correctional
institutions3. The ratio between the number of prison beds and the total
population (“prison space per 100,000 inhabitants”) increases between
1990 and 1994 in somewhat more than half of the countries for which data
are available, but generally decreased in the EU member states. Table 29
shows those trends and the 1994 occupancy rate of prisons (the number
of prisoners per 100 beds) according to the Fifth United Nations Survey
and to the Council of Europe (Council of Europe, Penological Information
Bulletin 1995, 19-20, p. 77).
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3 Questions 20.2, “Total number of spaces (beds) available (in adult prisons)”, and 21.2, “Total number
of spaces (beds) available (in juvenile prisons)” in the Fifth Survey questionnaire.
An examination of Table 29 shows that data on prison beds are provided for
14 Central and Eastern European countries, but for only 6 Western European
countries (Austria, England and Wales, Finland, Northern Ireland, Portugal, and
Scotland). The mean number of prison spaces available for the 20 countries for
which data are available is 221.3 beds per 100,000. Judging by the large standard
deviation (162.8), there is considerable international variation in the number of
prison beds per 100,000 population. Central and Eastern European countries
tend to have a larger number of prison beds available than the EU countries;
however, there is also considerable variation within the group of Central and
Eastern European countries (compare Croatia and Slovenia with less than 100
beds per 100,000 with Russia’s 654.1 beds per 100,000).
Country Prison space
per 100,000
1990
Prison space
per 100,000
1994
Occupancy rate
per 100 places
1994 (UN)
Occupancy rate
per 100 places
1994 (CE)
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
England/Wales
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Moldova
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
106.6
246.7
—
102.8
—
101.7
—
—
—
87.3
78.7
—
—
—
185.5
—
—
—
392.6
—
345.9
337.1
—
130.6
221.1
—
141.7
—
—
78.4
102.1
290.3
—
109.6
—
82.8
—
—
—
95.2
74.2
—
—
—
116.1
—
—
—
384.2
457.4
410.8
360.1
—
118.5
271.5
—
138.1
—
—
83.1
89.6
164.6
—
90.4
—
60.2
—
—
—
99.9
84.0
—
—
—
106.5
—
—
—
—
65.5
87.5
77.3
—
53.0
79.2
—
84.3
—
—
122.8
89.4
—
118.9
—
114.5
—
65.4
106.2
97.8
100.6
73.4
111.5
95.6
168.4
78.2
89.5
94.4
128.6
—
—
—
87.9
93.8
—
—
102.8
86.6
95.5
92.0
126.9
Table 29. Prison space per 100,000 inhabitants and occupancy rate per 100 places.
Table 29. continues...
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There are ten countries for which both United Nations data and Council
of Europe data on occupancy rate are available (Austria, England and Wales,
Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Northern Ireland, Portugal, Russia, Scotland
and Slovakia). With the exception of one country (Hungary), there are only
small divergences between the occupancy rates calculated on the basis of the
Fifth United Nations Survey and the Council of Europe data, suggesting that
both data sources are measuring the same phenomenon.
The United Nations data provide information on prison occupancy rate for
18 countries; the Council of Europe data provide information on 27 countries.
The Fifth United Nations Survey includes occupancy data for 7 countries for
which the Council of Europe lacks any information (Belarus, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Moldova and Slovenia). Only one of these countries (Belarus) has an occu-
pancy rate which is over 100 % of the available places. According to the
Council of Europe data (which provide information on 27 countries), one-third
of the countries exceed the available prison space (Belgium, Canada, the
Czech Republic, England and Wales, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands
and Portugal). If one assumes that a prison is overcrowded only when its
capacity is exceeded, it seems that in about one-third of the countries for which
data are available, prisons are overcrowded. The mean occupancy rate is close
to 100% (88.5% for the Fifth UN Survey data, 97.8% for the Council of Europe
data). It is notable that several Central and Eastern European countries report
an underutilisation of prison beds (for example, Croatia, Kyrgyzstan, the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Slovenia).
Country Prison space
per 100,000
1990
Prison space
per 100,000
1994
Occupancy rate
per 100 places
1994 (UN)
Occupancy rate
per 100 places
1994 (CE)
Russia
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Sweden
Turkey
Ukraine
Variance
Standard deviation
25% quartile
Median
75% quartile
Mean
EU mean
Central and Eastern
Europe mean
—
111.6
139.4
87.9
—
—
285.7
10 584
102.9
101.7
135.0
246.7
176.7
100.7
198.6
1654.1
109.8
167.4
90.4
—
—
309.8
26 496
162.8
98.6
128.3
334.9
221.3
100.4
248.5
88.7
99.1
82.8
57.8
—
—
—
668
25.8
77.3
85.9
99.1
88.5
96.6
86.2
85.0
99.3
93.7
—
91.7
54.0
—
477
21.8
87.9
94.4
106.2
97.8
105.0
90.5
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5.4 The prisoner rate
The prisoner rate varies considerably from one country to another. The mean
prisoner rate for 1995 is 157.9 prisoners per 100,000; the standard deviation
(1995) is about the same magnitude (156.2). Table 30 suggests that the
United States and the Central and Eastern European countries (with a few
exceptions) have the highest prisoner rates among all European and North
American countries. Belarus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the
United States all rank in the top 25% of the prisoner rate. On the other hand,
there are a few Central and Eastern European countries which rank very low
with regard to their number of prisoners per 100,000: Croatia, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Slovenia. Other countries with rela-
tively low prisoner rates are Cyprus, Greece, and the Nordic countries
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden).
Country Prisoner rate
1990
Prisoner rate
1992
Prisoner rate
1994
Prisoner rate
1995
Trend
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
England/Wales
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
90.5
204.7
58.9
122.7
111.0
40.3
32.0
79.4
62.1
88.1
280.6
67.8
82.2
—-
77.8
—-
118.8
40.61
—-
56.61
201,2
326.7
—-
230.7
91.9
49.4
32.5
94,8
314.8
70.9
93.9
112.6
43.0
31.3
135.4
64.4
89.0
292.4
69.5
83.7
66.2
—-
59.5
154.1
38.5
61.6
83.7
216.1
313.5
—-
245.2
90.5
47.8
46.6
91.5
477.8
74.1
99.1
117.9
49.9
25.1
181.5
67.4
95.0
293.6
62.4
90.31
140.9
83.01
71.01
123.7
38.21
58.61
89.6
299.7
359.7
58.1
278.3
109.2
62.8
56.0
76.02
505.03
75.72
103.22
115.03
55.03
26.32
188.02
66.02
99.32
270.03
59.32
89.02
—-
81.02
55.03
120.03
44.42
58.72
87,02
——
375.03
—-
356.02
115.32
54.02
62.02
Ø
Ú
Ú
Ø
Ú
Ú
Ø
Ú
Ú
Ú
≈
Ø
Ú
Ú
≈
≈
≈
≈
≈
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ú
Table 30. Prisoner rate per 100,000 inhabitants, 1990-1995.1
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The number of prisoners increased considerably among European and
North American countries between 1990 and 1994. The total prison popula-
tion for the 29 countries reporting4 was 1,428,589 in 1990, 1,608,700 in 1992,
and 1,775,021 in 1994. In 1990, the mean prisoner rate was 112.3; in 1994,
the mean prisoner rate had increased to 157.9. That increase persists even if
the United States, with its huge prison population, is removed from the list;
the total prison population in Canada and Western Europe was 266,860 in
Country Prisoner rate
1990
Prisoner rate
1992
Prisoner rate
1994
Prisoner rate
1995
Trend
Moldova
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Federation
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
USA
Variance
Standard deviation
25% quartile
Median
75% quartile
Mean
EU mean
Central and Eastern
Europe mean
204.9
46.9
112.3
56.51
—-
91.5
—-
—-
92.6
72.7
51.3
85.51
61.1
76.91
80.6
—-
464.9
8 546
92.4
57.2
81.4
117.2
112.3
77.7
148.5
216.7
49.4
111.8
—-
—-
97.4
—-
520.2
102.8
122.1
54.5
90.41
63.5
77.11
54,5
518,9
14 331
119.7
61.1
89.7
140.1
131.5
80.2
187.1
215.1
56.8
116.4
62.01
163.61
102.1
—-
580.2
108.8
143.5
52.2
105.91
70.4
—-
74.4
—-
553.9
18 269
135.2
62.6
95.0
153.6
145.4
85.4
214.8
275.03
65.03
106.02
55.82
170.03
125.03
206.02
694.02
110.02
147.02
30.03
122.42
66.02
80.82
90.32
392.02
600.03
24 401
156.2
63.5
99.3
158.5
157.9
85.7
262.7
Ú
Ú
≈
≈
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ø
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ú
1 Question 16.1 in the Fifth Survey questionnaire; persons held in incarceration; total.
2 Council of Europe, Penological Information Bulletin.
3 Roy Walmsley, Prison Populations in Europe and North America, HEUNI Papers, No 10, 1997.
Table 30. continues...
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4 The total prison population is admittedly an artificial term, since the dates on which the prison
population was counted vary from country to country, and also the definition of “prisoners” is not
necessarily the same. Among the countries which are not included in this calculation are France, Germany,
Italy, the Russian Federation and Spain, which unfortunately did not give information on their number
of prisoners in 1990, 1992 and/or 1994.
1990, 283,264 in 1992, and 329,281 in 1994. There are a few notable
exceptions to the growth in prisoner rate (Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Slovenia
and Finland), which clearly shows that prison populations can be controlled
(this is particularly the case of Finland, cf. Törnudd 1993) and that prisoner
rates are not destined to increase.
The Fifth United Nations Survey instrument uses the term “incarceration”
to refer to deprivation of liberty. This includes different forms of deprivation
of liberty, such as pre-trial detention (remand imprisonment), detention as a
convicted offender, administrative detention, etc. Therefore, the survey in-
strument divides the total number of incarcerated persons into the following
categories:
– awaiting trial or adjudication;
– sentenced;
– otherwise adjudicated;
– administrative detention;
– incarceration for non-payment of penal fine;
– civil law incarceration.
Since the two main categories are the sentenced prisoners and those
awaiting trial or adjudication, Table 31 shows – for 1994 – the total prisoner
rate, the sentenced prisoner rate, and the pre-trial prisoner rate (those await-
ing trial or adjudication). The four other categories are combined as an “other
prisoners” rate. It should be noted that countries which have similar (sen-
tenced) prisoner rates per 100,000 are likely to differ in the % of the total
prisoner rate consisting of (sentenced) prisoners. Examples are Belgium
(respectively, 36.6 and 49.4%) and Malta (37.1 and 66.3%). Or, conversely,
countries which have a similar proportion of sentenced prisoners out of the
prisoner rate do not necessarily have the same (sentenced) prisoner rates.
Compare Latvia (respectively, 270.8 and 75.3%) and Northern Ireland (87.6
and 75.3%).
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Prisoner
rate 1994
Sentenced Pre-trial Other
Country (= 100%)
per
100,000
popula-
tion
% of
prisoner
rate
per
100,000
popula-
tion
% of
prisoner
rate
per
100,000
popula-
tion
% of
prisoner
rate
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
England/ Wales
Estonia
Finland
Hungary
Italy
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Portugal
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Sweden
Turkey
Variance
Standard deviation
25% quartile
Median
75% quartile
Mean
EU mean
Central and Eastern
Europe mean
91.5
477.8
74.1
99.1
117.9
49.9
25.1
181.5
67.4
95.0
293.6
62.4
123.7
89.6
299.7
359.7
58.1
278.3
109.2
62.8
56.0
215.1
56.8
116.4
102.1
108.8
143.5
52.2
70.4
74.4
11397
106.8
62.7
97.1
153.0
133.7
87.0
194.4
60.1
363.4
36.6
68.1
96.8
36.4
19.4
96.1
49.6
68.5
173.1
51.8
87.2
44.8
229.4
270.8
6.5
197.7
75.6
53.6
37.1
167.1
32.4
87.6
65.1
86.1
105.5
27.6
58.7
34.2
6632
81.4
37.0
66.6
99.0
92.9
59.7
137.0
65.7
76.1
49.4
68.7
82.1
72.9
77.3
52.9
73.6
72.1
59.0
83.0
70.5
50.0
76.5
75.3
11.2
71.0
69.2
85.4
66.3
77.7
57.0
75.3
63.8
79.1
73.5
52.9
83.4
46.0
58.5%
71.6%
76.7%
26.2
114.4
25.9
18.9
18.4
13.0
3.7
85.4
15.5
24.3
115.1
5.7
33.5
42.5
70.3
88.9
51.6
80.6
33.2
7.4
18.4
48.0
19.9
26.9
37.0
19.8
38.0
9.8
11.7
40.2
965
31.1
17.7
26.6
48.9
38.1
24.1
54.2
28.6
23.9
35.0
19.1
15.6
26.1
14.7
47.1
23.0
25.6
39.2
9.1
27.1
47.4
23.5
24.7
88.8
29.0
30.4
11.8
32.9
22.3
35.0
23.1
36.2
18.2
26.5
18.8
16.6
54.0
19.0%
25.7%
35.0%
5.2
0.0
11.6
12.1
2.7
0.5
2.0
0.0
2.3
2.3
5.4
4.9
3.1
2.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.5
1.7
0.5
0.0
4.5
1.9
0.0
2.9
0.0
14.8
0.0
0.0
15
3.9
0.0
1.8
3.5
2.7
3.2
3.1
5.7
0.0
15.7
12.2
2.3
1.0
8.0
0.0
3.4
2.4
1.8
7.9
2.5
2.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.5
2.7
0.9
0.0
7.9
1.6
0.0
2.7
0.0
28.4
0.0
0.0
0.0%
1.7%
4.0%
1 Question 16 in the Fifth Survey questionnaire; Persons held in incarceration; number and type of incarceration: 16.2 Awaiting
trial or adjudication, 16.3 Sentenced. The category “Other” refers to 16.4 Otherwise adjudicated, 16.5 Administrative detention,
16.6 For non-payment of penal fine, 16.7 Civil law incarcerations, and 16.8 Other.
Table 31. Prisoner rate per type of incarceration, 1994.1
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In more than half of the countries, at least two-thirds of the total prison
population have been sentenced for an offence. With two exceptions, the
proportion of the prisoner rate that consists of pre-trial prisoners is below
50% in all countries. The highest pre-trial prisoner rates are to be found in
Liechtenstein (88.8%) and Turkey (54%). However, it should be noted that
the total number of prisoners in Liechtenstein was only 18, and that both
Liechtenstein and Turkey included in the pre-trial prisoner rate persons who
have been sentenced in a court of first instance but who have appealed the
verdict. The high “other prisoners” rate in Slovenia (28.4% of the total
number of inmates) is mainly due to a high administrative detention rate (11.6
per 100,000 inhabitants or 22.2% of all inmates).
Among the convicted prisoners (including juveniles) in 1994, between
1.1% (in Georgia) and 7.0% (in Portugal) are women. In other words, all over
Europe and North America, more than 90% of convicted prison inmates are
men. The only exception to that rule may be the United States, where the
1992 adult convicted female rate was 10.2%. Unfortunately, 1994 US data
on the proportion of women out of all convicted prisoners are unavailable.
The rate of juveniles among the convicted prisoners in 1994 oscillates
between 0.2% in Sweden (where juveniles are defined as those between 15 to
18 years of age) and 16.0% in Scotland (where juveniles are defined as those
between 8 to 21 years of age). The rate of foreign inmates among the convicted
prisoners in 1994 varies – in the few countries which provided this information
– from 0.02% in Latvia and the Russian Federation to 42.1% in Belgium.5
5.5 The imprisonment rate and the length of
sentence
It is not easy to deal with flow data because some multiple entries may be
overlooked by those compiling the statistics, and a number of single entries may
be counted several times. This happens when the data refer to “events” and not
to “persons”. On the one hand, a person who has been convicted of several
offences at different court appearances may be admitted toprison for one offence
and then serve successive sentences without being counted as serving time for
the other offences. On the other hand, inmates who move from one prison to
another and between different forms of imprisonment (such as week-end
detention) may “produce” several admissions for a single sentence. This is why
Table 32 cannot be used for comparisons between countries, but is much more
an indication of the evolution of the number of entries in each country.
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5 It is, however, not clear what the different respondents meant by “foreigners”. On that topic, see
Tomasevski 1994.
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Trend
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia3
Cyprus
Czech Republic3
Denmark
England/Wales
Estonia
Finland
France2
Georgia
Germany2
Greece
Hungary
Iceland2
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania3
Luxembourg2
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands2
Northern Ireland
Norway
Portugal
Russia
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey3
Ukraine
United States
Variance
Standard deviation
25% quartile
Median
75% quartile
Mean
EU mean
Central and Eastern Europe mean
219.5
234.2
173.4
50.4
416.7
64.5
80.5
43.6
300.0
256.0
—-
177.1
140.3
—-
160.9
45.4
172.5
134.3
100.1
599.6
103.6
171.2
74.6
119.2
74.7
137.8
295.2
255.6
112.4
1229.2
335.8
129.7
61.5
185.0
161.5
79.9
55.4
189.7
44478
211.9
80.1
150.6
230.5
198.4
187.3
222.6
236.2
265.3
180.8
60.9
311.8
—
63.1
79.8
277.3
271.5
—
177.0
157.1
—
—
42.4
188.4
119.0
141.4
—
104.5
163.2
55.2
—-
84.0
182.8
301.5
—
105.2
—
356.9
174.6
100.3
155.8
—
94.0
74.4
190.0
7411
86.1
89.0
157.1
213.1
162.6
196.4
92.2
241.1
372.3
189.8
65.7
300.6
37.8
63.3
68.3
283.8
279.9
—
195.4
155.3
110.4
149.2
49.6
198.4
125.0
164.9
706.0
152.9
174.2
59.1
192.3
78.6
187.2
310.5
—
123.3
1225.9
390.6
146.8
92.8
159.6
—
92.9
77.3
194.1
47521
218.0
92.8
159.6
241.1
211.8
203.6
215.7
231.6
454.1
184.7
55.1
431.5
—
54.0
77.4
280.2
275.5
269.6
186.2
140.3
110.1
174.3
53.4
170.3
108.0
173.6
—
192.8
165.0
64.5
185.3
100.6
193.5
318.1
—
115.9
1405.8
432.7
170.0
94.1
164.2
—
90.0
82.4
200.1
55309
235.2
99.0
172.0
241.1
217.8
205.9
214.8
216.9
484.2
169.5
54.6
419.5
30.6
65.9
159.7
289.5
304.3
303.7
171.0
149.1
142.9
208.0
46.7
178.4
107.5
176.3
767.9
244.2
162.6
78.5
173.6
124.4
—
300.1
271.3
80.2
1542.1
411.3
165.9
90.9
161.7
145.5
99.3
107.1
207.7
68719
262.1
107.3
169.5
280.4
238.2
203.4
298.3
≈
Ú
Ø
≈
≈
Ø
≈
Ú
≈
Ú
Ú
Ø
≈
Ú
Ú
≈
≈
Ø
Ú
Ú
Ø
Ú
≈
Ú
Ú
≈
Ú
Ø
Ú
Ú
Ú
≈
≈
Ø
Ú
Ú
Ú
1 Question 25.1 in the Fifth Survey questionnaire; Number of admissions to prison per year; total.
2 Data from the Council of Europe, Penological Information Bulletin.
3 Data only for sentenced persons, for Lithuania admissions only of new persons.
Table 32. Imprisonment rate per 100,000 inhabitants, 1990-1994.1
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In the 28 North American and European countries which reported such
data6, the total number of admissions increased from 1,005,409 in 1990 to
1,150,253 in 1992 and to 1,236,153 in 1994. If we again subtract the United
States from the total, the total number of admissions still increases from
531,311 in 1990 to 654,497 in 1992 and to 694,719 in 1994. The mean
number of prison admissions was 198.4 in 1990, and the mean number of
prison admissions was 238.2 in 1994 – a 20% increase in the average number
of prison admissions in this 5-year period.
The country trends in prison admissions are even more interesting when
compared to the trends in prisoner rates. Somewhat surprisingly, the data on
changes in the prison population do not necessarily follow the data on
changes in the number of admissions to prison. In some countries, a decrease
in the number of incarcerated persons (i.e., prison admissions) has been
accompanied by an increase in the prison population (Belgium, Croatia,
Luxembourg and Portugal). In other countries a stable imprisonment rate has
been accompanied by a decrease in the prisoner rate (Austria, Bulgaria,
Cyprus and Slovenia) or by an increase in the prisoner rate (Canada, Den-
mark, France and Sweden). And finally both a decreasing (Iceland) or an
increasing  (Estonia,  Germany and  Norway)  imprisonment rate  may  be
accompanied by a stable prison population.
Another apparent oddity is that in 1994 countries such as Austria, Denmark
and Germany are in the top quartile for the imprisonment rate but below the
50%  mark  for the  prisoner rate, whereas countries  such as  the  Czech
Republic, Georgia and Moldova are below the 50% mark for the imprison-
ment rate but in the top quartile for the prisoner rate.
These apparent anomalies suggest that the prisoner rate may be much more
influenced by a factor other than the imprisonment rate. That key factor is
the length of the time spent in prison.
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6 Among the countries which are not included in this calculation are France, Germany, the Russian
Federation and Spain which unfortunately did not give information on the number of prison admissions
in 1990, 1992, and/or 1994.
In Table 33, the data for Canada include only some provincial institutions.
The Canadian data do not include those offenders held in federal institutions
who, by definition, have sentences of two years or more.
Only 15 countries provided data on the average length of prison sentence
actually served by adults in prison. Table 33 shows that the length of
sentences has increased in a majority of the countries which have provided
that information. The average length of prison sentences imposed in Europe
and North America also increased between 1990 (69.9 weeks) and 1994 (76
weeks). The comparison of the different trends (in Tables 31, 32, and 33)
often suggests an inverse relationship between imprisonment rate and length
of stay (i.e. higher rate of admissions is associated with a shorter length of
stay once admitted), and the trend in the prisoner rate (i.e., number of people
incarcerated on a given day) seems much more related to the trend in the
length of the sentences than to the trend in the imprisonment rate. Therefore,
the length of the sanctions seems to be a determining factor in the explanation
Country 1990 1994
Trend
sentence
length
Trend
imprison-
ment rate
Trend
prisoner
rate
Belarus
Belgium
Canada
Cyprus
Denmark
England and Wales
Finland
Hungary
Latvia
Netherlands
Norway
Slovakia
Slovenia
Switzerland
United States
Variance
Standard deviation
25% quartile
Median
75% quartile
Mean
EU mean
Central and Eastern Europe mean
198
73
3
11
14
28
29
220
218
25
11
58
56
17
87
6021
77.6
14
29
87
69.9
33.8
150.0
239
82
4
9
15
24
33
250
218
32
13
41
48
23
109
7629
87.3
15
33
109
76
37.2
159.2
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ø
Ú
Ø
Ú
Ú
=
Ú
Ú
Ø
Ø
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ø
≈
≈
≈
Ú
Ø
≈
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ú
≈
Ø
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ø
Ú
Ú
Ø
≈
Ú
Ú
≈
Ú
Ø
Ú
Ú
1 Question 18.13 in the Fifth Survey questionnaire; Average length of prison sentence actually served in prison, for all offences.
Table 33. Average length (in weeks) of prison sentences actually served by adults in prison,
1990-1994, and trends in sentence length, imprisonment rate and prisoner rate. 1
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of the prisoner rate. The 1994 correlation7 between those two variables
(length of sentence and prisoner rate) is .60 (p = .032), whereas the correlation
between the prisoner rate and the flow factors is lower andnot significant.8 Thus,
the prisoner rate appears to depend more on the length of the sanctions than on
the number of people sent to prison. If the goal of a country is to reduce its
prisoner rate, it seems therefore more important to try to find ways to reduce the
average length of the prison terms than to reduce the number of admissions.
Table 33 also gives an insight into the differences in length of average
sentences. These range (in 1994) from 4 weeks in Canada to 250 weeks
(roughly five years) in Hungary. This indicator certainly depends on a number
of variables, such as the use of remand detention, early release (parole), and
perhaps even a confusion in the mind of the person responding to the Fifth
United Nations Survey between weeks and months. However, the wide range
seems to justify the conclusion that the length of sentence reflects primarily
the fundamental premise of criminal policy in a given country, which in fact
determines whether it is more or less “punitive”.
The data on persons released on parole (conditional release of a prisoner
which allows the individual to serve the remainder of the sentence outside
the prison) during the year, or on the number of parolees on a given day in
the year provide additional insight on what can be termed “punitiveness”. In
1994, between zero (in Bulgaria) and 158 (in the United States) persons per
100,000 inhabitants were paroled from prison, and on a given day of the year
between zero (Bulgaria) and 265 (the United States) per 100,000 population
were on parole.
With regard to gender, the survey instrument used in the Fifth United
Nations Survey did not ask for the length of the sentences by gender.
However, data on the imprisonment rate have been given by sex. In 1994
between 1.2% (in Georgia) and 11.1% (in Greece) of persons admitted into
prison were women, and in most of the countries, the proportion of women
entering the prisons is higher than the proportion of women staying in the
prisons. That suggests that the prison sentences served by men tend to be
longer than those served by women and therefore, that men are punished
more severely than women. Although this could be an effect of a sexist
criminal justice system, it is more likely due to the effect of the lesser
seriousness of the offences committed by women. To place this in context,
Table 34 shows the proportion of women at different stages throughout the
entire criminal justice system.
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7 Spearman’s correlation coefficient (Rho).
8 Rho = .55 (N.S.) for the relation with the incarceration rate and Rho = .42 (N.S.) for the correlation
with the delivered deprivations of liberty rate.
Country Suspected Prosecuted Convicted Admitted
to prison
In the prison
population
Trend
Andorra
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
England and Wales
Estonia
Finland
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
FER Macedonia
Moldova
Netherlands1
Northern Ireland
Portugal
Russian Federation
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Sweden
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
25% quartile
Median
75% quartile
—
19.1
6.2
16.6
—
8.8
16.5
4.8
5.5
—
18.6
—
7.3
14.1
5.7
—
12.0
10.3
—
12.4
11.6
9.0
11.4
—
9.3
—
—
—
13.1
—
7.2
11.5
17.4
5.7
15.5
20.0
7.25
11.5
16.0
10.8
—
5.9
—
—
—
—
9.9
6.3
7.7
14.4
12.1
7.3
15.8
—
15.4
—
9.4
17.0
—
11.3
—
—
6.0
—
12.3
11.0
12.8
9.1
13.2
6.7
—
—
5.8
—
—
7.0
10.8
13.0
11.7
18.2
4.5
13.6
—
7.2
13.4
7.9
5.0
8.6
11.8
12.7
7.2
15.8
—
17.5
12.8
8.8
16.2
3.5
—
9.5
5.4
5.1
7.6
10.7
11.0
8.8
9.1
13.6
4.7
12.4
15.9
5.2
—
—
7.2
9.5
13.4
—
7.0
—
6.2
8.1
3.8
8.8
3.3
4.1
4.4
5.7
5.4
2.2
4.0
1.2
—
11.1
5.7
8.0
—
2.6
8.0
4.7
1.1
1.5
—
4.0
8.8
—
6.7
—
4.5
5.5
2.3
4.5
8.4
3.6
4.7
7.5
—
4.9
—
3.4
5.0
3.8
—
2.8
1.3
3.1
—
3.6
1.9
3.8
2.0
—
6.8
5.4
4.5
3.1
1.8
4.4
2.8
1.3
2.1
—
1.8
7.0
—
2.9
3.0
5.3
5.4
2.3
3.4
—
2.2
3.3
4.8
Ú
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ú
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
1 The data from the Fifth Survey used for the table are: Suspected-question 5.2 Number of persons brought into formal contact
with the criminal justice system, female; Prosecuted-question 8.2 Number of persons prosecuted, female; Convicted-question
15.3 Number of persons convicted in the criminal courts, female; Admitted to prison-question 25.2 Number of admissions to
prison per year, female; In the prison population-question 26.3 Number of convicted prisoners, female.
Table 34. Proportion (in %) of women through the different stages of the criminal justice system,
1994.1
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The further one goes into the criminal justice system, the lower the
percentage of women among all those being processed. This decrease in the
proportion of women can be found in every European and North American
country, with the possible exceptions of Andorra and Germany (for which
only data about prosecuted and convicted women are available). Next to the
fact that women are far less involved in (reported) crime than men, the most
noticeable difference between females and males is that it seems much easier
for courts to send men to prison than it is to deprive women of their liberty.
Thus, on the average, less than 4 % (3.6%) of the persons admitted to prison
are female, which is exactly half of the average proportion of women
convicted (7.2%). Once the decision to impose a prison term is made, judges
additionally are more severe with men than they are with women (with the
exception of Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mol-
dova, Slovenia and Turkey).
Since the questionnaire used in the Fifth United Nations Survey did not
ask for such data, it is unfortunately impossible to make offence-specific
tables about the proportion of women at each stage. It is therefore not clear
if that gender difference is the result of differential treatment by gender or -
which is prima facie more likely – of different crime patterns.
5.6 Patterns in the use of imprisonment
The preceding has shown some basic patterns in the use of imprisonment in
Europe and North America:
a) The overall use of imprisonment has increased between 1990 and
1994. In several countries the number of prison sentences imposed and
the number of prison admissions have in fact decreased during this
period. Nevertheless, it seems that an increase in the length of the prison
terms actually served compensates for such a decrease in admissions and
even results in an increase in prison populations. Some interesting
exceptions (Austria, Cyprus, Finland and Slovenia) show that prison
populations can be controlled and that prisoner rates are not destined to
increase.
b) There appear to be substantial differences in the way imprisonment
is used. Some countries seem to have made a deliberate policy decision
to decrease the use of imprisonment (as with Finland), while others seem
to have made a deliberate policy decision to increase its use (as with the
United States). Some countries sentence only a few offenders to long
terms of imprisonment, others sentence many offenders to short terms,
and still others sentence many offenders to long terms. The Nordic
countries appear to represent one end of the spectrum, with the Central
and Eastern European countries (with a few exceptions) as well as the
United States at the other end.
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c) The length of the sentences seems to be the main factor in the
explanation of the prisoner rate. The length of sentence depends
primarily on the fundamental premise of criminal policy in a given
country, which in fact determines whether it is more or less punitive.
Thus, to reduce the prison population a criminal justice system has to
find means to reduce the average length of prison terms rather than to try
to reduce the number of admissions – although also a reduction in the
number of admissions can of course contribute to a decrease in the prison
population.
5.7 The severity of the sanctions
The severity of sanctions can be operationalized by several variables. Some
of them have already been mentioned: the number of sentences of deprivation
of liberty imposed by the courts per 100,000 inhabitants (Table 27), the
imprisonment rate (Table 32), the average length of sentence (Table 33) and
the prisoner rate (Table  30). The ratio between suspects and custodial
sentences, and the proportion of sentences which are custodial are two other
“measures” of severity. Table 35 shows all these factors for 1994.
Country
Sentences of
deprivation of
liberty
imposed per
100,000
Imprison-
ment rate
Average
length of
sentences
Prisoner
rate
Custodial
sentences
for 100
suspects
Proportion
of
custodial
sentences
Andorra
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
England and Wales
Estonia
Finland
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
146.2
81.5
61.7
151.4
103.5
92.0
108.6
—
30.8
107.7
—
101.4
111.0
143.4
80.7
37.7
—
98.8
—
216.9
—
484.2
169.5
54.6
419.5
30.6
65.9
159.7
289.5
304.3
303.7
171.0
142.9
—
46.7
178.4
—
—
—
239
82
91
4
—
9
—
15
24
238
33
370
—
—
250
—
91.5
—
477.8
74.1
99.1
117.9
49.9
25.1
181.5
67.4
95.0
293.6
62.4
140.9
—
—
123.7
—
3.2
31.5
23.7
—
9.3
4.5
—
20.8
—
—
—
17.9
3.4
55.8
—
27.7
8.5
14.4
9.9
39.9
33.1
26.0
82.0
29.8
—
36.0
22.0
—
4.4
27.3
9.6
53.2
6.9
95.9
12.9
Table 35. Operationalization of the severity of the criminal justice system, 1994.
Table 35. continues...
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If one would take the first column of Table 35 – the number of sentences
of deprivation of liberty imposed per 100,000 – as the measure of punitive-
ness, seven rather different countries (Italy, Kazakhstan, Moldova, the Neth-
erlands, the Russian Federation, Scotland and Turkey) would rank in the top
quartile. On the other hand, if one uses the imprisonment rate as the measure
of punitiveness, only two of these countries (the Russian Federation and
Scotland) would rank in the top quartile, together with Belarus, Canada,
Denmark, England and Wales, Estonia and Northern Ireland.
Country
Sentences of
deprivation of
liberty
imposed per
100,000
Imprison-
ment rate
Average
length of
sentences
Prisoner
rate
Custodial
sentences
for 100
suspects
Proportion
of
custodial
sentences
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Norway
Portugal
Russian Federation
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
Variance
Standard deviation
25% quartile
Median
75% quartile
Mean
EU mean
Central and Eastern
Europe mean
213.1
191.4
—
115.3
—
163.7
—
96.4
—
258.2
286.4
98.3
—
133.8
205.0
220.0
92.2
47.2
—
193.9
394.4
—
—
6 299
79.4
92.2
109.8
191.4
138.9
141.9
120.1
176.3
—
248.7
767.9
—
244.2
—
78.5
173.6
124.4
—
300.1
271.3
80.2
1542.1
411.3
165.9
90.9
161.7
145.5
99.3
107.1
207.7
73 910
271.9
107.1
172.3
289.5
248.1
211.6
298.3
—
—
146
218
11
—
—
—
—
—
32
—
13
—-
260
—
41
48
—
23
—
—
109
12 097
110.0
19.0
48.0
228.0
107.4
37.2
195.0
89.6
—
299.7
359.7
58.1
278.3
109.2
62.8
56.0
215.1
56.8
116.4
—
102.1
580.2
108.8
143.5
52.2
70.4
—
74.4
—
553.9
21353
146.1
65.1
102.1
198.3
160.2
87.0
218.1
16.4
29.9
—
22.0
—
28.6
—
8.6
—
63.0
—
—
—
—
21.0
—-
10.4
2.9
—
—
96.2
—
—
527
23.0
8.5
20.8
29.3
24.1
12.7
23.3
60.1
40.1
—
29.1
—
44.4
—
30.7
—
83.2
44.5
20.9
—
44.9
37.3
22.3
20.8
14.6
—
18.4
32.1
—
—
501.8
22.4
18.4
29.8
44.4
33.8
31.4
37.9
Table 35. continues...
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The average length of sentence is a third possible measure of punitiveness.
(However, only a small number of countries provided data on this.) Three of
the countries ranking in the top 25% (Belarus, Estonia and the Russian
Federation) also ranked high on one or both of first two measures of
punitiveness; two other countries (Georgia and Hungary) were not among
the most punitive as measured by the number of sentences of deprivation of
liberty imposed per 100,000 or the imprisonment rate.
According to a fourth possible measure of punitiveness (the prisoner rate),
Belarus, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, the Russian Fed-
eration and the United States are among the most punitive. Again, some of
these countries also ranked high on the other punitiveness indicators (Belarus,
Estonia and the Russian Federation), whereas the others did not. Examining
Table 35 for international data on the number of custodial sentences per 100
suspects – a fifth possible measure of punitiveness – shows that Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Turkey rank in the top quartile.
Finally, the proportion of custodial sentences may serve as a sixth possible
measure of punitiveness. Using 44.4% as the cut-off point (the 75th percen-
tile), Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Moldova, the Netherlands
and Portugal all could be considered high on punitiveness as measured by
the proportion of custodial sentences. Keeping in mind that one needs to be
extremely cautious in drawing generalizations from these indicators, it is
worth noting that, although several (mostly Central and Eastern European)
countries rank high on several of the measures of punitiveness, some coun-
tries score high on one (or more) measure(s) of punitiveness and low on others
(examples are the United States and Canada).
Answering the question of which is the best indicator of the severity of the
sanctions requires a philosophical discussion on punishment and its purposes.
However, as has already been mentioned, the length of sentence and the
number of persons in prison at any one time depend primarily on the funda-
mental premise of criminal policy, which in fact determines whether this
criminal policy is more or less “punitive”. Thus – in our opinion – the latter
are the preferred indicators of the punitiveness of a criminal justice system.
Nonetheless, punitiveness can be considered at two levels. The first, the
macro-sociological level, considers objective “attitudes” towards punish-
ment, i.e. social characteristics such as the severity of the sentence imposed
by the courts on the offenders. This is the punitiveness to which reference
was made above. The second, a more micro-sociological level of punitive-
ness, considers public opinion-based subjective attitudes towards punish-
ment, i.e. the attitudes of the persons who live in a given society and their
desire for more or less punitive sentences.
The latter, i.e. subjective punitiveness, has been operationalized by the
question in the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) asking the respondent
what would be the most appropriate response in the case of a 21-year-old man
who, having stolen a colour television set, is found guilty of a burglary for the
second time. The options offered to the respondents range from a fine, commu-
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nity service, suspended sentence, and imprisonment with variable length, to life
imprisonment.
To know if the criminal justice system responds to what people expect of it,
we analysed the relation between both objective and subjective measures of
punitiveness. The results of this analysis are not statistically significant for five
of the six of the measures of severity of punishment used in the present study
(see Table 34); the exception is the prisoner rate. Figure 5 illustrates this point.
Figure 5 clearly shows that the link between the prisoner rate per 100,000
inhabitants and the national percentage of ICVS respondents who favoured
imprisonment is very strong and significant.9 However, this finding does not
allow us to  determine the  direction of the  causality: is it  because the
population of a given country is very punitive that courts tend to send a large
number of persons to prison, or is it because there are many people in prison
(because of a high degree of objective punitiveness) that the respondents tend
to come to favour prison sentences? Due to the transverse nature of a
victimization survey, this question cannot be answered on the basis of the
present data (see the discussion in Beckett 1997).
Prisoner rate per 100,00 inhabitants
Spearman’s Rho = .64, P = .007
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Figure 5. Prisoner rate per 1994 and ICVS respondents who regard imprisonment as
an appropriate sanction for the case of a 21 year old recidivist burglar.
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9 If a recalculation of the same correlation is done excluding the extreme cases of the Russian Federation,
Slovakia, and the United States, the result obtained is identical: Rho = .53, p = .042
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Appendix A
The Crime Guide
The Crime Guide is a database consisting of data from various sources. The
primary sources of data for the Crime Guide are the Fifth United Nations
Survey on Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems 1990-
1994, and the International Crime Victim Surveys (collected in 1989, 1992,
and 1996).
The data in the Crime Guide are divided into five separate spreadsheets:
crime and attitudes, motivation and opportunity, policy indicators, the crimi-
nal justice system, and sanctions. In addition to these basic spreadsheets there
are three sheets with the rank-based indices: crime indices, motivation and
opportunity indices, and operation of the criminal justice system indices.
The 55 countries of Crime Guide are divided into three geographical
regions: Western Europe (Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark,
England and Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Germany (W), Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Northern Ire-
land, Norway, Portugal, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
united Kingdom), Central and Eastern Europe (Albania, Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazachstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithaunia, FYR
Macedonia,  Moldova,  Poland, Romania, Russian federation,  Slovakia,
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia) and North America
(Canada, United States).
The basic data sources used in creating the five main spreadsheets are the
following:
1. Crimes and attitudes
Basic data on crime and victimisation
Crime part
Fifth UN Survey: recorded crimes in 1990 and 1994
ICVS: all crimes (11 crimes, excluding corruption and consumer fraud),
burglary, sexual offences, assaults and threats, violence against women:
(sexual offences, assaults and threats (five year rates), sexual assaults includ-
ing rape, attempted rape and indecent assault), other thefts (theft of motor-
cycle/moped, theft of bicycle, theft of personal belongings), car crimes (car
theft, theft from car), car theft (percentage of car thefts in which the car was
not recovered, 5 year observation), pickpocketing (personal theft involving
pickpocketing), car vandalism, robbery, corruption
Transparency International: corruption index 1995
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World Competitiveness Yearbook (by the International Institute for Manage-
ment Development): improper practices in the public sphere, harassment and
violence in the workplace, alcohol and drug use at the workplace (all on a
scale from 10-0)
Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken: bank robberies per bank
HEUNI Paper on Motor Vehicle Theft in Europe (by Liukkonen, M.): regis-
tered, stolen, and not- traced motor vehicles
World Health Organization: homicide data/ 100 000 population 1992
Interpol (contained in the United Nations International Study on Firearm
Regulation, see also Interpol 1995): homicide data/ 100 000 population 1994
Centre for Disease Control (contained in the United Nations International
Study on Firearm Regulation, see also Krug et al 1998): homicide data/ 100
000 population
Attitudes and fear of crime:
ICVS: % of population that avoid places at night, feel unsafe after dark index
(average of four categories 1=low, 4=high), % of population that indicate that
people in their neighbourhood help each other
2. Motivation and opportunity
Basic data on social and development indicators
World Bank: GNP/capita 1990 and 1994
Human Development Report 1995 and 1997: human development index,
gender-related development index, enrolment ratios, female share of income,
parliamentary seats held by women, female unpaid family workers, female
economic activity rate, real GDP/capita, richest and poorest 20%
UN Compendium on Human Settlements Statistics 1995: urbanisation
UN Statistical Yearbook 1994: unemployment
UNICEF: women at top levels of government
UNESCO (http://unescostat.unesco...): female education
ICVS: percentage of female working, divorce rates, type of housing, going
out in the evening, satisfaction with income, urbanisation, car, motorcycle,
bicycle ownership, firearm and handgun ownership, burglary prevention
(burglar alarm, special locks and window grills)
Dutch Ministry of Justice (in Van Dijk, The Narrow Margins of the Dutch
Drugs Policy): hard drug addicts
World Drink Trends 1996: strong alcohol, beer, and wine consumption
World Values Study (http://www.icpsr...): justification of postmaterialism,
misdemeanours, small crimes, and deviate lifestyles, and intolerance of
minorities
UN Study on Firearm  Regulation:  license system,  number and rate  of
licenses, number and rate of firearm owners, number and rate of firearms,
houses with at least one firearm
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3. Policy indicators
Basic data on reporting behaviour, attitudes toward
the police and punishment, number of private security
personnel
ICVS:
– victims of burglary, robbery, sexual offences and assaults & threats were
asked if they received victim support from a specialised agency;
– if no, if such support would have been useful;
– all victims were asked if the incident was reported to the police, the
reporting rates for the 11 crimes, contact crimes (robbery, sexual offences,
assaults & threats), burglary, and assaults against women
– victims of theft from car, burglary, robbery, sexual offences and assaults
& threats who did report, were asked if they were satisfied with the way
the police handled the report
– all respondents were asked if they are satisfied with the way the police
controls crime in general, all respondents were asked what type of pun-
ishment they feel is appropriate for a repeated burglary (if prison detention
is preferred, the duration of the preferred sentence was asked);
– victims of corruption were asked who the corrupted government official
was (the percentage of victims saying that this official was a police officer)
Dutch Ministry of Justice (in De Waard, The Private Security Industry): total
police personnel and rate per 100 000 population, total security personnel
and rate of security personnel per 100 000 population, police and private
personnel per 100 000 population, rate of privatesecurity personnel per police
personnel
World’s Women 1995 (United Nations): NGO’s working on violence against
women
Interpol: clearance rate
World Competitiveness Yearbook (by the International Institute for Manage-
ment Development): security; confidence that person and property is pro-
tected, confidence in the fair administration of justice in society (both on a
scale from 10-0)
4. Criminal justice system
Basic data on criminal justice personnel and
financial resources of the criminal justice system
Fifth UN Survey: number of and rate per 100 000 population, and female
shares, of police, prosecutors, judges and prison personnel
Fifth UN Survey: financial resources allocated to police, prosecution, courts,
and prisons, share of salaries per total financial resources allocated to the cjs,
total sums and shares of all budgetary resources
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5. Sanctions
Basic data on the length and use of sanctions
Walmsley (HEUNI Paper No. 10): prisoner rate 1995, prison populations in
1985, 1990, and 1995, percentage of juveniles in the prison population 1995,
pre-trial prison population
Fifth UN Survey: suspects, juvenile suspects, incarcerated persons, prose-
cuted persons, remand lengths, pre-trial detention, convictions, imprison-
ment, sentences served, persons awaiting trial, admissions to prison
Council of Europe: imprisonment length, sentences ordered, imprisoned
population, suicides in prison, convicted persons according to offence: rape,
assault
ICVS Data in the Crime Guide 1
Levels of aggregation
COUNTRIES AND SWEEPS. There were three sweeps of the ICVS: 1989,
1992 and 1996. However, some surveys were done in other years: Spain, (the
region of Malaga in 1993 and 1994). In the Crime Guide, these were added
to the 1992 sweep. Estonia 1995, was added to the 1996 sweep. Seven surveys
were done in 1997 (Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia,
and Ukraine). These were also added to the 1996 sweep. For the Crime Guide,
all  available data from a country are taken together. For the items on
victimisation there is a time frame of five years or one year and for the
follow-up items on victimisation there is information on the last time a person
was victimised. The rest of the items have no time frame as the figures reflect
the situation/opinion of the respondents at the time of the survey. For some
of the items on victimisation, there is a breakdown by year and gender.
NATION-WIDE, URBAN AND RURAL. There are two types of surveys
in the ICVS. In all the industrialised countries, the surveys were nation-wide.
For most of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the surveys were
restricted to the capital cities. For some of these countries, the surveys were
extended to a rural area in the country, where about 200 interviews were done.
148
1 The ICVS data was provided by Leiden University, the Netherlands.
Victimisation
In the ICVS, there are data on 11 crimes (car theft, theft from car, car
vandalism, theft of motorcycle/moped, theft of bicycle, burglary, attempted
burglary, robbery, theft of personal belongings, sexual offences (women
only), assaults and threats, and corruption and consumer fraud. The last two
were partially added in the survey of 1992 and are therefore missing in the
1989 survey. All the victimisation statistics are prevalence rates, that is,
the percentage of respondents who have been victimised at least once.
The respondents were asked if they have been a victim in the past five
years. Since the surveys were done in the beginning of the year, the time
frames are 1984-1988 for the 1989 sweep, 1987-1991 for the 1992 sweep
and 1991-1995 for the 1996 sweep. The time frames are mentioned in the
labels of the variables in the Crime Guide (no time frame is mentioned in
those cases where  the three sweeps are taken together).
All victims were asked when the victimisation happened, was it this year
(a period of 2 or 3 months), last year (1988 for the 1989 sweep, 1991 for the
1992 sweep and 1995 for the 1996 sweep) or before that. These years are
mentioned in the labels of the variables.
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Appendix B
The Indices
The Crime Guide offers an enormous amount of data form several sources.
This totals up to more than 120 figures for each country for the crimes alone.
Sometimes this is too much to handle. It is worthwhile to reduce them to a
lesser number of variables that can serve as benchmarks.
The first step is to decide on how many categories of crimes should be
created, combining all into one index does not do justice to the wide range
of different crimes. Going towards 20 is too much, and we would not meet
the purpose of this exercise. We came up with eight indices, of which one is
a combination of two others. These indices cover a wide range of different
types of crimes. Not all types of crimes are covered, simply because for some
we do not have international comparative data. Not all of the data was used,
some of them did not fit the profile of the index. These indices never replace
the original data, it is up to the researcher to decide to use the indices or the
original data.
Below,  the  computational method is  described  and  evaluated, and a
description of the crime indices plus the list of variables that were used to
compute them are added. The variables are marked with the numbers as they
appear in the Crime Guide.
Computing the indices
For  each of the constituting  variables, a ranking over the  countries  is
computed, the country with the lowest score gets value one, the highest rank
number depends on the number of countries for which the data is available.
Since that number is not the same for the several sources, we need to
standardise this ranking. This is done by dividing the rank by the number of
countries for which that data is available and multiplying by 100. If data from
one source is missing, the index for that country is based on the data from
the remaining other sources.
Consistency of the indices
Although the data for each index come from different sources and are
therefore different, they measure the same types of crime, and should have
high correlations amongst each other. To evaluate this, the consistency of the
index, Cronbach’s alpha1, is computed. This alpha is based on those countries
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1 Cronbach’s alpha can be interpreted as the average correlation between the constituting variables
within a scale. More information on this measure can be found in any statistical manual.
that have no missing valves on any of the constituting variables. As described
above, the index itself is available for more countries. The consistency for
burglary is 0.55, this is acceptable, all others are good.
In case several surveys were carried out (in 1989, 1992 and 1996), these
surveys were taken together for the indices on burglary, non-fatal violence,
violence against women, motorvehicle crimes, opportunities for crime, and
police performance.
Separate victimisation rates were computed for the nation-wide surveys,
the main cities and the rural areas for the indices on burglary, non-fatal
violence, violence against women, motorvehicle crimes, corruption, and
police performance.
Burglary
V4AR V Survey2: rate of burglaries recorded by the police 1990
V4BR V Survey: rate of burglaries recorded by the police 1994
IN2 ICVS3 national: percentage of the respondents who have been
a victim of burglary in the year preceding the survey, average
annual rate 1988–1995
IC2 ICVS city: percentage of the respondents who have been a
victim of burglary in the year preceding the survey, average
annual rate 1988–1995
Index Number of
countries
Number of
variables
Cronbach’s
alpha
burglary
serious violence against persons
homicide
nonfatal violence
violence against women
motor vehicle crimes
petty crimes
corruption*
15
7
10
23
19
11
23
8
5
11
5
6
5
5
3
5
0.55
0.87
0.71
0.81
0.81
0.88
0.85
0.87
*If we include data on corruption from the UN Crime Survey (total recorded bribery crimes in 1990 and 1994),
the consistency for the corruption scale cannot be computed because there are too many missing valves. The
correlation between these two variables and the resulting corruption scale is very low (less than 0.20). Therefore
the UN data was kept out of the index.
Consistency of the indices
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2 V Survey: the United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems
3 ICVS: International Crime Victim Surveys: data are available for nation-wide surveys, urban areas
and rural areas
IR2 ICVS rural: percentage of the respondents who have been
a victim of burglary in the year preceding the survey, average
annual rate 1988–1995
Country BURGL v4ar v4br in2 ic2 ir2
Burglary
index
Rate of
burglaries
recorded
by 100 000
population
1990
Rate of
burglaries
recorded
by 100 000
population
1994
ICVS
national:
burglary
averaged
rate
1988-95
ICVS
city:
burglary
averaged
rate
1988-95
ICVS
rural:
burglary
averaged
rate
1988-95
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
England/Wales
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Germany (W)
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
79
38
04
17
61
94
79
37
23
75
81
98
40
64
82
25
39
52
61
25
68
57
59
37
18
27
1.155
17
71
1.427
489
174
1.991
1.432
710
292
744
111
127
250
169
1.123
16
198
1.534
1.326
405
176
2.445
1.936
840
356
769
215
203
198
445
198
0,9
2,2
3,3
3,1
2,7
5,0
0,6
2,4
1,3
2,4
4,1
0,8
3,4
0,2
1,5
2,7
5,8
4,0
1,0
4,0
4,5
7,2
0,4
4,2
4,3
1,8
2,5
2,8
4,0
2,9
5,5
2,3
0,4
3,8
1,1
2,2
2,8
2,8
2,0
3,7
0,7
1,9
2,9
1,1
2,2
7,6
2,2
2,7
1,3
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Serious violence
Non-fatal violence
IN4 ICVS national: percentage of the respondents who have been
a victim of assault and threat, average annual rate 1988–1995
IC4 ICVS city: percentage of the respondents who have been a victim
of assault and threat, average annual rate 1988–1995
IR4 ICVS rural: percentage of the respondents who have been a victim
of assault and threat, average annual rate 1988–1995
IN16 ICVS national: percentage of the respondents who have been a
victim of robbery in the year preceding the survey, average annual
rate 1988–1995
IC16 ICVS city: percentage of the respondents who have been a victim
of robbery in the year preceding the survey, average annual rate
1988–1995
IR16 ICVS rural: percentage of the respondents who have been a victim
of robbery in the year preceding the survey, average annual rate
1988–1995
Homicide (homicide index, including murder (premeditated) and
manslaughter)
V5AR V Survey: rate of homicides recorded/100000 population in 1990
V5BR V Survey :rate of homicides recorded/100000 population in 1994
O6 WHO4: homicide rate 1992 (/100000 population)
O7 Interpol homicide rate 1992 (/100000 population)
O8 CDC5: homicides/100 000 population 1994
Country BURGL v4ar v4br in2 ic2 ir2
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Federation
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom
USA
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
60
50
25
43
29
36
59
76
45
43
54
18
67
80
56
687
932
152
46
1.994
383
400
452
1.800
1.230
806
1.036
86
134
1.722
805
537
360
1.609
1.041
2,3
1,3
0,7
2,0
1,7
3,4
1,9
1,6
1,3
1,1
3,3
3,5
3,3
4,2
2,5
1,1
2,5
2,0
6,5
2,8
2,4
2,6
1,6
3,6
3,9
2,9
2,0
1,1
0,1
1,8
2,9
1,7
3,1
1,3
2,1
1,0
1,1
3,2
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SERVIO VIO HOM in4 ic4 ir4
Country Serious
violence
index
Non-fatal
violence
index
homicide
index
ICVS national:
assault and
threat
averaged rate
1988-95
ICVS city:
assault and
threat
averaged rate
1988-95
ICVS rural:
assault and
threat
averaged rate
1988-95
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
England/Wales
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Germany (W)
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
52
18
80
22
68
59
44
71
60
51
14
50
45
41
96
58
31
70
44
39
28
44
08
48
88
73
67
65
33
30
35
63
42
52
12
56
37
79
73
26
49
66
97
55
30
61
43
13
37
65
48
63
25
38
60
18
80
33
68
62
54
68
44
68
14
55
45
04
95
62
32
82
44
16
28
57
08
61
88
88
92
72
33
35
29
63
14
2,1
1,9
4,3
3,0
3,9
5,4
4,0
2,8
3,1
0,8
3,0
3,3
3,8
3,2
2,8
3,5
0,9
4,9
4,6
3,3
3,2
4,4
7,5
5,4
3,5
4,2
4,0
1,7
1,2
4,9
2,6
3,3
2,4
2,9
6,3
2,4
1,8
2,0
4,1
2,9
3,7
4,0
3,5
2,6
2,3
2,7
0,6
2,6
2,1
2,7
3,8
3,1
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4 WHO: United Nations World Health Organization
5 CDC: Centre for Disease Control (in United Nations International Study of Firearm Regulation and
Krug et.al 1998)
SERVIO VIO HOM in4 ic4 ir4
Northern Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Federation
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom
USA
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
55
32
71
55
56
93
37
52
58
45
50
31
17
67
86
58
30
36
77
51
88
40
61
61
59
37
27
75
88
58
92
26
54
55
60
96
32
34
54
18
65
38
17
59
83
1,8
3,0
3,9
3,0
3,5
4,6
3,1
3,4
2,1
5,2
4,7
3,6
4,9
6,3
5,3
4,2
2,9
4,0
2,6
4,7
0,4
3,9
6,9
5,5
1,6
2,8
3,4
3,9
2,8
3,7
4,4
1,6
3,0
2,3
4,8
in16 ic16 ir16 v5ar v5br o6 o7 o8
Country ICVS
national:
robbery
averaged
rate
1988-95
ICVS
city:
robbery
averaged
rate
1988-95
ICVS
rural:
robbery
averaged
rate
1988-95
Rate of
homicides
recorded
by 100 000
population
1990
Rate of
homicides
recorded
by 100 000
population
1994
WHO
homi-
cide
1992
Interpol:
homiciderate
per
100 000
population
1994
CDC Study
total
homicides
per
100 000
population
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbajan
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep
Denmark
England/
Wales
0,2
1,0
1,2
1,2
1,1
1,4
0,2
2,0
2,7
3,1
1,7
0,8
1,1
1,7
2,4
0,2
0,8
0,9
1,3
0,8
3,3
7,2
6,5
4,1
2,5
7,6
2,5
5,2
1,3
4
9
10
3
11
2
8
2
5
1
06,10
01,50
1,40
04,70
02,30
02,10
01,30
00,60
01,59
05,36
02,48
08,07
31,50
05,90
05,18
07,38
01,38
04,91
01,17
01,41
02,16
01,21
00,55
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in16 ic16 ir16 v5ar v5br o6 o7 o8
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Germany(W)
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
KazakhstanK
yrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechten-
stein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR
Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
Northern
Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian
Fed
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Turkey
Ukraine
United
Kingdom
USA
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
3,3
0,7
0,6
0,8
1,3
2,0
0,4
0,8
0,5
0,5
1,8
0,7
1,6
0,9
3,1
0,4
0,7
1,6
4,9
0,9
0,7
3,8
1,6
0,7
2,6
1,6
3,4
2,0
1,1
0,2
1,6
1,6
1,6
2,2
1,0
3,8
1,1
1,2
1,1
3,8
0,5
1,3
5,7
2,4
1,1
2,3
0,6
0,6
1,3
0,6
0,8
2,0
1,3
2,2
0,6
0,6
0,4
0,3
1,6
0,0
0,6
1,6
0,6
1,9
0,3
0,6
1,4
9,5
8,6
8,2
2,3
3,3
7,2
10,8
14,1
6,8
3,4
2,8
7,0
1,5
19,3
2,9
7,0
11,5
1,7
3,5
4,7
11,1
1,7
6,3
9,4
26
10
14
3
5
5
16
12
16
15
4
3
10
2
21
3
8
23
2
4
6
12
3
10
9
03,40
01,10
01,10
01,50
04,00
00,60
02,60
09,20
02,00
01,30
04,70
01,50
02,90
01,50
04,90
15,30
02,70
01,00
01,30
01,50
09,90
24,33
00,63
04,67
10,65
04,61
02,57
04,27
00,71
04,74
14,62
01,52
02,98
03,14
04,20
03,28
21,82
00,00
02,41
04,86
02,57
09,49
02,29
08,95
28,21
03,24
01,12
01,17
01,14
03,53
00,62
02,25
01,11
06,09
00,97
02,98
02,24
02,01
00,95
01,30
01,32
09,93
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Violence against women
IN5 ICVS national: percentage of the female respondents who have
been a victim of sexual or nonsexual assault in the period of five
years preceding the survey, average victimisation rate
IC5 ICVS city: percentage of the female respondents who have been a
victim of sexual or nonsexual assault in the period of five years
preceding the survey, average victimisation rate
IR5 ICVS rural: percentage of the female respondents who have been a
victim of sexual or nonsexual assault in the period of five years
preceding the survey, average victimisation rate
V3AR V Survey: recorded rapes by the police per 100 000 population
in 1990
V3BR V Survey: recorded rapes by the police per 100 000 population
in 1994
The violence (assaults) against women includes five year rates for: a) sexual
offences: the last time it happened, what happened; was it rape, attempted
rape or indecent assault (offensive behaviour was left out); b) assaults and
threats: the last time it happened, what happened, was force used (only
threatened (not assavited) was left out). All of these combined items are not
available in the Crime Guide, thus they are not all given below.
VIOWOM in5 ic5 ir5 v3ar v3br
Country Violence
against
women
index
ICVS
national:
violence
against
women
averaged
5y rate
1984-95
ICVS city:
violence
against
women
averaged
5y rate
1984-95
ICVS rural:
violence
against
women
averaged
5y rate
1984-95
rate of
rapes
recorded
by
100 000
population
in 1990
rate of
rapes
recorded
by
100 000
population
in 1994
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Canada
56
7
51
10
48
42
66
90
4,2
3,6
6,6
6,0
6,5
5,2
3,9
7,3
7,8
4,2
3,3
3,5
6,0
1,0
6,9
0,9
7,5
5,8
104,7
1
7
1
6
9
11
108
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VIOWOM in5 ic5 ir5 v3ar v3br
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
England/Wales
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Germany (W)
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Federation
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom
USA
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
31
6
90
74
51
61
76
54
26
81
22
38
16
84
80
33
49
21
15
59
57
37
52
25
62
83
66
57
74
22
82
48
5
37
84
69
6,8
4,1
5,7
6,6
3,8
6,2
2,7
4,9
2,6
3,8
1,6
3,0
3,2
4,3
7,8
4,9
3,2
5,1
4,1
6,4
5,5
8,3
4,9
7,3
10,2
5,4
5,8
8,6
1,8
3,4
13,1
3,9
5,5
3,8
2,6
6,7
3,3
13,4
4,7
6,9
8,6
5,8
2,1
7,7
3,2
7,8
2,9
5,5
6,1
7,1
6,5
3,9
4,7
5,3
3,4
3,1
5,3
2,5
7,2
2,9
4,3
2,5
3,1
1,5
1,1
2,6
14,6
3,9
7,5
3,5
2,4
4,3
4,3
6,4
3,4
0,1
9,5
6,7
3,4
7,6
8,1
1,5
1,9
7,2
1,2
10,5
8,0
5,0
5,3
2,7
1,1
8,1
8,8
7,9
9,4
4,1
10,1
9,7
6,0
10,6
3,6
16,5
15,8
0,5
4,1
41,0
2
1
9
10
8
8
11
1
2
8
2
11
9
5
4
2
3
6
10
13
8
6
9
11
4
12
3
21
4
1
3
39
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Motor vehicle crimes
(including theft of and theft from cars and other motor vehicles)
IN9 ICVS national: percentage of the respondents who have been a
victim of theft from/of car in the year preceding the survey, average
annual rate 1988–95
IC9 ICVS city: percentage of the respondents who have been a victim of
theft from/of car in the year preceding the survey, average annual
rate 1988–95
IR9 ICVS rural: percentage of the respondents who have been a victim
of theft from/of car in the year preceding the survey, average annual
rate 1988-95
O4 HEUNI Paper No.96: stolen/misapp. mot. vehicles/100 000 in 1995
O5 HEUNI Paper No.9: not-traced mot. vehicles/100 000 in 1995
MVCI in9 ic9 ir9 O4 O5
Country Motor
vehicle
crime
index
ICVS
national:
theft
from/of car
averaged
rate
1988-95
ICVS city:
theft
from/of car
averaged
rate
1988-95
ICVS rural:
theft
from/of car
averaged
rate
1988-95
HEUNI
Study:
stolen/misapp
motor
vehicles
per
10.000
HEUNI
Study:
not-traced
motor
vehicles
per
100.000
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
England/Wales
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
24
26
16
47
92
70
33
22
79
97
90
71
32
80
57
1,8
3,9
7,9
8,1
9,3
8,0
3,3
8,2
4,9
2,2
3,4
5,0
13,4
10,5
5,1
11,3
11,1
12,5
4,5
10,2
11,1
3,8
1,6
3,8
6,4
7,5
8,7
5,2
2,8
7,7
4,0
13,5
2,2
28,9
4,6
4,0
70,6
99,0
13,0
40,4
49,7
4,5
1,7
12,2
2,6
1,6
46,2
10,2
2,1
12,4
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6 Liukkonen, M (1997), Motor Vehicle Theft in Europe
Petty crimes
– car vandalism
– theft of motorcycle or moped
– theft of bicycle
– theft of personal belongings
– sexual offensive behaviour (no assaults)
– threats
The figures are the percentage of the population that has been victimised at
least once of at least one of the crimes. The source variables for these
MVCI in9 ic9 ir9 O4 O5
Germany
Germany (W)
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Federation
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom
USA
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
66
35
58
51
33
89
12
10
50
58
89
23
83
27
58
40
29
56
46
18
49
64
60
41
99
66
11
4
6
23
93
67
5,0
9,4
7,0
9,4
6,1
4,9
3,5
6,1
7,0
4,6
5,5
10,1
5,6
2,5
9,5
7,1
8,5
11,9
4,0
8,1
11,2
7,4
12,6
8,6
7,5
8,7
9,9
7,7
9,2
9,4
16,0
8,0
14,6
8,2
4,5
4,6
14,3
10,5
4,2
8,4
2,2
3,2
3,9
5,5
5,5
4,7
2,5
4,6
1,6
6,4
4,6
4,5
8,8
4,9
2,3
8,3
23,4
12,3
12,8
4,3
53,4
0,8
0,7
13,4
12,3
29,6
4,1
26,4
2,3
18,4
13,1
12,2
1,2
7,6
5,4
47,8
0,3
0,7
1,7
5,7
7,4
0,5
8,0
6,9
14,9
0,3
13,0
2,2
5,6
4,0
3,2
14,0
0,1
-
2,3
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prevalence rates are not available in the Crime Guide, therefore they are not
given below7.
Country Petty crime
index
National
data
Main
cities
Rural
area’s
Albania
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Czech Republic
England
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Hungary
Italy
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuani
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Norway
Poland
Romania
Russian Federation
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
USA
Yugoslavia
30
52
8
18
66
78
13
90
64
80
43
37
12
52
16
32
63
73
66
11
40
98
13
15
64
38
75
30
72
57
26
71
58
97
76
50
.
16,1
.
13,6
.
19,0
.
20,8
17,7
19,1
15,5
15,0
.
16,9
.
15,1
.
.
18,4
.
15,4
23,6
10,2
13,0
17,7
.
.
14,7
17,0
17,3
15,4
17,8
17,6
.
18,0
.
19,0
24,6
14,6
13,4
22,7
23,2
15,1
24,6
19,8
25,0
20,9
21,0
16,1
22,6
15,7
19,6
18,4
20,1
20,8
14,6
13,9
29,9
16,4
15,8
23,7
22,7
23,5
18,3
26,3
21,8
18,6
23,9
16,7
28,4
24,3
20,3
12,8
12,9
.
13,6
.
16,7
.
19,7
16,9
15,4
13,6
13,5
7,7
14,9
.
13,4
20,3
22,7
16,4
.
17,3
22,0
9,9
12,5
15,2
8,6
.
13,8
16,5
15,4
12,5
16,3
17,7
.
16,4
.
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7 For industrialised countries see Mayhew, P. And Van Dijk, J. (1997) and for Central and Eastern
European countries Zvekic 1998, Zvekic and Stankov 1998, Hatalak et al. 1998.
Corruption
IN17 ICVS national: percentage of the respondents who have been
confronted with a corrupted government official in the year
preceding the survey, averaged annual rate 1988-1995
IC17 ICVS city: percentage of the respondents who have been con-
fronted with a corrupted government official in the year preceding
the survey, averaged annual rate 1988-1995
IR17 ICVS rural: percentage of the respondents who have been con-
fronted with a corrupted government official in the year preceding
the survey, averaged annual rate 1988-1995
O1 Transparency International8: corruption index 1995
O1A World Competitiveness Yearbook9 1997: improper practices
(bribing/corruption) do not prevail in the public sphere (scale 10-0)
For the industrialised countries, the ICVS data is only available for the 1996
surveys.
CORR in17 ic17 ir17 o1 o1a
Country Corruptio
nindex
ICVS
national:
corruption
averaged
rate
1991-95
ICVS city:
corruption
averaged
rate
1991-95
ICVS rural:
corruption
averaged
rate
1991-95
TI corruption
index 1995
(reverse
scale)
World
Competitiveness
Yearbook 1997:
(reverse scale)
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep
Denmark
England/Wales
Estonia
Finland
France
78
52
65
72
94
31
84
76
04
34
61
10
49
0,7
0,4
7,9
0,3
3,8
0,1
0,7
13,8
1,5
12,0
19,1
0,7
16,0
8,8
0,2
3,8
0,0
3,0
8,4
0,4
0,2
7,6
0,4
3,9
0,2
0,2
7,1
6,9
8,9
9,3
8,6
9,1
7,0
6,8
4,0
8,0
3,7
9,5
9,2
5,6
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8 Transparency International Report 1996
9 World Competitiveness Yearbook 1997, International Institute for Management Development
CORR in17 ic17 ir17 o1 o1a
Georgia
Germany
Germany (W)
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Federation
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom
USA
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
98
56
52
88
74
12
35
93
98
86
86
48
55
63
37
06
25
74
72
67
95
33
77
52
72
19
24
93
68
24
33
87
11,0
4,0
0,5
0,0
5,0
0,3
1,2
0,2
0,2
0,3
29,9
3,9
21,3
14,0
13,4
7,7
4,2
0,6
0,0
7,4
11,9
18,7
0,5
13,9
1,5
0,4
0,3
12,6
1,3
17,4
13,9
15,1
12,4
8,9
3,8
0,5
0,0
4,0
6,1
0,2
1,3
0,2
0,2
0,0
8,1
4,0
4,1
8,6
3,0
8,7
8,6
5,6
8,6
4,4
8,9
8,8
4,1
7,8
6,7
3,1
2,7
9,0
8,1
3,0
7,5
8,0
8,6
3,0
5,0
0,8
5,4
8,5
7,9
2,4
8,2
7,6
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Motivation for crime
ICVS data on percentage of the respondents who are young, male and either
unemployed or dissatisfied with their income.
All available data were used. No distinction is made for the nation-wide
surveys, the main cities or the rural areas. The data for calculating these
indices is taken directly from the main database. All of the source variables
are not found in the Crime Guide and therefore they are not given below.
Opportunities for crime
ICVS city: data on vehicle ownership (cars, motorcycles and bicycles),
ICVS city: data on average number of evenings spent away from home for
recreation
ICVS city: data on the percentage of single person households
ICVS city: data on the percentage of females with paid employment.
Opportunity
index
ICVS
car
ownership,
averaged
rate
1989-99
ICVS
motorcycle
ownership
averaged
rate
1989-96
ICVS
bicycle
ownership
rate
1989-96
Going
out
Single
person
householdsa
veraged
rate
1989-96
Percentage
of women
working
averaged
rate
1989-96
lbania
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Czech Republic
England/W
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany (W)
Hungary
Italy
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
27
68
33
57
33
78
49
61
65
51
75
68
28
67
38
62
26
29
29
21,3
76,4
34,5
80,9
64,1
87,2
71,7
65,9
78,1
48,7
73,3
78,4
59,9
72,9
61,3
86,2
43,4
46,0
56,3
11,1
8,7
5,2
12,1
3,5
8,0
9,8
13,8
7,5
8,7
8,7
14,2
8,7
7,8
8,7
33,9
5,7
6,7
4,7
56,2
74,3
39,0
48,2
36,9
69,9
61,9
67,0
44,1
56,1
84,1
48,0
39,5
71,0
50,7
57,8
35,9
40,6
39,6
2,51
3,35
2,66
2,98
3,07
3,60
3,04
2,99
3,52
2,81
3,13
2,99
2,75
3,31
2,21
3,05
2,79
2,72
2,44
1,7
18,8
7,5
19,7
7,0
12,5
5,5
4,9
13,3
11,3
25,7
20,7
1,2
29,5
7,5
8,9
2,1
3,7
6,8
33,5
44,3
50,0
38,2
42,4
54,5
38,7
52,4
51,9
54,4
55,6
49,2
38,8
45,9
44,1
31,1
47,5
44,4
46,5
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The following three indices were created by Ineke Haen Marshall
LERI  Law enforcement resources index
POLICE V Survey: number of police (sworn and civilian) per 100,000
for 1994
PRIVATE Dutch Ministry of Justice: number of private police per
100,000 for 1995
PROSEC V Survey: number of prosecutors per 100,000 for 1994
JUDGES V Survey: number of judges per 100,000 for 1994
PRISON V Survey: number of correctional personnel (adult and
juvenile institutions) per 100,000 for 1994
Opportunity
index
ICVS
car
ownership,
averaged
rate
1989-99
ICVS
motorcycle
ownership
averaged
rate
1989-96
ICVS
bicycle
ownership
rate
1989-96
Going
out
Single
person
households
averaged
rate
1989-96
Percentage
of women
working
averaged
rate
1989-96
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Norway
Poland
Romania
Russian Federation
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
USA
Yugoslavia
50
51
72
54
73
41
11
29
53
48
70
53
82
70
19
82
47
74,0
90,6
68,8
68,3
75,9
56,7
45,5
37,3
70,1
60,7
83,5
77,5
74,4
69,7
33,9
92,5
67,8
13,6
13,1
14,9
4,4
6,1
10,4
1,7
4,0
4,0
2,5
19,1
25,1
11,2
15,2
3,6
11,0
5,4
66,5
43,4
86,8
52,8
57,7
66,0
21,1
47,5
36,8
66,7
83,9
34,6
87,3
51,8
35,9
64,8
48,3
3,20
3,48
3,37
3,78
3,33
2,46
1,97
2,45
3,54
2,92
2,90
2,69
3,14
3,34
2,55
3,69
3,29
1,2
2,7
22,5
13,5
38,8
5,9
3,1
3,9
15,1
4,1
9,0
8,6
31,6
27,3
3,0
13,3
5,2
33,9
26,0
39,0
41,5
61,8
41,2
38,9
49,6
48,9
66,7
46,2
47,0
56,8
46,6
46,6
57,8
47,8
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Country LERI POLICE PRIVATE PROSEC JUDGES PRISON
Law
Enforcement
Resources
Index
Police
per
100000
Dutch Min.
of Justice:
private
security
private
police
per 100.000
Prosecutors
per
100 000
Judges
per
100 000
Correctional
staff per
100 000
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep
Denmark
England/Wales
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Germany (W)
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Fed
Scotland
Slovakia
10
19
22
50
24
27
20
30
35
29
30
30
23
39
20
28
15
31
16
36
29
30
40
29
38
30
38
31
19
24
25
21
35
20
10
34
05
45
23
37
405
367
344
249
670
523
238
347
436
232
349
320
383
293
304
488
779
463
190
545
276
318
507
241
255
520
231
440
214
1.225
360
352
75
109
24
193
155
69
121
217
19
143
76
121
201
132
112
26
156
4,62
8,72
2,49
16,49
14,44
7,68
6,98
6,97
9,67
8,16
7,42
4,06
8,21
6,56
7,03
6,60
3,76
11,24
18,60
11,73
15,62
9,68
15,80
6,73
5,56
10,74
2,71
10,33
19,27
4,85
10,47
2,53
19,79
6,56
11,88
11,71
22,96
9,13
19,93
1,91
12,34
18,23
4,56
27,19
13,10
21,42
6,71
5,22
7,30
25,81
6,88
26,68
18,63
7,97
5,56
8,10
2,70
9,71
12,70
8,50
2,67
20,91
28
44
35
52
34
93
49
29
78
75
75
176
53
37
37
18
64
54
80
55
107
46
23
33
58
61
193
42
154
86
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Criminal Justice Gender Balance Index
FEMPOLR V Survey: female share of police personnel (in percen-
tages) in 1994
FEMPROP V Survey: female share of prosecutors (in percentages)
in 1994
FEMJUDR V Survey: female share of judges (in percentages) in 1994
FEMPRIR V Survey: female share of prison personnel (in percen-
tages) in 1994
Country LERI POLICE PRIVATE PROSEC JUDGES PRISON
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom
USA
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
32
13
25
26
11
30
29
412
129
282
265
190
419
300
135
184
108
10
582
7,31
3,28
8,17
3,85
8,92
26,26
4,44
69,60
8,76
4,31
42
51
39
40
46
106
Country GBI FEMPOLR FEMPROR FEMJUDR FEMPRIR
Gender
Balance Index
% female
police
% female
prosecutors
% female
judges
% female
prison staff
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep
Denmark
England/Wales
Estonia
55
20
21
02
34
23
39
48
35
15
43
40
28
50
17
14
5
24
21
5
19
67
5
16
3
19
33
41
31
34
55
42
47
66
23
19
41
29
68
9
62
6
61
12
32
15
25
4
20
33
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Country GBI FEMPOLR FEMPROR FEMJUDR FEMPRIR
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Germany (W)
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Fed
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom
USA
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
27
03
18
21
21
29
23
26
48
12
35
24
19
21
25
13
33
28
23
41
29
35
40
20
40
26
07
11
27
23
3
6
10
7
18
3
11
5
13
4
9
10
31
10
21
23
8
20
2
33
10
3
4
24
7
5
29
17
20
15
58
33
34
31
14
31
37
33
46
44
45
40
32
10
13
26
37
34
28
71
-
43
41
3
27
31
-
16
22
57
7
53
56
31
39
5
25
10
23
27
37
6
24
13
12
28
7
30
9
20
34
8
5
7
5
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Citizen evaluation of police performance index
SATIC26 ICVS city: percentage of respondents who are satisfied with
police performance in general (police crime control), average
annual rate 1988–95
SATIC27 ICVS city: percentage of victims who reported their victimi-
sation and were satisfied with how the police handled their
case, average annual rate 1988–95
IC24 ICVS city: percentage of victims of contact crimes who
reported their last victimisation to the police in a period of five
years (percentage of all), average annual rate 1988–95
Country CEPPI SATIC26 SATIC27 IC24
Citizen Evaluation
of Police
Performance
Index
%
satisfied
with crime
control
%
victims
satisfied with
police
ICVS city:
report contact
crimes averaged
rate 1988-95
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep
Denmark
England/Wales
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Germany (W)
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
28
26
13
37
21
47
18
23
44
13
33
41
13
33
23
27
3
11
14
47
56
32
69
39
73
40
51
71
40
80
59
39
54
49
56
20
33
32
73
66
36
57
38
88
56
25
75
14
71
71
36
69
38
46
18
29
19
23
20
21
33
25
34
19
31
37
21
20
44
20
27
26
24
16
21
27
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Country CEPPI SATIC26 SATIC27 IC24
Luxembourg
FYR Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Fed
Scotland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom
USA
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
28
25
42
43
30
15
12
4
50
32
25
32
45
50
14
46
18
43
35
72
61
71
33
31
29
84
54
54
60
82
77
21
63
37
47
54
62
68
73
27
35
15
80
42
61
52
76
79
29
77
38
33
29
42
66
09
26
21
19
38
40
20
30
31
53
27
48
23
171

Appendix C
Crime Situation
The composition of the data for the indices (10 lowest and 10 highest for
each)
Data sources:
V Fifth UN Survey
ICVS International Crime Victim Survey
HEUNI Heuni Study (see Liukkonen 1997)
WHO World Health Statistics
CDC Centre for Disease Control (see United Nations International
Study on Firearm Regulation and Krug et al 1998)
IP Interpol (see United Nations International Study on Firearm
Regulaton and Interpol 1995)
TI Transparency International
WCS World Competitiveness Yearbook (see International Institute
for Management Development)
Burglary index Data sources
lowest
Azerbaijan 04 V
Belarus 17 V + ICVS
Malta 18 V + ICVS
Switzerland 18 V + ICVS
Cyprus 23 V
Kazakhstan 25 V
Germany (W) 25 ICVS
Norway 25 V + ICVS
Moldova 27 V
Romania 29 V + ICVS
highest
Kyrgyzstan 68 V + ICVS
Czech Republic 75 ICVS
Slovakia 76 V + ICVS
Albania 79 ICVS
Canada 79 V + ICVS
United States 80 V + ICVS
England/Wales 81 V + ICVS
Georgia 82 ICVS
Bulgaria 94 ICVS
Estonia 98 ICVS
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Motor vehicle crime index Data sources
lowest
Tajikistan 4 HEUNI
Turkey 6 HEUNI
Kyrgyzstan 10 ICVS + HEUNI
Switzerland 11 ICVS
Kazakhstan 12 HEUNI
Belarus 16 ICVS + HEUNI
Romania 18 ICVS + HEUNI
Cyprus 22 HEUNI
Ukraine 23 ICVS + HEUNI
FYR Macedonia 23 ICVS + HEUNI
highest
Czech Rep. 79 ICVS
France 80 ICVS + HEUNI
Malta 83 ICVS + HEUNI
Luxembourg 89 HEUNI
Italy 89 ICVS + HEUNI
England/Wales 90 ICVS + HEUNI
Bulgaria 92 ICVS
United States 93 ICVS
Denmark 97 HEUNI
Spain 99 ICVS
Homicide index Data sources
lowest
England/Wales 04 V + WHO + CDC
Ireland 08 WHO + IP + CDC
Cyprus 14 V + IP
Netherlands 14 V + WHO + CDC
Germany (W) 16 WHO
Turkey 17 V
Andorra 18 IP
Spain 18 WHO + IP + CDC
Norway 26 V + WHO + CDC
Greece 28 V + WHO + IP + CDC
highest
Lithuania 72 V
Armenia 80 V + WHO + IP
Georgia 82 V + IP
United States 83 V + WHO + IP + CDC
Kazakhstan 88 V
Kyrgyzstan 88 V
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Northern Ireland 92 V + WHO + CDC
Latvia 92 V + WHO + IP
Estonia 95 V + IP + CDC
Russian Fed 96 V + WHO + IP
Serious violence index Data sources
lowest
Ireland 08 WHO + IP + CDC
Cyprus 14 V + IP
Turkey 17 V
Andorra 18 IP
Austria 22 ICVS + V + WHO + IP + CDC
Greece 28 V + WHO + IP + CDC
FYR Macedonia 30 ICVS + V
France 31 ICVS + WHO + IP + CDC
Switzerland 31 ICVS + WHO + IP + CDC
Norway 32 ICVS + V + WHO + CDC
highest
Azerbaijan 68 V + IP
Georgia 70 ICVS + V + IP
Poland 71 ICVS + WHO + IP
Bulgaria 71 ICVS + V + WHO + IP
Kyrgyzstan 73 ICVS + V
Armenia 80 V + WHO + IP
United States 86 ICVS + V + WHO + IP + CDC
Kazakhstan 88 V
Russian Fed 93 ICVS + V + WHO + IP
Estonia 96 ICVS + V + IP + CDC
Violence ag. women index Data sources
lowest
Turkey 05 V
Cyprus 06 V
Armenia 07 V
Azerbaijan 10 V
Malta 15 V + ICVS
Italy 16 V + ICVS
FYR Macedonia 21 V + ICVS
Greece 22 V
Spain 22 V + ICVS
Poland 25 ICVS
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highest
Denmark 74 V
Finland 76 V + ICVS
Kyrgyzstan 80 V + ICVS
Germany (W) 81 ICVS
Sweden 82 V + ICVS
Russian Fed 83 V + ICVS
United States 84 V + ICVS
Kazakhstan 84 V
Canada 90 V + ICVS
Czech Rep 90 ICVS
Corruption index Data sources
lowest
Denmark 04 TI + WCS
Netherlands 06 ICVS + TI + WCS
Finland 10 ICVS + TI + WCS
Iceland 12 WCS
Sweden 19 ICVS + TI + WCS
United Kingdom 24 WCS
Switzerland 24 ICVS + TI + WCS
Norway 25 TI + WCS
Canada 31 ICVS + TI + WCS
United States 33 ICVS + TI + WCS
highest
Lithuania 86 ICVS
Latvia 86 ICVS
Yugoslavia 87 ICVS
Greece 88 TI + WCS
Italy 93 TI + WCS
Turkey 93 TI + WCS
Bulgaria 94 CVS
Russian Fed 95 ICVS + WCS
Georgia 98 ICVS
Kyrgyzstan 98 ICVS
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Appendix D
Operation of the Criminal Justice System Indices:
LERI, GBI AND CEPPI
The law enforcement resources index (LERI)
The purpose of the Law Enforcement Resources Index (LERI) is to produce
an index which uses all of the data available, while keeping the number of
countries with missing data as small as possible. The main objective of the
LERI is to differentiate between those countries with high levels of resources
devoted to law enforcement (i.e, public police, private police, prosecutors,
judges, prison staff), and those countries with low levels. The law enforce-
ment resources index relies primarily on data reported in the Fifth United
Nations Survey for 1990 and 1994, with some supplementary data on private
policing drawn from a study conducted by the Dutch Ministry of Justice.
Instead of using different data sources to measure the same phenomenon (e.g.
homicide), the LERI uses data primarily from one data source (the United
Nations Fifth Survey) to measure different dimensions of the same phenome-
non: the proportion of the work force involved in different aspects of crime
control (personnel employed as public and private police, judges, prosecutors
and correctional staff). Thus, the LERI is a composite measure which - for
those countries for which multiple data points are available - incorporates
more than one single dimension of the concept of law enforcement resources.
Such an index will be more robust than an index based on single-source
measurement. Unfortunately, as will be explained later, for several countries,
the LERI is limited to only one data point.
The creation of the LERI
The two main indicators of the relative importance of the system of criminal
justice in a particular society available in the Fifth UN Survey are (1) the
proportion of the work force involved in criminal justice-related jobs, and
(2) the proportion of the gross national product devoted to criminal justice
activities and personnel.
The financial resources devoted to criminal justice activities and personnel
are not used in the  creation of the  LERI, because  of major  problems
associated with financial data provided by the UN Survey. First, such data
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are only available for a small number of countries. Although 18 countries
report on police expenditures, 13 countries report on prosecutorial expendi-
tures, 13 countries report on judicial expenditures, and 24 countries report
on prison staff expenditures, only 6 countries report on ALL four categories
of expenditures (Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova and Slovenia).
Second, there is the additional problem that the original data are provided in
the local currency. In order to make international comparisons, UN currency
conversion tables need to be used. Particularly in countries in transition (i.e.
Central and Eastern European countries) with a highly fluctuating currency,
the resulting figures are questionable and should be approached with great
caution.
The following data were used to create the Law Enforcement Resource Index:
(1) The number of police (both sworn and civilian) per 100,000 people for
1994 reported in the Fifth United Nations Survey. If 1994 data were not
available, 1990 data were used (Switzerland). For several countries
where Fifth UN Survey data were not available, police data were taken
from the Dutch Ministry of Justice study on private security (Germany,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal). [This variable is referred to
as POLICE].
(2) The number of private police per 100,000 population (Dutch Ministry of
Justice study on private security). [This variable is referred to as PRI-
VATE].
(3) The number of prosecutors per 100,000 population for 1994 reported in
the Fifth United Nations Survey. If 1994 data were not available, 1990
data were substituted (this was the case with the United States). [This
variable is referred to as PROSEC].
(4) The number of judges per 100,000 population for 1994 reported in the
Fifth United Nations Survey. If 1994 data were not available, 1990 data
were substituted (this was the case with the Netherlands and Switzer-
land). [This variable is referred to as JUDGES].
(5) The number of (adult and juvenile) correctional staff per 100,000 popu-
lation for 1994 reported in the Fifth United Nations Survey. If 1994 data
were not available, 1990 data were substituted (the United States and
Switzerland). [This variable is referred to as PRISON].
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Table D1 presents summary statistics on the five data sources for the law
enforcement resource index. There is considerable variation in which coun-
tries provide data on each of the component variables. Only a small propor-
tion of the countries reported data on all variables (Austria, Belgium, Greece,
Finland, Germany, Luxemburg, Portugal and Sweden.) Twenty-four coun-
tries provide data on the number of police, prosecutors, judges and prison
personnel.
The index is based on the assumption that it is not wise to place too much
reliance on the accuracy of a country’s exact rate on one particular variable.
Instead, an index based on rankings is preferred, where the exact distance
between two consecutive values is not important. Also, it is assumed that a
composite measure - consisting of the average of the rankings on several
variables - is more robust than a measure based on a single variable. The
LERI is based on average rankings on the source variables.
The LERI was created as follows. First, the countries were ranked
according to their rate on the basis of each of the five data sources (public
police, private police, prosecutors, judges, prison staff). Before averaging the
ranks, the ranks were weighted based on the number of countries for which
data were available for that particular variable. Simply averaging the ranks
has the problem that it would give undue weight to variables where there are
few missing data (because the ranks would have the maximum value of, for
example, 39 for police per 100,000 and only 22 for private police per
100,000). A simple correction procedure was employed to adjust for differ-
ences in the number of data points. Each individual ranking was multiplied
as follows: (rank / number of countries) * (X / 53 (maximum number of
Police per
100,000
Private Police
per 100,000*
Prosecutors
per 100,000
Judges per
100,000
Prison Staff
per 100,000
Reporting Countries
Missing Countries
Mean Rate
SD
25% Quartile
Median
75% Quartile
Minimum
(Country)
Maximum
(Country)
39
14
389.92
188.84
265.0
349.27
463.46
190
Turkey
1,124.58
Russian
Federation
22
31
134.9
116.42
73.5
121
163
10
Turkey
582
United
States
36
17
8.74
4.38
5.81
7.92
10.67
2.49
Austria
19.27
Russian
Federation
37
17
13.53
12.23
6.06
9.13
19.86
1.92
England&W
69.6
Switzerland
37
17
64.34
41.45
38.02
52.01
76.62
18.12
Greece
193.2
N. Ireland
Data sources are the Fifth UN Survey and *the Dutch Ministry of Justice study on private security
Table D1. Law Enforcement Resources Data (LERI)
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countries). [These variables are referred to as WPOLICE, WPRIVATE,
WPROSEC, WJUDGES, WPRISON].
After this correction procedure, each country was assigned a value on the
LERI, reflecting the average of the rankings. This rank-averaging method
has one major drawback: countries which have only one or two data points
base their ranking on fewer data points than countries with more complete
information. Also, the relative ranking of each country on a particular
variable is determined by the (coincidental) mixture of countries on that
variable. The obvious advantage is that this method minimizes the loss of
cases, plus maximizes the use of all pertinent data simultaneously (i.e. it is
a summary measure). This last point is important. One major advantage of
the LERI is that it does not give undue weight to one of the components (i.e.
the police) over other components ( which invariably account for a smaller
proportion of all criminal justice resources and personnel). For example, if
we would use a simple additive measure of total criminal justice personnel
per 100,000, the countries with the largest police force would always end up
at the top, as a mere artifact of their relative dominance of numbers. In the
law enforcement resource index, on the other hand, each of the individual
components (police, prosecutors, judges, private police, prison personnel)
has an equal weight (i.e., just because a country has a large police force per
100,000 – as is the case for example in the Russian Federation – does not
automatically mean that this factor will overshadow its ranking on the other
dimensions). However, it should be noted that there is a relationship between
the relative size of, respectively, police, judges, prosecutors, prison personnel
and expenditures.
An additional advantage of using an index over a simple addition of the
total number of criminal justice personnel is that it deals better with missing
data. If a country has data only on police, or on judges, and not on the other
components, the size of the criminal justice work force is likely to be lower
than for countries with complete data on all five components. However, the
LERI simply averages the rankings, adjusting for the availability (or lack
thereof) of data by the size of the denominator (i.e., if there are data on 2
components, the total is divided by 2; if there are data on all 5 components,
the total is divided by 5).
The procedure resulted in the law enforcement resource index (LERI) with
a minimum value of 4.08, a maximum value of 50.06, a mean value of 26.95,
and a standard deviation of 9.22 (n = 47).
Overall, 11 countries are low on the LER Index, 12 countries are high, and
24 countries are medium (Table D2). Romania, Poland, Andorra, Turkey,
Georgia, Greece, Armenia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Bulgaria, Finland and the Netherlands are in the bottom quartile of the LER
Index. The United States, Portugal, Northern Ireland, Croatia, Hungary,
Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and
Azerbaijan are in the top quartile of the LER Index. With the exception of
the United States, Portugal and Northern Ireland, the countries in the top
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quartile of the LER Index are all Central and Eastern European countries.
The governments of these Eastern European countries have historically relied
heavily on state security forces (police) to maintain order. The LER Index
reflects different  components of criminal  justice (not only the  police),
however, and so that by itself the index could not explain the clustering of
these countries in the top quartile of investment in law enforcement.
Table D3 shows that the LER Index differentiates well between the rates
of countries on each of the component variables. That is, countries in the low
quartile of the law enforcement resource index have a mean rate of 285.26
police per 100,000, compared with a mean rate of 547.54 police per 100,000
for the high quartile. The rates of police per 100,000 in countries in the top
quartile of the LERI are 1.92 times higher than those in countries in the
bottom quartile. Countries ranking in the bottom quartile of the LER Index
have a lower mean private policing rate (51.20 per 100,000) than do countries
in the medium (second and third) quartiles of the LER Index. Another
noteworthy fact is that only three of the countries in the high quartile of the
LER Index provide any information on private policing (these are countries
in transition). Countries in the bottom quartile of the LER Index also have a
lower average rate of prosecutors per 100,000 (5.53) than do countries in the
medium quartiles (6.96 in the second quartile, and 8.41 in the third quartile)
or in the top quartile (12.90 prosecutors per 100,000). The low:high LERI
countries ratio is 2.33 for prosecutors. The pattern for prison personnel is
also consistent with expectations: countries in the bottom quartile of the LER
Index have an average rate of 3.677 prison personnel per 100,000, those in
Law Enforcement Resources Index Category
Low Medium High
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile Missing
Romania(1)
Poland (2)
Andorra (3)
Turkey (4)
Georgia (5)
Greece (6)
Armenia (7)
FYR Macedonia (8)
Bulgaria (9)
Finland (10)
Netherlands (11)
Austria (12)
Norway (13)
Scotland (14)
England/Wales (15)
Belarus (16)
Malta (17.5)
Moldova (17.5)
Sweden (19)
Switzerland (20)
Spain (21)
Belgium (22)
France (23)
Ireland (24)
Canada (25)
Cyprus (26)
Kyrgyzstan (27)
Ukraine (28)
Czech Rep. (29)
Denmark (30)
Liechtenstein (31)
Italy (32)
Luxembourg (33)
Germany (34)
Slovenia (35)
United States (36)
Portugal (37)
Croatia (38)
N. Ireland (39)
Hungary (40)
Slovakia (41)
Latvia (42)
Lithuania (43)
Estonia (44)
Kazakhstan (45)
Russ. Fed. (46)
Azerbaijan (47)
Albania
Bosnia
Iceland
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
Note: the figures between parentheses are the ranks on the LERI.
Table D2. Categorization of Countries According to Law Enforcement Resources Index (LERI).
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the medium quartiles average 52.56 (Q2) and 55.52 (Q3), while the top
quartile averages 111.73 prison staff per 100,000.( Ratio low-to-high LERI
is 3.04).
The pattern with regard to judges is less straightforward: although the
bottom quartile shows a lower mean rate of judges per 100,000 (10.70) than
does the top quartile (11.52), the intermediate quartiles have the highest mean
rate  (13.45 Q2 and 20.03 Q3) (the low:high LERI ratio is 1.08). The
implications of these patterns are further explored in the next section.
Criminal Justice Practitioner Gender Balance Index (GBI)
The procedure for constructing the criminal justice practitioner gender
balance index (GBI) consists of (1) rank ordering the countries on each of
the four component measures, (2) weighing the ranks based on the number
of countries for which data were available for that particular variable (see
explanation LERI), and (3) averaging the ranks for each country.
This procedure resulted in the GBI with a minimum of 1.66 (Azerbaijan), a
maximum of 54.66 (Andorra), a standard deviation of 12.81, and a mean
value of 27.62.
Table D4 shows the categorization of countries according to the criminal
justice practitioner gender balance index.
Law Enforcement
Resource Index
Mean Rate per 100,000 population
Public Police Private Police Prosecutors Judges Prison Staff
Low
(Q1)
(n=11)
Medium
(Q2)
(n=12)
Medium
(Q3)
(n=12)
High
(Q4)
(n=12)
Ratio Low to
High
285.26
(84.55)
n=7
342.58
(88.34)
n=11
341.86
(112.36)
n=10
547.54
(268.84)
n=11
1:1.92
51.20
(50.53)
n=5
124.87
(33.19)
n=8
142.33
(77.44)
n=6
286.33
(256.65)
n=3
1:5.59
5.53
(1.95)
n=9
6.96
(4.11)
n=8
8.41
(1.79)
n=8
12.90
(4.36)
n=11
1:2.33
10.70
(5.87)
n=8
13.45
(19.26)
n=11
20.03
(9.18)
n=7
11.52
(7.21)
n=11
1:1.08
36.77
(14.52)
n=8
52.56
(12.04)
n=10
55.52
(20.18)
n=10
111.73
(56.60)
n=9
1:3.04
Table D3. Mean Personnel Rates, by Law Enforcement Resource Index (LERI).
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The countries with the lowest females/males ratio in the criminal justice
work force are Azerbaijan, France, Turkey, Ukraine, Liechtenstein, Northern
Ireland, Cyprus, Georgia, Malta and Armenia. Bulgaria, Denmark, Slovenia,
Female Share of
Police (%)
Female Share of
Prosecutors (%)
Female Share of
Judges (%)
Female Share of
Prison Staff (%)
Reporting Countries
Missing Countries
Mean %
EU mean
Central and Eastern
Europe mean
25% Quartile
Median
75% Quartile
Maximum
Country
Minimum
Country
32
21
12.97
13.79
11.88
5.36
10.16
20.54
33.32
Sweden
2.3
Spain
33
20
31.58
31.42
30.67
16.55
32.69
42.73
66.67
Andorra
3.08
Azerbaijan
31
22
30.86
23.14
45.09
12.85
29.07
42.58
70.97
Latvia
0
N. Ireland
26
27
19.14
16.36
23.95
8.67
19.94
28.70
36.75
Latvia
4.15
Cyprus
Note: Data are 1994 UN data, except Switzerland and the Netherlands (1990)
For the proportion of female correctional staff, whenever there was no information for both juveniles and adult
prisons, the total of the correctional staff in adult prisons divided by the female staff in adult prisons for 1994
was used
Table D4. Mean Rates of Female Share of Criminal Justice Workforce (%).
Criminal Justice Practitioner Gender Balance Index Category
Low Medium High
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile Missing
Azerbaijan (1)
France (2)
Turkey (3)
Ukraine (4)
Liechtenstein (5)
N.Ireland (6)
Cyprus (7)
Georgia (8)
Malta (9)
Armenia (10)
Spain (11)
Greece (12)
Moldova (13)
Austria (14)
Germany (15)
Kazakhstan (16)
Romania (17)
Belgium (18)
FYR Macedonia (19)
Netherlands (20)
Kyrgyzstan (21)
Switzerland (22)
Finland (23)
Portugal (24)
England/Wales (25)
Hungary (26)
Scotland (27)
Norway (28)
Belarus (29)
Croatia (30)
Lithuania (31)
Slovakia (32)
Bulgaria (33)
Slovenia (34)
Denmark (35)
Sweden (36)
Russ.Fed. (37)
Czech. Rep. 38
United States (39)
Canada (40)
Latvia (41)
Estonia (42)
Andorra (43)
Albania
Bosnia
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Poland
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
Note: The figures between parentheses are ranks
Table D5. Categorization of Countries According to the Criminal Justice Practitioner Gender Balance
Index (GBI).
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Sweden, United States, Estonia, Andorra, the Russian Federation, the Czech
Republic, Canada and Latvia, on the other hand, rank in the top fourth with
regard to the female/male ratio in the criminal justice work force. A total of
43 countries received a ranking according to the GBI, with 12 countries not
providing data (Albania, Bosnia, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Poland,
Tajikistan, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan and Yugoslavia)
The GBI differentiates well between countries for the four component
variables (Table D6).
Countries that fall in the bottom quartile of the gender balance index have
lower mean rates for female share of police (7.07), prosecutors (15.14),
judges (7.66), and prison staff (9.43) than do countries in the top quartile of
the GBI: (female share of police: 22.82, female share of prosecutors: 48.77,
female share of judges: 57.84, and female share of prison staff: 27.30). The
female-to-male ratios range between a low of 1:2.89 (prison staff) and a high
of 1:7.55 (judges). These substantial differences in mean rates for the
different categories of the GBI suggest that this index differentiates reason-
ably well between countries. It appears to make the most clear-cut distinction
between the top and bottom quartiles; the patterns for the second and third
quartiles are less clear-cut, although with one exception (Q2 for female share
of police) the medium values are lower than the top quartile and higher than
Gender Balance Index Female Share of
Police (%)
Female Share of
Prosecutors(%)
Female Share of
Judges(%)
Female Share of
Prison Staff (%)
Low
(Q1)
n=10
Medium
(Q2)
n=11
Medium
(Q3)
n=11
High
(Q4)
n = 11
Ratio Low to High
7.07
(5.31)
(n = 8)
6.83
(3.42)
(n=9)
17.16
(3.42)
(n=8)
22.82
(5.19)
(n=7)
1:3.23
15.14
(14.45)
(n=6)
24.66
(9.09)
(n=10)
33.24
(13.92)
(n=8)
48.77
(13.10)
(n=9)
1:3.22
7.66
(8.27)
(n=7))
30.20
(6.46)
(n=9)
28.33
(17.8)
(n=8)
57.84
(13.10)
(n=7)
1:7.55
9.43
(7.10)
(n = 7)
18.34
(8.85)
(n=5)
20.25
(9.66)
(n=6)
27.30
(8.02)
(n=8)
1:2.89
Table D6. Relation of Criminal Justice Practitioner Gender Balance Index to Mean Rates of Female
Share of Criminal Justice Workforce (%).
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the bottom quartile. Averaging the second and third quartile would present
values that are in between the top and bottom quartiles.
The advantage of using the GBI is that it makes use of all available
information, it minimizes the number of missing countries, and it avoids
placing undue emphasis on only one of the four components of the work
force. It should be noted, however, that an index such as the criminal justice
practitioner gender balance index by its very nature summarizes information,
thereby obscuring information which more detailed examination of its com-
ponent variables would reveal.
Citizen Evaluation of Police Performance (CEPPI)
There is little doubt that a high level of citizen satisfaction with the police is
an acceptable indicator of how well the police perform their job. Important
indicators of criminal justice performance (specifically the police) are the
ICVS measures related to the percentage of the victims who were satisfied
with the response of the police (variables in26,ic26), and the percentage of
the respondents who are dissatisfied with crime control (variables in27,ic27).
The willingness of victims to report the crime to the police is another
frequently used indicator of the perception that members of the public have
of the police. Table D7 presents summary statistics on the three source
variables for the citizen evaluation of police performance index (CEPPI).
% Victims Reporting
Contact Crime to
Police
% Victims Satisfied
with Report to Police
% Respondents
Satisfied with Police
Crime Control
Reporting Countries
Missing Countries
Mean %
25% Quartile
Median
75% Quartile
Maximum
Country
Minimum
Country
36
17
29.04%
(11.32)
20.70%
26.43%
34.02%
66.29%
N. Ireland
9.32%
Norway
36
17
51.29%
(17.93)
35.32%
52.13%
67.38%
83.86%
Scotland
20.46%
Kyrgyzstan
36
17
51.13%
(21.53)
35.01%
52.92%
71.36%
88.02%
Canada
13.52%
Estonia
The numbers between parentheses are the standard deviations
Table D7. Citizen Evaluation of Police Performance Index (CEPPI).
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The CEPPI was created as follows. First, the countries were ranked
according to the percentage of respondents satisfied with how their report to
the police was dealt with, the percentage of respondents satisfied with the
way the police control crime in their area, and the percentage of victims of
contact crimes who reported their victimization to the police. Before aver-
aging the ranks, the ranks were weighted (see the explanation of weighting
in the appendix explaining the construction of LERI). After this correction
procedure, each country was assigned a value on the CEPPI, reflecting the
average of the (corrected) rankings.
This procedure resulted in the citizen evaluation of police performance
index (CEPPI) with a minimum value of 2.94, a maximum value of 50.06 ,
a mean value of 27.24 , and a standard deviation of 13.31 (n = 36).
Table D9 shows that the CEPPI differentiates well between the countries’
rates on each of the component variables. In countries which scored in the
top quartile of the CEPPI, victims of contact crimes were more than twice
as likely to report their victimization to the police (1:2.03), to be satisfied
with the police report (1:2.32), and to be satisfied with police crime control
(1:2.94) than was the case in countries in the lowest quartile of CEPPI.
Citizen Evaluation of Police Performance Index (CEPPI) Category
Low Medium High
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
Kyrgyzstan (1)
Russian Fed. (2)
Latvia (3)
Romania (4)
Georgia (5)
Estonia (6)
Belarus (7)
Lithuania (8.5)
Ukraine (8.5)
Poland (10)
Croatia (11)
Yugoslavia (12)
Bulgaria (13)
Czech Rep. (14.5)
Hungary (14.5)
Malta (16)
Slovenia (17)
Austria (18)
Italy (19)
Albania (20.5)
FYR Macedonia (20.5)
Norway (22)
Slovakia (23)
Spain (24)
Germany (W) (25)
Finland (26)
Belgium (27)
France (28)
Netherlands (29)
N. Ireland (30)
England/W (31)
Sweden (32)
United States (33)
Canada (34)
Scotland (35)
Switzerland (36)
The figures between parentheses are ranks.
Table D8. Categorization of Countries, According to Citizen Evaluation of Police Performance Index
(CEPPI).
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CEPPI % Victims of Contact
Crime Reporting to
Police
% of Victims Satisfied
with Police Report
% of Respondents
Satisfied with Police
Crime Control
Low
(Q1)
Medium
(Q2)
Medium
(Q3)
High
(Q4)
(N = 11)
Ratio Low to High
21.52%
(3.60)
(n=9)
24.40
(4.06)
(n=9)
26.61
(8.88)
(n=9)
43.62
(10.89)
(n=9)
1:2.03
30.77
(6.59)
(n=9)
43.65
(8.66)
(n=9)
59.37
(11.99)
(n=9)
71.35
(8.93)
(n=9)
1:2.32
25.61
(9.2)
(n=9)
44.68
(14.82)
(9)
58.92
(12.74)
(n=9)
75.30
(7.46)
(n=9)
1:2.94
Figures between parentheses are standard deviations.
Table D9. Relationship of Citizen Evaluation of Police Performance Index (CEPPI) to Mean % of
Source Variables.
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Appendix E
The International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS)1
As mentioned in chapter 1, most of the international information on crime
and related subjects is taken from police reports and information provided
for by governmental bodies. Characteristic of this information is that they
were not meant for international comparison. Great efforts were taken by
international organisations such as the United Nation and Interpol to make
them comparable, but the problems will apparently always remain.
The International Crime Victim Survey was set up to overcome these
difficulties. The general methodology is that in many countries, a random
sample of the population is questioned on their experiences with crime,
policing, crime prevention and feelings of unsafety. The questionnaires were
standardised, as was the method of sampling and the interview methodology.
This standardisation ensures that the results from these surveys are compa-
rable.
The ICVS is similar to most crime surveys of households with respect to
the crimes it covers. It is confined to counting crimes against clearly identi-
fiable individuals, excluding children. Crime surveys cannot easily cover
organisational crimes or victimless crimes such as drug abuse. For the crimes
it covers, the ICVS asks about incidents which by and large accord with legal
definitions of offences, although the offences are described in laymen terms.
It therefore in essence accepts the accounts of respondents of what happened-
or at least the accounts that they are prepared to give interviewers. In this
respect, it applies to a broader definition of crime than that used by the police
who, if incidents are reported to them, are likely to filter out those which may
not be felt to merit the attention of the criminal justice system, or meet
demands for reasonable evidence.
The count of crime
The respondents are asked about eleven main forms of victimisation, three
of which allow for further subdivision. Household crimes are those which
can be seen to affect the household at large, and the respondents answered
to all incidents known to them. For personal crimes, they reported on what
happened to them personally.
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1 Comprehensive information on the ICVS can be found in Alvazzi del Frate et.al. (1993) and on the
Internet; http://ruljis/leidenuniv.nl/user/jfcrjk/icvs
The respondents were asked about their experiences of crime over the last
five years. Those who mentioned an incident of any particular type were
asked when it occurred, and if in the previous year, how many times. All
victims reporting incidents over the past five years were asked some addi-
tional questions about what happened, if they reported it to the police and
how they evaluated the incident.
Apart from the crimes, there are a number of items in the questionnaire
concerning the attitude of the respondent towards the police, crime preven-
tion and protection against crime. Attention is paid to social correlates that
may help in explaining crime and of course demographic data such as age,
gender, education and income.
Data collection
Industrialised countries
In all developed countries except Northern Ireland and Spain, interviews in
the 1996 survey (as was usually the case in previous sweeps) were done by
telephone. Interviewers used computers from which they read the questions
and recorded the answers – a procedure known as computer-assisted tele-
phone interviewing (CATI). The issue of telephone interviewing is returned
to below.
Inter View was appointed as overall contractor for the 1996 surveys, as
was the case in 1989 and 1992. The field work was sub-contracted to survey
companies in the countries taking part. Interviews began in January 1996 and
lasted six to seven weeks. An average interview lasted about 15 minutes
depending mainly on the extent of victimisation experiences reported.
Household property crimes Personal crimes
theft of car
theft from cars
vandalism to cars
theft of mopeds/motorcycles
theft of bicycles
burglary with entry
attempted burglary
robbery
theft of personal property
- pickpocketing
- non-contact personal thefts
sexual incidents
- sexual assaults
- offensive behaviour
assaults and threats
- assaults with force
- assaults without force (threats)
Table E1
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To keep costs in check and encourage as full participation as possible,
samples in all sweeps of the ICVS have been relatively modest. In the 1996
surveys in industrialised countries, samples were usually of between 1,000
and 2,500 respondents per country. In each country, a regionally well spread
sample of households was taken. Within each household, one randomly
selected respondent aged 16 or more was questioned.2 No substitution of the
selected respondent was allowed. Selected respondents, who could not be
contacted, were called again at least four times. Those who refused or were
not available were recontacted one week later.
Results for the Western European and North American countries in this
report are based on data which have been weighted to make the samples as
representative as possible of national populations aged 16 or more in terms
of gender, regional population distribution, age, and household composition.
The weighting procedures in the 1996 surveys are the same as those used
previously and details can be found in van Dijk and Mayhew (1992).
Countries in Central and Eastern Europe
Field work in Central and Eastern Europe included the undertaking of
feasibility/training missions and the carrying out of pilot studies in the
countries which were participating in the ICVS for the first time. The main
aim of the missions was to pass on experience and provide advice as to the
technical and organisational aspect of the ICVS, with the assistance of the
“Manual” developed by UNICRI for this purpose (Alvazzi del Frate, 1996).
Details regarding sampling, translation of the questionnaire into local lan-
guage(s), organisation of the project, selection and training of the interview-
ers, data collection method, data entry procedure, data analysis and the
structure of the national report were discussed and mutually agreed upon.
Training on the conduct of the face-to-face survey and on the use of the ICVS
data entry software developed by the University of Leiden was provided to
selected members of the local team who, in turn, provided further training to
the interviewers.
In principle, pilots were carried out in all countries that were newcomers
to the ICVS. The results of the pilots carried out in Albania (and, outside the
region, in Bolivia, Mongolia, Romania, and Zimbabwe) in late 1995 were
used for the drafting of the revised version of the questionnaire adopted by
the 1996-97 ICVS and for necessary modifications taking into account local
conditions.
Samples of 1,000 respondents were generally drawn from the population
of the largest city, although in a few countries the survey covered either
several cities with or without the addition of a small rural sample (Estonia,
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2 The respondent was generally selected by the Troldahl-Carter method.
Georgia, Latvia, and Kyrgyzstan) or a national sample (Czech Republic,
Poland).
Full standardisation of the sampling designs was not feasible. The manual
lays down some basic principles of random-stratified sampling. Sampling
designs were prepared by local experts and approved by UNICRI. The
procedures are explained in the reports of the national co-ordinators. The
samples were stratified geographically on the basis of administrative zones
in the cities. Where possible the sample was also stratified according to the
social status of the zones ( higher status, middle status, lower status). This
criterion was not always applicable in the countries in transition where the
social status of areas is often mixed.
The respondents in the selected areas were chosen by a step-by-step
procedure aimed at identifying 1) streets, 2) blocks, 3) households, and lastly
the person aged 16 or more whose birthday is next.3 The households were
selected at random (e.g. through random walk techniques or the selection of
each 10th household starting from a randomly chosen start address). Inter-
viewers were instructed to recontact the selected address or person at least
two times if there was no response. No substitution of the address or of the
selected respondent was allowed. In some countries it was difficult to contact
sufficient numbers of young males. In these countries quota sampling was
used to ensure a more equal representation of gender and age groups. The
data were in all cases weighted to make the samples representative in terms
of gender and age (three groups).
In all the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, except Slovenia, the
survey was carried out face to face. In most countries the survey was carried
out by an ad hoc team of interviewers, whereby the national co-ordinators
relied on senior students. In some countries, data collection was subcon-
tracted to survey companies (Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,
Kyrgyzstan, Poland, and Russia) whose work was supervised by the national
co-ordinator.
In most of the countries the full-fledged survey was administered during
the period January-March 1996. However, due to certain problems in terms
of funding in some countries, the survey was carried out somewhat later in
the year.
Data collection lasted from eight to ten weeks in each country and was
followed by the data entry and logical validation process. On average,
fieldwork lasted four months including translation of the questionnaire,
sampling, data collection and preparation of the data set for delivery. A final
report was prepared by each national co-ordinator.
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3 The questionnaire starts with a few questions for the primary respondent in the household and then
continues with questions for the member of the household whose birthday is next
Sample sizes
Sample sizes in the ICVS are small by the standards of most ‘bespoke’
national crime surveys. However, the decision to accept relatively modest
samples was carefully made. It was considered simply unrealistic to assume
a sufficient number of countries would participate if costs were too high
(especially as some countries had their own ‘bespoke’surveys). The value of
the ICVS rests on the breadth of countries which have participated; this would
have been considerably reduced if costs had been higher.
Modest sample sizes produce relatively large sampling error, but for
straightforward comparisons of national risks, samples of 1,000 or more
suffice to judge broad variations in levels of crime across country. This is
even more true for city or urban area only samples. Modest samples, however,
restrict the scope for analysis issues about which a small proportion of the
sample would provide information.
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Type City
National
survey
City
survey
Townsize
not coded
Urban
area
Rural
area
Albania
1996
Austria
1996
Belarus
1997
Belgium
1989
1992
Bulgaria
1997
Canada
1989
1992
1996
Czech Republic
1992
1996
Croatia
1997
England & Wales
1989
1992
1996
Estonia
1992
1995
Finland
1989
1992
1996
France
1989
1996
Georgia
1992
1996
Germany(West)
1989
Hungary
1996
Italy
1992
Kyrgyzstan
1996
Latvia
1996
1507
.
2060
1485
.
2074
2152
2134
1262
1801
.
2006
2001
2171
1000
1173
1025
1655
3830
1502
1003
.
.
5274
.
2024
.
.
1200
.
999
.
.
1076
.
.
.
.
.
994
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1395
1137
.
756
.
1750
1411
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1395
.
.
.
.
.
.
983
433
999
123
242
1076
968
683
702
237
717
994
628
496
559
457
364
222
420
977
347
199
.
567
1523
756
550
1494
1011
217
1074
0
1937
1243
0
1106
1469
1432
1025
1084
0
1378
1505
1612
543
809
803
1235
2853
1155
804
0
570
3751
0
1474
256
400
Table E2 lists the countries participating in the ICVS, in what year, type of survey
(nationwide or capital city) and the number of urban and rural cases.
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Type City
National
survey
City
survey
Townsize
not coded
Urban
area
Rural
area
Lithuania
1997
FYR Macedonia
1996
Malta
1997
Netherlands
1989
1992
1996
Northern Ireland
1989
1996
Norway
1989
Poland
1992
1996
Romania
1996
Russian Fed.
1992
1996
Scotland
1989
1996
Slovakia
1992
1997
Slovenia
1992
1997
Spain
1989
1993
1994
Sweden
1992
1996
Switzerland
1989
1996
Ukraine
1997
United States
1989
1992
1996
Yugoslavia
1996
1176
.
1000
2000
2000
2008
2000
1042
1009
2033
3483
.
.
.
2007
2194
508
.
.
2053
2041
.
.
1707
1000
1000
1000
.
1996
1501
1003
.
.
700
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1091
1002
1018
.
.
.
1105
1000
.
.
1634
1505
.
.
.
.
1000
.
.
.
1094
.
.
1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
656
700
543
386
409
434
.
262
145
666
1073
1000
1002
1018
484
353
21
1105
1000
1107
895
842
920
327
234
128
110
1000
390
354
193
1094
520
0
456
1614
1591
1574
2000
780
864
1367
2410
91
0
0
1523
1841
487
0
0
946
1146
792
585
1380
766
872
890
0
1606
1147
810
0
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